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HOLLAR, WARREN L., Ed.D. The Legal Aspects of Private Use 
of Public Elementary and Secondary School Facilities. (1984) 
Directed by Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. pp. 255. 
This study is an investigation of the legality of 
private use of public elementary and secondary school fa-
cilities during nonschool hours as determined by the laws 
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia; addition-
ally, analysis ot selected court cases relevant to the issue 
are presented. 
The following conclusions were reached: 
1. Decisions of courts are made in light of 
statutory and constitutional issues re-
lating to specific uses. 
2. Courts will not interfere with de-
cisions .of local school boards unless 
violations of statutory and consti-
tutional issues are found. 
3. School authorities may prohibit use 
that interferes with the regular 
school program. 
4. Temporary, casual, and incidental use 
of school property is allowed under 
board discretion. 
5. School boards must not allow use in an 
arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, 
or illegal manner. 
6. School boards may deny all requests for 
use when allowed by statutes. 
7. Permissability of use by religious groups 
is evaluated .in light of the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
8. Once school boards open facilities to 
use by political groups, constitutional 
rights of freedom of speech, assembly, 
and access to a public forum must not 
be abridged. 
9. School boards and state legislatures 
cannot require nonsubversive oaths as 
a condition for use. 
10. Burden of proving a group is subversive 
or may damage school property belongs to 
the school board. 
11. School facilities cannot be used for com-
mercial purposes when the primary purpose 
is personal gain. 
12. School boards have a legal right to oper-
ate school stores and cafeterias. 
13. School facilities cannot be leased for 
permanent businesses on school grounds. 
14. School boards must operate within their 
own rules and regulations, statutory en-
titlement·, state constitutions, and the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Legality of .. private use of school property continues 
to be in a state of flux because of the diversity of state 
statutes. Generally, decisions relating to private use 
are made first in light of state statutes and state con-
stitutions and then in light of prevailing rulings con-
cerning the United States Constitution. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Use of public school facilities by private groups is a 
much litigated question in recent times. Citizens frequently 
request use of school facilities because of the prevailing 
attitude that "school buildings belong to citizens because 
they were paid for with tax dollars."1 School boards and ad-
ministrators who receive requests from private groups must 
address requests in view of the many legal implications pre-
sented by state statutes and litigation. 
School officials have attempted to conserve school sys-
tern resources for student use and concurrently to acquiesce 
to demands of current political and economic conditions 
which invite shared decision-making in school operations. 2 
Many state legislatures have taken the broad view of com-
munity use of school facilities as a method to win broader 
support for public schools.3 N. L. Engleh~rdt placed the 
question of school use in this perspective: 
!Phillip K. Piele and James R. Forsberg, School Property: 
The Legality of Its Use and Disposition (Topeka, Kansas: 
National Organization of Legal Problems in Education, 1974), 
p. 4. 
2Ann M. Dellinger, North Carolina School Law: The 
Principal's Role (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Institute of Govern-
ment, 1981), p. 86. 
3"Turn your Schools into Centers of Community Activity, 
and Wi.n Broader Citizen Support," Tf>~ An}._~rican School Board 
.Jourr~ 11ay, 1982, p. 35. 
In a democracy, is enhancing the life 
opportunities of its citizens important in 
terms of the cost of reducing the service 
life of its physical properties?4 
A review of state statutes indicates a movement toward 
answering Englehardt's question positively. States vary 
widely in staiutory regulations. Court decisions have 
2 
varied widely in the interpretation of statutory provisions. 
Because of divergent statutes, litigation, and use requests, 
school officials have been seeking a clear definition of the-
various legal principles established by state legislatures 
and courts to establish guidelines for use by nonstudent 
groups. 
The study of state statutes and judicial decisions has 
helped many school boards and administrators to understand 
the complexity of legal issues as well as their responsibility 
for permitting private use of public school facilities. Their 
understanding of what kinds of requests for use of school fa-
cilities are being made and why is important. If school ad-
ministrators are aware of controversial issues and how they 
have been addressed previously, their ability to deal with 
issues without great harm coming to policy making and admini-
strative processes should be enhanced. Indeed, if contra-
versies cannot be solved locally, lengthy judicial processes 
4N. L. Englehardt, flannin~ the Community School (Boston: 
American Book Company, 1940), p. vii. 
may result. This study is designed to contribute to positive 
local solutions to questions of private use of public school 
facilities. 
Status of Private Use of Public School Facilities 
School properties and facilities represent an investment 
of well over one hundred billion dollars in the United States. 5 
Individual units of this investment are at once an adult edu-
cation center, a recreation building, a political arena, a 
lyceum, a forum, and a neighborhood school, as well as a fa-
cility for education of the young.6 
Inasmuch as public education is a state function, public 
school property is state property held in trust for the state 
by the local school authority. 7 Whatever authority school 
boards have over school property is conferred by the state.s 
State governments are vested with plenary control over 
educational policy.9 States commonly express educational 
SE. Gordon Gee and David J. Sperry, Education Law and 
the Public Schools: A Compendium (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
Inc., 1981), p. S-2. 
6M. Chester Nolte, Guide to School Law (West Nyack, New 
York: Parker Publishing Company, 1969), p. 144. 
7Lee 0 Garber and Newton Edwards, The Law Governing 
School Propertv and School Building Construction (Danville: 
The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1964), p. 3. 
sibid. 
9Lee 0 Garber and Newton Edwards, The Public School in 
Our Governmen~al Structure (Danville, Illinois: The Inter-
s t a t e P u b l i s h e r s e. n d -p :: T-: t. r:.: ' s , I n c • , l 9 7 0 ) • p • 9 • 
3 
policy through legislation which often provides "ends" and 
"means". 10 Subject to constitutional limitations,_ state 
legislatures have complete power to develop educational 
policy.ll 
4 
In general, the governments of the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia leave decisions on use of school fa-
cilities by private groups to the discretion of local 
school boards. 12 However, California, one of five states 
with public use mandated, has a statute which reads: 
There is a civic center at each and 
every public school building and grounds 
within the state ••• 13 
Statutes vary from California's which flatly states that 
facilities will be used, to varying degrees of discretion.l4 
Where statutes detail requirements or limitations, school 
board discretion is presumably limited to determining whether 
specific applications for use are appropriate.l5 
Litigation often develops in instances where, because 
statutes are silent on allowable uses of facilities, school 
lOibid, p. 10. 
1 lrbid, p. 11. 
12Edward Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure 
(Cincinnati: W.H. Anderson Company, 1973), p. 179. 
13california Education Code, 16556. 
14Piele and Forsberg, p. 3. 
15rtid. 
5 
boards are forced to use discretionary authority which may be 
challenged. 16 Most school districts have been granted either 
specific or implied authority to manage and control school 
buildings and grounds.l7 
Discretion granted school officials must not be abused 
or exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 18 His-
torically, courts have not interfered with decisions of 
school authorities regarding use of school facilities unless 
discretion is ab~sed.l9 
In general, no legal recourse for individuals or groups 
denied use of school buildings is provided in the absence of 
state statutes.20 In most cases which question school board 
authority over school facility use, courts have turned to 
state constitutions and state legislation.21 Conversely, 
cases which deal with constitutional rights such as freedom 
of speech and religion and equal protection have been viewed 
16E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., Schools and the Law (Reston, 
Virginia: National Association of Secondary School Prin-
cipals, 1981), p. 82. 
17LeRoy J. Peterson and others, The Law and the Public 
School Operation (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), 
p. 169. 
18Peterson. and others, p. 171. 
19Ibid. 
20Bolmeier, p. 179. 
21Piele and Fosberg, p. 5. 
in light of leading interpretations of the United States 
Conf,titution.22 
Short-term use of facilities by religious organiza-
tions for educational, cultural, or even· some religious 
purposes,23 has been upheld. Courts in various locations 
have permitted religious groups to use school facilities 
for worship during nonschool hours on the same basis as 
nonreligious groups. 24 In Country Hills Christian Church 
v. Unified School District Number 512 and Resnick v. East 
Brunswick Township Board of Education, courts ruled: 
The secular purpose of maintaining school 
facilities as open forums for community 
activities during non-school hours, that 
activities under such policies are suf-
ficiently divorced from the official ac-
tivities during the school day to avoid 
the implica~ions of official school support, 
and that such open door ~olicies require no 
entangling supervision.25 
6 
Use by political and subversive groups has further com-
plicated private use of public school facilities. Uncon-
stitutional bars to groups whose beliefs and doctrines are 
22Ibid. 
23Richard D. Gatti and Daniel J. Gatti, New Encyclopedic 
Dictionary of School Law (West Nyack, New York: Parker Pub-
lishing Company, 1983), p. 71. 
24Benjamin Sendor, "The Wall Between Preaching and 
Teaching in the Public Schools,'' School Law Bulletin 15 
(July, 1983). p. 6. 
disapproved by school boards have frequently resulted in 
litigation. Chester Nolte clarified constitutional con-
cerns: 
The distinction between freedom of 
expression on a theoretical plane and ex-
pression that presents clear and present 
danger must be clearly maintained. The 
former is everywhere protected by the 
First Amendment, but the latter is every-
where prohibited.26 
School officials have often been forced to determine 
whether free enterprise will be hindered by particular 
uses. While the courts have been in agreement that fa-
cilities cannot be used for personal gain, questions have 
arisen as to whether gain has come from incidental use.27 
Questions have also been raised concerning legality of 
school stores and cafeterias.28 Whatever their nature, 
questions continue to be raised concerning the nature of 
school property and constitutional and statutory rights 
for private use of school property. 
~ 
I 
This study, then is significant in that it provides 
educational leaders an analysis of the legal aspects of use 
of public school facilities by private groups. Furthermore, 
26Nolte, p. 145. 
27Peterson and others, pp. 174-175. 
8 
the study provides historical perspective on a variety of 
judicial decisions as well as a review of state statutes 
dealing with private use of school facilities. The study 
may also provide direction to school districts when questions 
concerning facility use arise. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine the legality 
or private use of public elementary and secondary school 
facilities through analysis of statutory provisions of the 
fifty states and District of Columbia and through analysis 
of selected court cases. This study is being developed in 
a factual manner. It will deal with the legal questions, 
and no attempts will be made to relate these questions to 
social or economic factors. To serve as guidelines for 
the conduct of the study, the following basic questions 
were formulated: 
1. What are the major legal issues regarding pri-
vate use of public elementary and secondary 
school facilities? 
2. What major legal principles emerge from land-
mark judicial decisions that are applicable to 
the statutory provisions of the states? 
3. Based on recent court cases, what issues re-
lated to private use of public school facili-
ties are being litigated, and are likely to be? 
4. What trends can be determined from analysis of 
statutory provisions of the states? 
5. Based on established legal precedents, what are 
the legally acceptable criteria for private use 
of public school facilities? 
Scope of the Study 
This is a historical study of the legal ramifications 
of private use of public elementary and secondary school 
facilities as determined by the laws of each state and 
analysis of selected court cases. The research describes 
the extent to which private use of public elementary and 
secondary schools for nonschool purposes has been challenged 
and litigated, the reasons for the litigation, and the re-
sults or effects of the judicial decisions. 
Legal questions arising from long-term lease of fa-
cilities are not addressed. No research is presented in 
the areas of tort liability during nonschool use, use of 
school buses for private purposes, the legality of private 
schools using public school facilities, or the legality of 
released-time programs for sectarian purposes. 
Methodology 
The basic research technique of this historical research 
study was to examine and analyze the avail~ble references con-
cerning the legal aspects of private use of public and 
secondary school facilities. 
10 
In order to determine whether a need existed for such 
research, a search was made of Dissertation Abstracts 
for related topics. A computer search from the Edu-
cational Resource Information Center (ERIC) was also 
completed to determine related dissertation topics. 
Journal articles related to the topic were located 
through use of such sources as Reader's Guide to Peri-
odical Literature, Education Index, Index to Legal 
Periodicals, and the Legal Resource Index. 
General research summaries were found in the En-
cyclopedia of Educational Research, various books and 
guides to school law, and in a review of related litera-
ture obtained through a computer search from Educational 
Resource Informa~ion Center (ERIC). 
Federal and state court cases related to the topic 
were located through use of the Corpus Juris Secundum, 
American Jurisprudence, the National Reporter System, 
American Digest System, and Shephard's Citations. Recent 
court cases were found by examining case summaries con-
tained in issues of the Nolpe School Law Reporter. All 
of the cases were read and placed in categories corre-
sponding to issues noted from the general literature 
review. 
ll 
Definition of Terms 
For the purposes of this study, the following selected 
terms are defined: 
Commercial use: any use by a group having financial 
profit as the primary aim. 
Community school program: the composite of those 
educational, cultural, social, and recreational services 
provided to the citizens of a community exclusive of those 
services normally provided through the regular instructionql 
program. 
Political use: use by any organization of individuals, 
parties, or interests that seek to control the appointment 
of those who manage the affairs of a state. 
Private group: any group not affiliated with the 
public schools. 
Private purposes: any activity not associated with 
the regular school program. 
Public school: any school established under law of 
the state (usually regulated in matters of detail by local 
authorities), maintained at the public expense by taxation, 
and open with or without charge to the children of all the 
residents of the district. 
Public school facility: any educational facility 
under the jurisdiction of a local school board, whether 
termed an elementary school, middle school, junior high 
school, high school~ or union school. 
12 
Religious use: use of school facilities by sectarian 
groups. 
Subversive use: use by any group advocating the 
overthrow of the government of the United States or any 
state by force, violence, or other unlawful means. 
Design of the Study 
This study is an investigation of the legality of 
private use of public elementary and secondary school 
facilities as determined by analysis of the statutes of 
the fifty states and District of Columbia and selected 
court decisions. Chapter I serves as an introduction 
which establishes the existence of a valid question, 
describes the scope and design of the study, and defines 
pertinent terms. 
The remainder of the study is divided into four major 
parts. Chapter II contains a review of related literature 
on the use of public elementary and secondary school fa-
cilities by private groups. 
Chapter III encapsulates a thorough review and analysis 
of statutory provisions of the fifty states and District of 
Columbia concerning private use of public elementary and 
secondary school facilities. The information in the 
statutes is presented in a continuum ranging from mandated 
use to broad dis~retion by local boards. Examples of per-
mitted uses are presented in tabular form; use by religious, 
political, and subversive groups is discussed. Co3plete 
codes to all statutory provisions are included in ~~e 
Appendices. 
13 
Chapter IV includes a·narrative discussion of ~~e 
major legal issues relating to private use of publ~~ ele-
mentary and secondary school facilities. An atte=~~ is 
made in this chapter to show the relationships bet~~en 
legal issues and state statutory provisions and i~ some 
cases federal constitutional issues. 
Chapter V contains a general review, analysis, and 
discussion of selected court cases and landmark decisions, 
which have increased private use of public elemen~a~y and 
secondary school facilities. 
The final chapter contains a summary and concl~sions 
obtained from review of literature, review of stac~~es, 
and review of court decisions. Finally, legally a=ceptable 
criteria for private use of public elementary and secondary 
school facilities are provided. 
14 
Chapter II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The expanded use of school facilities is a product of 
changes in American society. Traditionally, schools in 
rural areas were made available to citizens who assembled 
for civic, educational, or social purposes. Often the 
schools were the only facilities available for community 
use. Because the educational process was confined strictly· 
to instruction of an academic nature and the number of or-
ganizations requesting use was small, such use could be 
allowed. 1 
As educational purposes expanded to include a variety 
of extracurricular activities, school boards began to con-
done a variety of activities in school buildings. Expanded 
use included athletic contests, science fairs, adult classes, 
parties, etc.2 
The civic center movement opened schools to further 
public use. Community discussion led to more efficient use 
of public school space including extended library services, 
adult classes, little theatre, and similar activities. 
1M. Chester Nolte, "Courts Becoming More Liberal Per-
mitting Non-School Use of Public School Buildings", American 
School Board Journal, February, 1966, pp. 63-64. 
2rbict. 
15 
The number of groups in society has increased tremen-
dously. As taxpayers, members of these groups have looked 
to public schools as public property available for their 
private use. Increased legal and community pressure on 
school boards has resulted. Therefore, a review of the 
historical development of public attitudes and consequent 
development of legal trends is valuable to this study. 
Use of Early American School Buildings 
The design of American schools in seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century America had progressed little beyond 
ancient Greek ideas. 3 During the Hellenistic era (500 B.C.-
200 B.C.) school buildings did not exist as we know them to-
day. Instructions were generally conducted in the open air, 
sometimes in the shadow of temples, or in enclosures barely 
protecting students from the elements. Meeting places were 
not important to instruction. 4 In early America, schools 
were still .basically shelters in which pupils and teachers 
came together, although they did include some furniture--
benches and tables for students and a podium for the teacher. 5 
3Basil Castaldi, The Evolution of Educational Facilities 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1977), pp. 8-9. 
4Edgar W. Knight, Education in the United States (3rd 
ed.; Boston: Ginn and Company, 1951), p. 416. 
SEllwood P. 
Stat~:.§., (Boston: 
One-room schoolhouses of early America were not 
strictly limited to use by children. School buildings 
were the community's responsibility and could in case 
of need be used as shelter, storehouse, and emergency 
hospital. 6 Variety of use was necessary in early days 
for survival of the community.7 
.l6 
According to Ellwood P. Cubberley, in rural districts 
"a weather-boarded box" or an old log schoolhouse, with 
two or three windows on each side, a few wooden benches, 
and an unjacketed stove in the middle of the room, 
answered all needs. Many buildings were also in sad re-
pair because funding was sparse. 8 
Even in cities, building conditions were poor well 
into the middle of the nineteenth century. Edgar Knight 
described: 
The great majority of the schools of 
New York State in 1844 were officially 
described ••• as naked and deformed, in 
comfortless and dilapidated buildings with 
unhung doors, broken sashes, absent panes, 
stilted benches, yawning roofs and muddy 
moultering floors ••• Only one-third of 
the schoolhouses were reported in good re-
pair, another third in comfortable circum-
6Building for School and Community (Paris: Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1978), 
p. 11. 
7Ibid. 
Bcubberley~ op. cit. p. 328. 
stances, while more than 3,300 were unfit 
for reception of man or beast.9 
Nineteenth Century Use 
Educational Trends 
In nineteenth-century America, some major changes in 
attitudes concerning education and schools came about. 
The industrial revolution created a radical shift in 
school functions. Enormous numbers of new jobs requir-
ing specialized training were created.10 As organized 
labor developed, it struggled against conditions which 
permitted children to work long hours in factories.ll 
The first free, graded elementary schools appeared 
in the United States about 1848.12 The 1872 landmark 
Kalamazoo case virtually settled the issue of establish-
ing a tax-supported free public school system in the 
United States. While, much remained to be done to de-
velop effective free public schooling, American public 
17 
schools--supported by general taxation, freed from pauper-
9Knight, op. cit., p. 417. 
lOEdgar W. Knight, Twenty Centuries of Education, 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940), p. 233. 
llJohn C. Almack, Modern School Administration: Its 
Problems and Progress, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1933), pp. iv-v. 
12Guide for Planninll" Edt!_f-ational Facilities, op. cit., 
p. 11. 
school taint, free to all, under direction of representa-
tives of _the people, and independent from sectarian con-
trol--had permanently been established through efforts 
·of many educational leaders.l3 
In Public Education in the United States, Ellwood P. 
Cubberley outlined reasons for development as follows: 
Up to the time of our Civil War we 
were engaged in the laying of foundations 
and establishing principles of action ••• 
The great stream of immigration which has 
come to our shores, the vast industrial 
revolution which has taken place, the 
destruction of the old-type home, the 
virtual disappearance of the apprentice-
ship system of training, the institution 
of compulsory education, new conceptions 
as to the education of delinquents and 
defectives, new child welfare legislation, 
and the rise of a rural-life problem of 
great dimensions--these are the important 
changes and forces which have necessitated 
extensive modifications in almost every as-
pect of educational service. To enable our 
schools to meet these new problems of our 
changing democratic life we have been forced 
to change and adart our schools to the new 
needs of society. 4 
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In 1791, the Tenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution provided "powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
13cubberley, op. cit., pp. vii-viii. 
14rbid. 
the people."lS The Tenth Amendment placed responsibility 
for ~ublic education upon the states. Education in the 
earlier days of American "history had a local origin and 
was organized from the communi~y and upward. As states 
began to exert contrdl over education, educational 
standards were developed that could be tested through 
litigation. 1 6 
When states decided that schools should be free and 
equally open to all, an end was put to tuition charges, 
and the concept that public schools were only for poor 
people disappeared. When states ruled schools should be 
free of church control, limits on public aid to denomi-
19 
national schools were established. State compulsory atten-
dance legislation ~uperseded the authority of parents in 
deciding the importance of providing education for chil-
dr·en.17 
Legal Trends 
Numerous legal issues arose from the development of 
free public school systems. Questions on private use of 
school facilities were present even during the late nine-
teenth century. 
lSu. S. Constitution, Amend. X. 
16cubber1ey, An Intxoduction to the Studv of Education, 
(Boston~ Houghton Mi£flin,.l933), p • .57. 
1 7 Ibid, pp. 58-60 
Early concepts of use of facilities were that the 
schools were public corporations of the state for the 
primary purpose of educating the young. 1 8 The opinion 
of the courts appeared to be that school buildings were 
to be used only for educational instruction. And while 
this opinion was firmly held, the only relaxation of this 
attitude was toward inclusion of private educational in-
20 
struction which could take place in public school buildings, 
but only after regular school hours.l9 
Court rulings give evidence to the opinion that fa-
cilities could be used only for school purposes. 
v. School District Number 47, the justices ruled: 
that a school district would have no 
authority to_construct a school building to 
accommodate societies, lecturers, dramatic 
exhibits, or for any other purpose other 
than that of a district town school.20 
In George 
The Chaplin v. Hill case held that a school district 
had authority to permit a private school to be conducted on 
public school premises provided no public school instruction 
was being given at the time.21 
18M. Chester Nolte, "Board has Right and Duty to Pre-
determine that School Premises Shall not be used in Contra-
vention of the Law," American School Board Journal, March 1 
1965, pp. 59-60. 
19American Law Report, Vol. 94, p. 1277 (1967). 
20George v. School District Number 47, 6 Met. 497, 
(Massachusetts) (1843). 
These two cases followed trends developed in other 
states during this era. The court rendered the following 
opinion in School District Number 8 v. Arnold: 
The statute has not given the board, 
nor the electors of the district, any au-
thority to permit a schoolhouse to be 
used for meetings of the Sons of Temperance, 
or anything of this kind • . This action 
of the electors in voting that the Sons of 
Temperance might have the use of the school-
house to hold their sessions in, was doubt-
less taken upon the notion that as the 
schoolhouse was the property of the district, 
the electors might permit it to be used for 
such purposes as they might think proper. 
But although the schoolhouse is the property 
of the district, it does not follow that the 
electors may divert it from its original use. 
There may be others besides the electors 
interested in the school building, and whose 
rights would be affected. Tax-paying females, 
non-resident taxpayers and others might have 
reason to complain if the building was used 
for other than school purposes. Certainly the 
schoolhouse is not property of the electors 
in such a sense that they may control its use 
as they would that of their own property.22 
21 
During the same time in Connecticut, a school district, 
which was authorized by statute to build and maintain public 
schools and to levy taxes for that purpose, voted to con-
struct a school buidling containing a hall to be used for 
school society meetings and lectures. The court in Shelton 
v. Centre School District maintained: 
the uses of the hall did not render 
the vote illegal inasmuch as school society 
22school District Number 8 v. Arnold, 21 Wisconsin 
665 (Wisconsin) (1867). 
meetings were not customarily held fre-
quently, and it could be assumed that 
the giving of lectures for ~~ults would 
be an occasional happening. 
Chaplin v. Hill and Russell v. Dobbs helped establish 
that a public schoolhouse could be used for the purpose of 
.giving instruction at a time other than regular instruc-
tional periods. But the court pointed out that private 
instruction could not be accepted for a set duration of 
time and thereby declared it not fixed in duration.24 
For the next quarter century, as seen in cases ranging 
from New England to the midwest region, trends of limited 
private use of school facilities seemed to prevail. In 
Kansas in 1875, the courts directed that schools could not 
be used for nonschool purposes: 
The publi~ school house cannot be 
used for any private purposes. The argu-
ment is a short one. Taxation is invoked 
to raise funds to erect the building; but 
taxation is illegitimate to provide for 
any private purpose. Taxation will not 
lie to raise funds to build a place for a 
religious society, a political society, or 
a social club. 
What cannot be done directly, cannot 
be done indirectly. As you may not levy 
taxes to build a church, no more may you 
levy taxes to build a schoolhouse and 
then lease it for a church. Nor is it an 
23Shelton v. Centre School District, 25 Connecticut 224 
(Connecticut) (1865). 
24chaplin v. Hill, 24 Vermont 528 (Vermont) (1852): 
Russell v. Dobbs, 37 Vermont 497, (Vermont) (1865). 
· answer to say that its u~e for school pur-
poses is not interfered with, and that the 
use for the other purposes work little, 
perhaps no immediately - perceptable in-
jury to the buildi~g, and results in the 
receipt of impecuniary benefit. The 
character of the use is the only legiti-
mate question. A municipal bond of five 
cents in aid of a purely private purpose, 
is as void as one of a thousand dollars, 
and that, too, though the actual benefit 
to the municipality far exceeds the amount 
of the bond. The use of a single religious 
or political gathering is legally as unauth-
orized as its constant use therefor.25 
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Essentially the same judicial concept was assumed by a 
Pennsylvania court in the 1897 Bender v. Streabich decision. 
The court found: 
Although the use of school buildings 
by the community at large for the holding 
of meetings for public discussion of gene-
ral interest might be educational in 
nature, such use was not that intended by 
law. The public school system was designed 
for the exclusive benefit of youthful stu-
dents and that school premises could not 
be used for any purpose not directly re-
lated to their instruction.26 
Early Twentieth-Century Use 
Educational Trends 
The twentieth century brought new consciousness about 
the role of education. The efforts and ideals of society 
25spencer v. Joint School District, 22 American Re-
porter 268 (Kansas) (1875). 
26Bnnder ~t b' h ~ _ v. __ rea 1c , 37 Atlantic 853 (Pennsylvania) 
(1397). 
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are symbolized through two ideas--democracy and education. 
Democracy represents the goal and education represents the 
instrument fo~ attainment of the goal.2 7 
Several educational theorists continued to question 
ways newly developed systems of free public schools could 
be improved. Influences of such men as John Dewey, Johann 
Heinrich Pestalozzi, and William James resulted in more 
liberal approaches to education. 28 Creative participation, 
the learning-by-doing concept, quickly replaced earlier 
passive recitation and rote memorization. Observation, 
investigation, discussion, evaluation, and self-expression 
opened doors not only to new instructional methods but to 
whole new ideas of community participation in the educa-
tional process.29 In 1900, John Dewey, writing in his 
widely read School and Society, planted the idea of ex-
panded services of public schools by saying: "Learning 
certainly, but living primarily and learning through and 
in relation to this living.n30 
27Ellwood P. Cubberley and Edward C. Elliott , State 
and County School Administration, (New York: Macmillan, 
1915), p. 3. 
28El1wood W. Cubberley, An Introduction to the Study 
of Education, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933), 
p. 12. See also Cremin, Lawrence. The Transformation of the 
School (New York: Random House, 1961). 
29Guide fer Planning Educacional Facilitie~~, (Columbus, 
Ohio: Council of Educational Facility Planners, 1969), p. 12. 
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Expansion of tax-supported public school systems in 
the early twentieth century aided understanding of the 
real meaning of public education. Cubberley and Elliott, 
in State and County School Administration, defined the 
purpose of public education as: 
any socially organized project which 
has for its justification the communizing 
of intelligence--the essential prerequisite 
for the attainment of popular culture; 
whether the culture be expressed in terms 
of a bettered physical condition of life, a 
higher standard of social conduct, an en-
larged sphere of common appreciation and 
s~m~ath3i or an improved economic produc-
tJ.vJ.ty. 
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Progressive education, although a controversial move-
ment, stimulated a variety of innovations and vigorous 
public interest iri all activities of public schools. Ex-
pansion of the role of public schools gained impetus 
through a number of early laws promoting wider use of 
school facilities. In 1911, Wisconsin authorized school 
directors to establish "evening schools, vacation schools, 
reading rooms, library stations, debating clubs, gymnasiums, 
public playgrounds, public baths, and similar activities. 11 32 
Additional provisions included that "nonpartisan, nonsec-
tarian, and nonexclusive associations of citizens shall 
3lcubberley and Elliott, op. cit., p. 386. 
32clarence A. Perry, "Recent Progress in Wider Use of 
School Pla~.t:, n R£2g.E_'::..-.S':.:~ the_Uni~:d SJ;_at_::E.._fommi~sion~r 
.9_L.E d u c ·~~i2E~ ( \\: .:i ::: ;··!. -£. n g 1.: c.~;; ~ :) \ r,·~ ~ , l 9 :t 5 ; , ~l. ~· t+ 7 1 ;> 
have use of schoolhouses free of charge."33 
According to Charles Zeublin, by 1914, seventeen 
states had provided "wider-use" legislation--five in the 
East, five in the Midwest, four in the far West, and 
three in the South.34 Many of the "wider-use" statutes 
came as a result of the Community Center Movement which 
had an aim of "organizing America into a society where 
the schoolhouse is the society's home and clubhouse in 
each local unit."35 Neighborhood schools are agencies 
"through which the economic, social, intellectual, po-
litical, and religious conditions in neighborhoods were 
to be transformed according to the spirit of order, 
progress, and national well-being."36 
Ellwood Cubberley and Edward Elliot described ex-
panded use of school facilities during the era: 
It is obvious that the schoolhouse is in 
most communities used only during certain 
hours of the day, those hours when the rest of 
the community is busily engaged in bread-winning 
work • • • Inasmuch as the schoolhouses belonged 
to the community it was perfectly legitimate that 
33Ibid. 
34Edward W. Stevens, "Social Centers, Politics, and 
Social Efficiency in the Progressive Era," History of 
Education Quarterly, Spring, 1972, p. 16. 
35Ibid, p. 22. 
36rbid. 
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the community should use them for its own 
entertainment and schooling when the young 
p~ople were not occupying them, and that, 
therefore, it would be a good idea to have 
there all sorts of gatherings, for social 
purposes, for purposes of entertainment, 
for purposes of conference, for any legiti-
mate thing that might bring neighbors and 
friends together in the school houses.37 
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This new national awakening of the purposes of public 
schools and facilities brought an increase in the number 
of state statutes allowing expanded use. Accompanying the 
new statutes, many questions concerning legality of par-
ticular uses arose. 
Legal Trends 
Near the turn of the century and for the next thirty 
years, court cases indicated an opening of schools to com-
munities for a variety of purposes. Some of the activities 
accepted during this period have remained with public edu-
cation and become an integral part of the system. A number 
of cases, particularly in areas from the Midwest to the 
Pacific, have documented expansion of nonschool use. 
In the 1909 Lagow-v. Hill case, school directors wer~ sup-
ported in granting temporary use of an unused assembly hall 
when not occupied by schools for purposes of religious meet-
ings, Sunday Schools, evening schools, literary societies, 
37cubberley and Elliot, op. cit., p. 387. 
and civic groups such as Modern Woodmen, Odd Fellows, and 
Royal Neighbors. Organizations were permitted to use fa-
cilities for holding their meetings and conducting their 
fraternal affairs.38 
The court maintained in 1913 in Royce Independent 
School District v. Reinhardt that the school trustees 
could lease a portion of the school grounds to a private 
28 
organization for use as a baseball field during the summer 
recess of the school for "financial advantages accruing 
to the school district from the rentals.rr39 Financial 
advantage was also the reason given in the Cost v. Shinault 
case ~hich sustained the schoor district's right to lease 
property for a profit to benefit the school district.40 
Recreation was the issue in California in McClure v. 
Board of Education. A statute which permitted the citizens 
of the respective school districts, with permission from 
the school board, to use school buildings for recreational 
activities to include dancing as a form of social activity 
was upheld.41 The same was held to be true in Nebraska in 
38Laglow v. Hill, 87 N.E. 369 (Arkansas) (1914). 
39Royce Independent School District v. Reinhardt, 159 
S.W. 1010 (Texas) (1913). 
40cost v. Shinault, 166 S.W. 704 (Arkansas) (1914) 
41McClure ~. Board of Education, 176 Pacific 711 
(California) (1918). 
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Brooks v. Elder when a school board was permitted to allow 
supervised dances for students in a high school gymnasium 
after school hours.42 
A variety of cases were heard during this period. 
Trends were toward increased use by religious, political, 
cultural, social, and recreational use of school facilities. 
Modern Era: 1930 to Present 
Expanded Public Schools 
By the great depression of the 1930s teachers, prin-
cipals, curriculum supervisors, and superintendents had 
become well acquainted with concepts of early twentieth-
century educational reform through college classes and 
professional journals. Experimentation was considered 
evidence of professional competence; innovation was re-
warded with journalistic attention.43 
The stock market collapse and closing of banks in 
1931 partially paralyzed the nation. People were forced 
to apply their knowledge and inventiveness to the resources 
in their local communities. Many communities turned to 
42Brooks v. Elder, 134 (Nebraska) (1922). 
43Maurice F. Seay, Community Education: A Develop-
ing Concept (Hidland: Nichigan: Pendell Publishing Company, 
1974), p. 21. 
schools. for leadership during the emergency. Schools 
had buildings a~d equipment which were centrally located 
for convenience of families; they also had staffs which 
were familiar with innovation. Results varied, ·but 
there was renewed emphasis on school-community coope-
ration.44 
When another national emergency, World War II, came 
during the 1940s, many communities responded by develop-
ing cooperative programs of school use such as volunteer 
war service projects, adult evening classes, etc. 4 5 
The fifties brought the uneasy years of the 
30 
"cold war" and Russia's Sputnik and fear reactions in the 
United States. Pressure grew from citizens who thought 
schools should be"more efficient, more "accountable." The 
1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 
plunged public schools ·into the social commotion of inte-
gration.46 
Social upheaval in the sixties showed that the po-
litical and economic views of American people had diverged. 
The two ends of the spectrum--human needs and technological 
44Ibid., page 23. 
45Ibid., page 26. 
46Ibid. 
needs--tended to push schools to try to develop a mix of 
human values in American culture along with technological 
skills.47 
The decade of the seventies b~ought clearer under-
standing of the limitations of resources to meet both 
the technological needs and human needs. Litigation in 
31 
all areas of discretion of school boards increased during 
the decade. State legislatures chose to encourage facility 
use by private groups through passage of community school 
legislation in a number of states. New avenues for use 
also brought a coresponding amount of litigation question-
ing these avenues. 
Legal Issues Affecting Use of Facilities 
Reflecting the change in social concerns, during the 
mid-forties and early fifties almost entirely new issues 
dealing with private use of school facilities began to appear 
in the courts--issues such as overthrow of the government, 
controversial speakers, Communist groups, religious groups, 
danger to public order, and individual versus group use.48 
Goodman versus Board of Education in California 
established that a school board must prove that a group 
47Ibid., page 27. 
48American Law Reports, Vol. 94, p. 1280. 
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advocated the overthrow of the government by force, vio-
lence, or other unlawful means before it could be denied 
by statute from using school buildings as a meeting place.49 
Another case in California, Payroll Guarantee versus Board 
of Education, substantiated the previous case when the 
board had in its possession substantial evidence that at 
another meeting at which the same speaker had appeared 
there had been extended picket lines, boisterous disturb-
ances, noisy demonstrations, and public disorder.SO 
Several landmark decisions regarding use of school 
property occurred in 1946. One situation saw members of 
the San Diego Civic Liberties Committee filing an appli-
cation with the school board for use of a high school 
auditorium for a series of meetings on the general theme 
of ''The Bill of Rights in Postwar America." An affidavit 
saying they did not advocate the overthrow of the govern-
ment by force, violence, or other unlawful means was re-
quired with the application. The committee would not sign 
on the contention that this requirement ~nlawfully deprived 
citizens of rights of freedom of speech and peaceable 
49Goodman v. Board of Education of San Francisco United 
School District, 164 Pacific 2d. (California) (1941). 
50Pavroll Guarantee Association v. Board of Education 
of San Fr~ncisco United School District, 163 Pacific 2d 433 
(California) (1945). 
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assembly guaranteed by the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of California.Sl 
A resulting case, Danskin v. San Diego United School 
District, came to trial. The justices declared that al-
though the state was under no duty to make school buildings 
available for public meetings that once it had elected to 
do so, it could not then arbitrarily discriminate between 
different individuals or groups seeking to secure privilege 
of assembly and public discussion on school property. The · 
court quickly added that the state cannot prohibit persons 
or groups classified as subversive elements from exercising 
the rights of free speech and assembly at places where 
others are allowed to speak and assemble except under 
conditions of clear and present danger, and that they cannot 
be required to furnish proof that they are not subversive 
elements as a prior condition of.the right to assemble 
peaceably and engage in free discussion.52 
An increasing number of recent suits in state and 
federal courts have presented the question of whether 
public schools may constitutionally permit religious groups 
the use of unoccupied buildings, facilities, or grounds for 
51Danskiri v. San Diego Unified School District, 171 
Pacific 2d 885 (California) (1946). 
52Ibid. 
religious purposes during noninstructional hours. Cases 
have arisen as religious congregations have sought tempo-
rary use of unoccupied school buildings after school 
hours for worship services or religious instruction. In 
Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 
') I 
.J'+ 
School Tax District Number 1, the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that public schools could be used temporarily as a 
place of worship during nonschool hours. The court indi-
cated that its decision might have been different had the 
case involved a situation where a church contemplated 
permanent use of school facilities.S2 
In Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Edu-
cation, an action was brought charging that use of public 
school facilities by religious groups during noninstruc-
tional hours violated a state statute governing the operation 
of public school facilities and the federal and state consti-
tutions. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that religious 
groups which fully reimburse school boards for related out-
of-pocket expenses may use school facilities for religious 
services as well as educational classes. No violation of 
the establishment clause of the state constitution or the 
52southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees 
of School Tax District Number 1, 115 Southern 2d 697 
(Florida) (1960). 
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tripartite test developed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States was found.S3 
The Country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School 
District Number 512 case expanded these ideas to say that a 
school district could not, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, close their doors to groups wishing to rent facilities 
for the purpose of religious worship during nonschool hours. 54 
The establishment clause did not provide defense for the 
action according to the decision in the case. 
As a school board uses discretion in allowing use of 
school facilities, equal treatment of various groups is 
questioned. Such was the case in East Meadow Community 
Concerts Association v. Board of Education of Union Free 
School District Number 3. The action re~terated a school 
board's right not to make school buildings available unless 
mandated by statute. In the East Meadow decision the 
justices maintained that if a school board elected to make 
buildings available for private use, such use must be 
granted in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, 
equally applicable to all and administered with equality. 55 
53Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Education, 
389 Atlantic 2d (New Jersey) (1978). 
54country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School 
District Number 512 
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Legal_trends in the modern era are toward liberali-
zation of use of school facilities. The judicial system 
has played a major role in areas of constitutional rights, 
board responsibility to protect property, equal treatment, 
etc. Enabling legislation such as community education acts 
has presented new and fertile ground for litigation. Re-
cent decisions continue to fall back on state constitutions 
and statutes for broad determinations of use. Courts also 
continue to depend on the major interpretations of the 
United States Constitution when the questions deal with 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equal protection, 
and other constitutional issues. 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES CONCERNING 
PRIVATE USE OF ·PUBLIC AND 
SECONDARY SCHOOL FACILITIES 
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The legislatures of most states have enacted statutes 
providing guidelines for use of public school facilities 
by private groups. Laws range from very specific to very 
broad methods of expression. 
Three broad classifications appear from review of 
these statutes: (1) statutes mandating broad use of school 
facilities subject to school board regulations; (2) statutes 
describing use for specific or general purposes as allowed 
by local school boards; (3) statutes not specifically address-
ing conditions o~ private use. These are shown in Tables I, 
II, and III. 
The first classification (Table I) is composed of statutes 
with language mandating use by private groups. The intent of 
these statutes is that use will be granted subject to regu-
lations developed by local school boards. 
TABLE I 
STATES HAVING MANDATED USE STATUTES 
1. California 4. Ohio 
2. Hawaii 5~ Utah 
... ~ ~' Maryland 
Utah's statute is representative of a mandated~use 
statute: 
There shall be a civic center at all public 
school buildings and grounds where the citizens 
of the respective districts may engage in super-
viGed recreational activities, and where they may 
meet and discuss any and all subjects and questions 
which in their judgement may appertain to the edu-
cational, political, economic, artistic, and moral 
interests of the citizens of the community; but 
such use of public school buildings and grounds 
for such meetings shall in no wise interfere with 
any school function or purpose.! 
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Hawaii's relevant statute illustrates clearly the in-
tent to grant wide use: 
The fullest freedom shall be given citizens 
of the state to use for lawful purposes all pub-
lic school buildings throughout the state during 
the hours the structures are not in use for 
strictly educational purposes; provid~d, that 
the per~on v·e~ted with the proper authority 
over the building shall issue a permit to 
the applicant, when the proposed use is shown 
to be lawf~l by the applicant.2 
Maryland's statute is also indicative of this classi-
fication: 
If written application is made to the 
county superintendent, the county board 
shall provide for the use of a public school 
f "1' 3 ac~ ~ty ••• 
1Utah, Code Annotated (1981), vol. SB, chap. 53, Sec. 21-1. 
2Hawaii, Revised Statutes (1976), Vol. iv, sec. 298-24. 
3Maryland, Education Code Annotated (1978 and Supplement 
1983), Sec. 7-108. 
Table II shows that thirty-five states and the District 
of Columbia have statutes describing uses for specific or 
general purposes as allowed by local school boards. Lang-
uage in this category encourages use but does not mandate 
use. Typically, statutes included terms such as "may allow" 
or "may permit" instead of "shall allow". 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
. 5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
TABLE II 
STATUTES DESCRIBING GENERAL OR SPECIFIC PURPOSES AS 
ALLOWED BY LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS 
Alabama 13. Maine 25. North Dakota 
Alaska 14. Massachusetts 26. Oklahoma 
Arizona 15. Michigan 27. Oregon 
Arkansas 16. Minnesota 28. Pennsylvania 
Colorado 17. Mississippi 29. South Dakota 
Connecticut 18. Missouri 30. Texas 
Florida 19. Nebraska 31. Tennessee 
Illinois 20. Nevada 32. Virginia 
Indiana 21. New Hampshire 33. Washington 
Iowa 22. New Jersey 34. West Virginia 
Kansas 23. New York 35. Wisconsin 
Kentucky 24. North Carolina 36. District of 
Columbia 
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Section 162.050 of Kentucky Revised Statutes is repre-
sentative: 
The board of education of any school dis-
trict may permit the use of the schoolhouse 
whil~ school is n~t in session by any lawfui 
pub~1c assembly or educational, religious, 
agr1cultural, political, civic or social 
bodies under rules and regulations which the 
board deems proper.4 
Oklahoma's statute is very similar: 
The board of education of any school dis-
trict may, under such regulations and conditions 
as it may prescribe, open any school building 
and permit the use of any property belonging to 
such district for religious, political, lite-
rary, cultural, scientific, mechanical, or 
agricultural purposes, and other purposes of 
general interest and may make a reasonable 
charge to cover the cost of the use of such 
building and property.S 
New York has a very complete description of allowed 
uses at school board discretion: 
Section 16.414. Use of schoolhouse and grounds 
out of school hours. Schoolhouses and the grounds 
connected therewith and all property belonging to 
the district shall be in the custody and under the 
control and supervision of the trustees or board 
of education of the district. The trustees or 
board of education may adopt reasonable regulations 
for the use of such schoolhouses, grounds, or other 
property, when not in use for school purposes, for 
such other public purposes as are herein provided. 
Such regulations shall not conflict with the pro-
4Kentuckyt Revised Statu~es Annotated (1980), Vol, VII, 
Sec. 162.050. 
Soklahoma~ Statutes Annotated (1970). Title 70, Sec. 5-130. 
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visions of this chapter and shall conform to the 
purposes and intent of this section and shall be 
subject to review on appeal to the commissioner of 
education as provided by law. The trustees or board 
of education of each district may, subject to regu-
lations adopted as above provided, permit the use 
of the schoolhouse and rooms therein, and the 
grounds and other property of the district, when not 
in use for school purposes, for any of the following 
purposes: 
1. For the purpose of instruction in any 
branch.of education, learning of the arts. 
2. For public library purposes, subject to 
the provisions of this chapter, or as stations of 
public libraries. 
3. For holding social, civic, and recreational 
meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining· 
to the welfare of the community; but such meetings, 
entertainment and uses shall be nonexclusive and 
shall be open to the general public. 
4. For meetings, entertainments and occasions 
where admission fees are charged, when the proceeds 
thereof are to be expended for an educational or 
charitable purpose; but such use shall not be per-
mitted if such meetings, entertainments and occasions 
are under the exclusive control, and the said pro-
ceeds are t~ be applied for the benefit of a society, 
association or organization of a religious sect or 
denomination, or of a fraternal, secret or exclusive 
society or organization other than organizations of 
veterans of,the military, naval and marine service of 
the United States and organ~zations of volunteer 
firemen. 
5. For polling places for holding primaries 
and elections and for the registration of voters 
and for· holding political meetings. But no po-
litical meetings shall be permitted unless authorized 
by a vote of a district meeting, held as provided by 
law, or in cities by the board of education thereof. 
Except in cities, it shall be the duty of the trus-
tees or board of education to call a special meeting 
for such purposes upon the petition of at least ten 
percent of the qualified electors of the district. 
Authority so granted shall continue until revoked in 
like manner and by the same body as granted. 
6. For civic forums and community centers. 
Upon the petition of at least twenty-five citizens 
residing with the district or city, the trustees 
or board of education in each school district or 
city shall organize and conduct community centers 
for civic purposes ••• 6 
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As shown in Table III, ten states are without statues 
or have stat~tes not specifically addressing private use of 
school facilities. States in this classification generally 
have statutes that describe methods of accountability of 
school boards for control of school property. Lack of di-
rect statutes enhances discretionary power of local school 
boards to determine extent of use and regulations for pri-
vate use. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
TABLE III 
STATUTES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING PRIVATE USE OF 
SCHOOL FACILITIES 
Georgia 6. Idaho 
Montana 7. Louisiana 
South Carolina 8. New Mexico 
Wyoming 9. Rhode Island 
Delaware 10. Vermont 
The statutes in this classification often provide lists 
of suggested activities and arE! not compulsory in nature. 
School boards may or may not a:Llow the suggested activities. 
Other possible activities are not forbidden simply because 
they are not listed. Often school board authority is en-
6 !-! ew York . ~-(~~.::::~.~.-~:..'::'2~ .. -L!~~~-:_ (19 6 9) , v c 1 • 16 .• c h a. p • 16, 
S!~C., 41·4." 
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hanced through guidelines for development of rules and 
regulations. 
In South Carolina, lawmakers adopted Section 59-19-90 
which reads. 
"General powers and duties of school trus-
tees shall include ••• 
(5) Control school property. Take care of, 
manage, and control the school property of the 
district; 7 
Vermont legislators chose to enact requirements as 
follows: 
Each town district shall provide, furn-
ish, maintain and control schoolhouses suit-
able for schools.B 
Discretion in varying degrees is provided in each 
classification. In states with mandated-use statutes, 
school board discretion is limited to determining which 
uses fall into limited or permitted classifications. 
Greater freedom is allowed school boards when state legis-
latures create statutes with broad-use language. The 
latitude of discretion forces school boards to make a 
range of value judgments that frequently result in liti-
gation. 
A review of statutes listed in Appendix A shows uni-
formity in delegating a governmental body to enforce require-
ments of individual statutes. A Louisiana statute is typical 
7soutb Ce.ro l:i.na. ~::-~~ An.£2.!~ (1977), vol. 20, 
Sr:c ., 59- L 9-.. r~:.·~( 
.: ·_:·. 
:. '.' 
. I 
• ..... 'i.
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of the delegation to local school boards or boards of trus-
tees as administrators of statutory requirements. The statute 
provides: 
Each school board is authorized to make 
such rules and regulations for its own govern-
ment, not inconsistent with law or with the 
Louisiana St~te Board of Education, as it may 
deem proper. 
Statutes are also uniform in clarifying that private use 
may not interfere with regular operation. An Arkansas statute 
is indicative of this point: 
The facilities of any school district 
shall be used primarily for the purpose of 
conducting the regular school curriculum and 
related activities ••• 10 
Statutory Responsibility for Cost of Private Use 
Table IV denotes statutory intent for covering costs in-
curred by private use of school facilities. Seventeen states 
have chosen not to mention cost of use specifically, thus 
leaving school boards wide discretion to determine costs. 
Twenty-seven ~tate statutes make direct mention of user 
responsibility for costs incurred. Fourteen states provide 
funding from state sources for certain categories of use. 
Seven states provide funding through community school pro-
grams or civic center programs. 
9Louisiana, Revised Statutes Annotate~ (1982lr Vol. 13, 
Sec. 17.81. 
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TABLE IV 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COST OF PRIVATE USE 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COST OF PRIVATE USE 
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Statutes Allowing Religious Use 
Table V reveals sixteen states with laws specifically 
addressing use by religious groups. All sixteen states 
allow use of public school facilities for rel~gious meet-
ings under regulations determined by school boards or 
boards of trustees. 
TABLE V 
STATUTES SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING RELIGIOUS 
USE IN PROVISIONS 
1. Arizona 9. New Hampshire 
2. California 10. New York 
3. Illinois 11. North Dakota 
4. Kentucky 12. Ohio 
5. Maryland 13. Oklahoma 
6. Massachusetts 14. Oregon 
7. Michigan 15. Washington 
8. Minnesota 
California Education Code, is specific in describing 
allowed religious use: 
The conduct of religious services for 
temporary periods by any church or religious 
-· organization which have no suitable meeti,i-
place for the conduct of the services, pro-
vided the governing board charges the church 
or religious organizatibn using fhe school fa-
cilities or grounds, a fee ••• 1 -
---· --------· 
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TABLE VI 
EXAMPLES OF USES ALLOWED BY STATUTES 
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Florida X 
Georgia 
Hawaii X X X 
I 
Idaho 
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Indiana X X xi 1_} ' I l -----r- ---! ----, 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
EXAMPLES OF USES ALLOWED BY STATUTES 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
EXAMPLES OF USES ALLOWED BY STATUTES 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
EXAMPLES OF USES ALLOWED BY STATUTES 
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Chapter 122, Section 10-22.10 of the Illinois statutes 
is similar: 
.to have the control and supervision of 
all public school houses in their district, 
and to grant .the temporary use of them, when 
not occupied by schools, for religious meet-
ings and Sunday schools ••• 12 
In several of the sixteen states, legislation includes 
sections specifically stating that religious affiliation 
is not to be used to disqualify use. The Massachusetts 
statute reads: 
••• The affiliation of any association with 
a religious organization does not disqualify 
such association from being allowed such a 
use for such a purpose.l3 
Many state statutes include reference to rulings by 
attorney generals of the state. ''Notes of Decisions" 
accompanying Missouri Section 177.031 reads: 
.Public school boards may allow use of 
public scho~l property by churches • • • 
for civic, social, and educational purposes 
that do not interfere with prime purposes of 
school property ••• 14 
12Illinois, Annotated Statutes (1984) chap. 122, Sec. 
10-22.10. 
13Massachusetts, Annotated Statutes (1978), chap. 71, 
Sec. 71 
14Missouri, Annotated Statutes (1984), vo1. 21A, 
Sec. 177.031. 
Statutes Allowing Political Meetings or 
Use as Polling Places 
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Table VI indicates that twenty-six states permit use of 
school facilities for political purposes or as polling places. 
Statutes vary in descriptions of political or election use. 
Several allow political use only following a vote of the 
people. New York offers an excellent example: 
For polling places for holding primaries 
and elections and for the registration of 
voters and for holding political meetings. 
But no political meetings shall be permitted 
unless authorized by a vote of a district meet-
. 15 
~ng ••• 
State election codes often specify schoolhouses as 
precinct voting places. The Texas Election Code is indicative 
of codes allowing schoolhouses to be used for election 
purposes: 
In all cases where it is practicable 
to do so, all elections--general, specific, 
or primary--shall be held in schoolhouses, 
firehouses • • • No ch~rge shall be made 
for the building ••• lo 
Other states are more specific concerning the role of school 
boards in granting use to political groups. North Carolina 
General Statutes are very specific: 
The governing authority having control 
over schools or other public buildings which 
have facilities for group meetings, or where 
polling places are located, is hereby autho-
rized and directed to permit the use of such 
buildings with out charge, except custodial and 
utility fees, by political parties ••• for 
the express purpose of annual or biennial pre-
cinct meetings and count and district conventions. 
Provided that such use by political parties shall 
not be permitted at times when school is in 
session or which would interfere with normal 
school activities or functions normally carried 
on in such school buildings, and such use shall 
be subject to reasonable rules and regulations 
of the school boards and other governing authori-
ties _17 
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Still other states set limits on types of political groups 
which may use school facilities. Naryland's statute limits 
political groups which poll a ~ertain percentage of votes 
cast: 
Each county board may permit a partisan 
political organization that has polled 10 
percent or more of the entire vote cast in 
this State in the last general election to 
use public school facilities for programs and 
meetings that relate to a political campaign 
for nomination or election of a candidate to 
public office.l8 
State statutes sporadically prohibit use for political 
activity. Maine's legislature chose to say "use of school 
buildings may not be denied to a person solely because 
use is reques~ed for a ·political activity. 19 The 
North Dakota law provides equal protection to political 
17North Carolina, General Statutes (1983), Vol. 3A, 
Part 2, Sec. llSC-527. 
18Maryland, Education Code Annotated (1978 and 1983 Supple-
ment)t Sec. 7-loa: 
19Maine. BY~jsed Statutes Annorated (1983), Title 20-A, 
Sec. J.OOl. 
parties by stating "equal rights and privileges shall be 
accorded to all political parties."20 
Of the twenty-six states with statutes on political 
use or use as polling places, single word mention is the 
most common method of describing allowances. States with 
mandated-use statutes tend to have the most complete des-
criptions of political use. 
Statutes Allowing Use by Subversive Groups 
57 
Court cases involving use of school facilities by sub-
versive groups has prompted four states to enact statutory 
sections concerning subversive-group use. Although most 
cases have pertained to use of college and university 
campuses, California, Maryland, Nevada, and New York have 
statutes relating to public elementary and secondary school 
facilities. 
Section 393.0715 of the Nevada Revised Statutes is 
illustrative: 
No school property, buildings or grounds 
may be used to further any program or movement 
the purpose of which is to accomplish the over-
throw of the Government of the United States or 
of any state by force, violence or other unlawful 
means.Zl 
20North Dakota. Central Code, Vol. 3B, Sec. 15-35-14. 
21Nevada, Revised Statutes (1979), Vol. 16, Sec. 393.0715. 
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As in other areas, the California Education Code con-
tains complete guidelines for dealing with subversive groups, 
providing methods for determining intent as well as a form 
for statement of information.22 
Summary 
Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have 
statutes providing guidelines for private use of public 
school facilities. Laws range from very specific to very 
broad provisions. 
As shown in Table VI, thirty-four state legislatures 
have provided specific. examples of activities allowed in 
public school facilities by private groups, with educational 
and recreational uses most frequently cited. Thirty states 
have listed educational use and twenty-seven have listed 
recreational use. 
Authority for control and regulation of school facili-
t~es is usually vested in local school boards or boards of 
trustees. State constitutions often vest this power in local 
boards. Arizona's constitution is typical of this delegation; 
The general conduct and supervision of 
the public school system shall be vested in 
a State Board of Education, a State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, County Super-
intendent of Schools, and such governing 
22california, Education Code (1984), Vol. 27B, Sec. 
40044-40045. 
boards for the institutions as may be pro-
vided by law.23 
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Cost of use of school facilities ha~ been addressed by 
many state legislatures. Twenty-seven state statutes make 
direct mention of user responsibility for cost incurred. 
Fourteen states have some type of governmental funding of 
facility use by private groups. Wider discretion is pro-
vided in seventeen states by lack of statutory direction 
for payment of incurred costs. 
Sixteen states mention use by religious groups in 
statutes. All sixteen states authorize local school boards 
to determine use regulations. 
Twenty-six states cite use of school facilities for 
political purposes or as voting places. Descriptions in-
elude information on fees, regulations for use, and authority 
of school boards~ 
Although diversity best describes the statutes of the 
fifty states and District of Columbia, common factors include 
delegation of authority for control and regulation of school 
facilities and no interference with regular school programs. 
23Arizona~ Revised Statutes Annotated (1983) Vol. 1, 
Art. 2, Sec. 2. 
CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATE USE OF PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL FACILITIES 
As shown in Chapter III, statutes governing private 
use of school facilities vary greatly--from general to 
specific, and from strict to permissive. Most recent 
court decisions have tended to allow school boards broad 
discretion in types of private use allowed. 
60 
The purpose of Chapter IV is to review selected major 
legal issues relating to private use of public elementary 
and secondary schools. The relationship between state 
statutes and major litigation is investigated in four major 
parts of the chapter: (1) court decisions dealing with use 
of public school facilities by religious groups; (2) court 
decisions dealing with use of public school facilities by 
•. 
political or subversive groups; (3) court decisions dealing 
with use of facilities for commercial purposes; and (4) court 
decisions dealing with use of facilities for other than re-
ligious, political or commercial purposes. Each section 
of this chapter will have subsections to arrange categories 
of cases for greater clarity of presentation. 
Decisions Dealing with Religious Use 
Public schools have been a principal battleground for 
controversies dealing with church and state relationships. 
A number of suits heve arisen concerning questions of whether 
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public schools may constitutionally permit religious groups 
use of school facilities during noninstructional hours. 
The United States Supreme Court has had no occasion 
to rule on the constitutionality of voluntary religious 
meetings by religious groups on public school property 
during noninstructional hours. 1 In some states, courts 
have said religious use is allowed if there is no inter-
ference with the regular school program. Discretion is 
granted local school boards even in the absence of statutes: 
In other states, courts have ruled that religious use 
of public school facilities is not allowed unless permitted 
by specific statute or approved by voters of the district. 
Lack of harmony of state statutes has increased litigation 
in the area. Diversity of court rulings has resulted as 
courts have developed individual state statutory inter-
pretations. Pertinent cases show diversity of judicial de-
cisions, but also justify that many of the diverse rulings 
can be explained by reviewing the substantial differences 
in facts, statutes, or constitutional provisions involved in 
individual cases. 
The purpose of this section is to review selected cases 
and decisions to identify these diverse issues and principles 
as well as trends concerning private religious use of public 
~ 
;·Douglas I.J'. Abendroth, "Property: The Constitutional 
Dime n s i o 1~ o f 1~ h u r c h. .... ~~ t a. t e N e u t r e 1 i. t y ~ " L (; J.i o 1 ~--=~ f L a s An r:: e l !:'! s 
L ~t ~-~ R e.::::.~~:.~-~. ~ J . .':: ( ~!. ~"i 8 J. ) I J. ~~: ~:. ., 
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school facilities during noninstructional time. Three sub-
divisions of the section are (1) allowed used by religious 
groups, (2) prohibitions against religious use, and 
(3) factors entering into decisions permitting or pro-
hibiting use. 
Decisions Allowing Use by Religious Groups 
In the 1872 Townsend v. Ha~2 case voters of a town-
ship chose to permit school facilities to be used .for re- · 
ligious meetings. The case was brought under the assumption 
that the electors had no right to allow the school to be 
used for religious purposes. 
The justices concluded that religious use corresponded 
to private schoo~ use. 
If this be correct, then the keeping of a 
select school in a public school-house would 
be prohibited, although it is conducted in all 
respects as a public school; and thus one tax-
payer in the district could prevent, by in-
junction any select schools being kept in the 
school-house of the district, though every 
other person in the district desired them, 
and during a time of the year when there were 
no public schools kept in the district. There 
exists no reason for excluding Sabbath schools 
from the school-houses that does not exist also 
to select schools. If it be said that in 
Sabbath Schools the Scriptures are read and 
commented upon: we answer, the same may be done 
in select schools. So also may sectarian dogmas 
be taught in such schools as are in religious 
meetings. Those who attend either religious 
worship, Sabbath or select schools, do so volun-
tarily. Every one is at lib~rty to stay away 
who chooses to do so.3 
r, 
L.~fot,rnsc:Pd -.r 
. ·~ ~. 
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It was held in State ex rel. Gilbert v. Dilley4 that 
occasional use of the public schoolhouse for Sunday school 
and religious meetings on Sundays, occurring about four 
times a year over a period of five years, with the per-
mission of the school board, did not constitute the 
schoolhouse a place of worship within the meaning of the 
Nebraska constitutional provision that no person should be 
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship 
against his consent. The use was not unconstitutional and 
would not be prohibited by the courts, especially where the 
complaining taxpayers failed to show that they were subject 
to additional taxation because of the occasional use. 
For this argument the plantiff used Section 4, Article 1, 
of the Nebraska C~nstitution which reads: "All persons have 
a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God •••• 
No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any 
place of worship against his consent •• 5 
The constitutionality of an Illinois statute authorizing 
.the school directors of a district to grant the temporary use 
of schoolhouses when not occupied by schools for religious 
meetings was sustained in Nichols v. School Directors.6 
4State ex rel. Gilbert v. Dilley, 145 NW 999 (Nebraska) 
(1914). 
SNebraska,Revised Statutes, Vol. 2, Art. 1, Sec. 4, 
pp. 49-50. 
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The plaintiff had brought suit against the school directors, 
charging that the use amounted to use of tax funds to sup-
port churches. The court ruling found no constitutional 
infringement compelling the taxpayer to aid in providing a 
house of worship and that the taxpayer may only be required 
to contribute to repair of the building caused by normal 
wear and tear of such use and such wear and tear would be 
inappreciable. The court further ruled that religion and 
religious worship are not so placed under the ban of the 
constitution that they may not be allowed to become the 
recipient of any incidental benefit whatsoever from the 
public bodies of authority of the state; one significant 
provision in the constitution itself authorized the legis-
lature to exempt property used for religious purposes from 
taxation. This exemption might by its operation indirectly 
cause a greater burden of taxation to be imposed upon the 
taxpayers and thereby result indirectly in his support of 
places of worship.7 
A similar view was taken by an Iowa Court in Davis v. 
Boget8 when the court ruled: 
The use of a public school building for 
Sabbath schools, religious meeting, debating 
clubs, temperance meetings, and the like, all 
7rbid. 
8Davis v. Beget, 50 Iowa 11 (Iowa) (1878). 
of which of necessity must be occasional 
and temporary, is not so palpably a vio-
lation of the fundamental law as to 
justify the courts in interfering, this 
being especially so where the electors 
had included in their resolution permit-
ting such use a requirement·that any per-
son asking for the use of a schoolhouse 
should be held strictly responsible for 
all damag9s done to the schoolhouse by 
such use. 
It was stressed in this case that use for religious 
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meetings or other purposes was only temporary, occasional, 
and liable at any time to be denied by the district electors.· 
Such use would not convert the schoolhouse into a building 
for worship.10 
In Baer v. Kolmorgen,ll a plaintiff contended that the 
construction of a nativity scene or creche on the school 
lawn subjected his.child to sectarian religious influences 
at the public school his child attended. The school board 
had permitted a volunteer committee of residents of the 
village to construct and maintain on the lawn of a junior-
senior high school, for a few days during the Christmas 
season while the school was closed for the Christmas va-
cation, a nativity scene or creche. All of the expenses 
9Ibid. 
lOibid. 
llBaer v. Kolmorgen, 181 NYS Zd 230 (New York) (1958). 
for installing, maintaining, and lighting the scene were 
paid by the committee erecting the scene. No school 
personnel were involved in the erection of the scene.12 
The court held that the erection and maintenance of 
the scene for a limited time on the school lawn, with the 
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permission of the school board, even though the scene con-
stituted a religious sectarian symbol, did not violate 
the provisions of the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution or the provisions of the New York State Consti-
tution. The court considered that since the nativity scene 
was erected and maintained without use of public school 
funds that the father had not been subject to a tax to sup-
port the establishment of religion and since the school was 
not in session no influences had been forced on his chilct.l3 
A suit, Lewis v. Board of Education of City of New 
York, 14 was brought when a school had permitted facilities 
to be used by Catholic Newman Clubs, Young Men's Christian 
Associations, Young Women's Christian Associations, Hi-Y 
Clubs, and Jewish groups. Plaintiffs alleged that school 
facilities were being devoted to religious use. Reply of 
12rbid. 
14Lewis v. Board of Education of City of New York, 
285 N.Y.S. 164 (New York) (1935). 
the school board was that the use was only for "ethical, 
educational, and cultural discourses and lectures for 
the moral uplift of pupils in the public schools" and 
at no time were the buildings being used "for. inculcating 
the tenets of any religious denomination or for any meet-
ing or purpose, directly or indirectly, in which any 
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught."l5 
New York State statutes allowed local boards to use 
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discretionary powers to control and hold in custody school 
facilities .and to permit use for: 
••• holding social, civic and recre-
ational meetings and entertainments, and 
other uses pertaining to the welfare of the 
community; but such meetings, entertainments 
and uses shall be non-exclus~ve and shall be 
open to the .general public. 1 
The complainant was found in error by the New York 
Supreme Court i~ thinking that the racial and religious 
affiliations of the users conflicted with use of the fa-
cilities. The court stated that all religious and racial 
groups are equal before the laws and no difference can be 
made between believers and nonbelievers.l7 
Florida Revised Statutes, Section 235.02, allows 
school boards 
15Ibid. 
16New York Consolidated Laws, Book 16, Article 9, 
Section 414, pages 244-245. 
. • to permit the use of educational 
facilities and grounds for any legal assembly . 
.• and to adopt rules necessary to protect 
educational facilities and grounds when used 
for such purposes.l8 
When a school board permitted religious organizations 
to use school facilities for Sunday worship, a group of 
taxpayers brought suit against the school board to have 
the permission rescinded. Several church groups had been 
permitted to use school buildings for a temporary place of 
worship while new church buildings were being erected.l9 
The Florida Supreme Court in the case, Southside 
Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, held that the 
statute allowed religious use of school facilities during 
nonschool hours. Rationale was that: 
While admittedly, there are some 
differences of view regarding the matter 
of religious meetings in school houses 
during non-school periods, we think that 
logic, as well as our traditional atti-
tudes toward the importance of religious 
worship, justifies our alignment with 
those courts which permit such use. The 
cases where this type of use of school 
property is permitted usually involve 
the application of statuteS similar to 
that of Florida. The cases which deny 
such use customarily involve situations 
where there has been no such statutory 
authority ••• In the instant case the 
Legislature has endowed the trustees of 
18Florida,Revised Statutes, Chap. 1, Sec. 235.02, 
p. 1022. 
19southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trus-
tees, School Tax District Number 1, 115 Southern 2d 697 
(1959). 
the school district with reasonable dis-
cretion to permit the use of school 
property during non-school hours for any 
legal assembly. We think that the re-
ligious observances described in the 
complaint are well within the category 
of legal assembly. We, therefore, hold 
that a board of trustees of a Florida 
school district has power to exercise 
reasonable discretion to permit use of 
school buildings during non-school hours 
for ••• religious meetings, subject to 
judicial review should discretion be 
abused to the point that it could be con-
strued as a contribution of public funds 
in aid of a particular religious group 
or as the promotion or establishment of 
a particular religion.20 
Equally important in the Florida case was the fact 
that the decision sustained the statute as not violating 
First Amendment establishment clause rights, albeit the 
decision points to review of individual cases to guard 
against abuse of First Amendment rights. The opinion 
also gives credibility to a trend of allowing only 
temporary use of facilities.21 
In Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Edu-
cation,22 an action was brought charging that use of 
public school facilities by religious groups during 
20Ibid. 
2lrbid. 
22Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Edu~ 
cation, 389 Atlantic 2d 944 (New Jersey) (1978). 
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noninstructional hours violated a state statute govern-
ing the operation of public school facilities and the United 
States and New Jersey Constitutions. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that religious groups which fully 
reimburse school boards for related out-of-pocket ex-
penses may use school facilities for religious services 
as well as educational classes. Justice Pashman, in de-
livering the majority opinion of the court, stated that 
the New Jersey statute which regulates use of school 
properties when not in use for school purposes includes 
use for religious services or education. Since the New 
Jersey constitution specif{cally prohibits the use of 
tax revenues for maintenance and support of a religious 
group, all out-of-pocket expenses must be fully reim-
bursed by the religious group.23 
The majority opinion also stated that rental of 
school property does not violate the establishment clause 
of the state constitution since it only prohibits the 
preference of one religious sect over others.24 
The court applied the tripartite test announced by 
the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman25 
23Ibid. 
24rbid. 
25Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 613, (1971). 
to determi~e if the establishment clause of the Federal 
Constitution was violated. The establishment clause 
First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits ·religion; • finally, 
the statute must not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.26 
The court found that there was a secular purpose in 
the leasing of the school facilities, that of enhancing 
the public use of the property for the common benefit 
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of all residents; that the primary effect neither en-
hanced or inhibited religion since the entire community as 
a whole is benefited and all religious groups received 
evenhanded treatment; and that no excessive entanglement 
with religion resulted. As in similar cases, the court 
maintained that prolonged use of school facilities by a 
congregation without evidence of immediate intent to con-
struct or purchase its own building would constitute an 
excessive entanglement with religion and would be imper-
missable.27 
A recent case, Country Hills Christian Church v. 
Unified School District Number 512,28 provided that school 
26 Ibid. 
27Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Edu-
cation, 389 Atlantic 2d 944 (New Jersey)- (1978). 
v. Unified School 
:;~nsas) (1983). 
districts could not, consistent with the First Amendment, 
close their doors to groups wishing to rent school dis-
trict facilities for purposes of religious worship 
during noninstructional hours. A lawsuit was brought 
to force the school district to allow use for religious 
purposes on the same basis as nonreligious groups. 
The decision was based on three areas: ( 1) The 
school board had created a public forum by allowing 
buildings to be used by a wide variety of community or-
ganizations; (2) Religious worship and discussion are 
"forms of speech and association" protected by the First 
Amendment;29 and (3) Neutrality is required by school 
boards in dealing with religious groups, but does not 
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require the school board to be an adversary of religious 
groups. 30 Inability of school boards to use the establish-
ment clause as reason to deny use was the most significant 
point in the decision which reads: 
The court concludes that by allowing 
their facilities to be used during non-
school hours by non-school groups, defen-
dants have created a public forum. Having 
created a public forum, defendants cannot 
29widmar v. Vincent, 102 Supreme Court 269, (1981). 
30country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School 
District Number 512, 560 F. Supp. 1207 (Kansas) (1983). 
exclude plaintiffs from the forum because 
of the religious content of plaintiffs' in-
tended speech unless such exclusion is 
justified under applicable constitutional 
law ••• The Establishment Clause does not 
justify excluding plaintiff's religious 
services from school district buildings, 
and there is no evidence either that 
children will be harmed or that defendants 
risk placing an imprimatur of approval on 
religious sects which rent school district 
facilities.31 
Decisions Prohibiting Religious Use 
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In most cases where requests for use of public school 
facilities during noninstructional hours for religious 
meetings have been refused, judiciary decisions have up-
held rights of school boards to refuse use within accepted 
guidelines. Often the decision is based on lack of a case 
by the complainant. 
Early litigation often focused on the use of tax money. 
Such was the case in an 1875 Kansas proceeding: 
The public school house cannot be 
used for any private purposes. The 
argument is a short one. Taxation is 
invoked to raise funds to erect the 
building; but taxat~on is illegitimate 
to provide for any private purpose. 
Taxation will not lie to raise funds to 
build a place for a religious society, a 
political society or a social club. What 
cannot be done directly cannot be done in-
directly. As you may not levy taxes to build 
a church no more may you levy taxes to build 
a school house and then lease it for a 
church • • • The use of a public school-
house for a single religious or political 
gathering, is legally, as unauthorized as 
its constant use therefore.32 
Th2 judge recognized that buildings throughout the 
state were being used for similar purposes. He also re-
lated that no disagreement with this use had been brought 
to the attention of the courts.33 
In an interesting case decided before the adoption 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, Scofield v. Eighth School District,34 judges found . 
it unlawful for the directors of a school district to per-
mit school buildings to be used repeatedly to hold religious 
meetings. Even though the voters of the district had 
approved of such use, the majority opinion indicated that 
use of the public school house for such meetings was an 
improper use, constituting an unlawful diversion of school 
property and funds to a nonschool purpose. Emphasis was 
placed on the fact that there was not merely o~casional use 
for religious purposes.35 
32spencer v. Joint School District Number 6, 15 Kansas 
259, 262-263 (Kansas) (1875). 
33Ibid. 
34scofield v. Eighth School District, 27 Connecitcut 
499 (Connecticut) (1858). 
35Ibid. 
In 1897, H.H. Bender brought suit against K. 
Streabich, President of the School Board,relative to 
allowing religious and other community groups use of 
public schoolhouses.36 The justices found: 
The use of school buildings by the 
community at large for public meetings 
for the discussion of subjects of general 
interest may be said to be in the line of 
their use for educational purposes, but 
it is not the use intended by law. The 
public school system is for the instruc-
tion of pupils who may attend the schools, 
and not for the instruction or entertain-
ment of other persons. The school di-
rectors are trustees of the school property 
for that use, and they may not, against ob-
jection, authorize or permit its use for 
other purposes. If the school building 
may be used for meetings for the conven-
ience, pleasure, or instruction of the 
general public, all other school property 
may with equal propriety be so used, and 
it would be but a step further to apply a · 
part of the school funds to the same use.37 
In Dorton v. Hearn, 3 8 the directors of a school dis-
trict had adopted a resolution authorizing the school 
buildings to be used for the purpose of teaching Sunday 
school classes. The ruling stated that the Sunday school 
classes should not be held because the school directors 
had no authority to grant permission to hold the classes 
75 
36Bender v. Streabich, 37 Atlantic 853 (Pennsylvania) 
(1897). 
3 7 rbid. 
38Dorton v. Hearn, 67 Missouri 301 (Missouri) (1878). 
in school buildings. Conflict among the different re-
ligious groups had to be avoided.39 
An Arkansas statute prescribing ~hat school di-
rectors shall have the care and custody of the school-
house and grounds, and the other property belonging to 
the district, "and shall carefully preserve the same,· 
preventing waste and damage," furnished authority to 
school directors to refuse continuation of use of school 
facilities for religious meetings. While the building 
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was being used for religious meetings at an earlier time, 
the desks, books, and other school equipment were damaged. 40 
The decision in Boyd v. Mi tchel·l upheld that once land was 
granted to the control of the state, no control could be 
exerted by a religious organization.41 
Judge Wiley, in the Indiana Baggerly v. Lee42 de-
cision, spoke to preventing use of school facilities for 
religious purposes even in the presence of an Indiana 
statute allowing use. The statute provided that if a 
majority of legal voters of any district desire the use 
of the schoolhouse of such district for other purposes 
39rbid. 
40Boyd v. Mitchell, 62 S.W. 61 (Arkansas) (1901). 
4lrbid. 
42Baggerly v. Lee, 73 N.E. 921 (Indiana) (1905). 
when unoccupied for common school purposes, directors 
are to allow use giving equal rights and privileges to 
all religious denominations and political parties.43 
The court said that it knew, as a matter of common 
knowledge, that a school is occupied from the beginning 
of the term in the fall until the end of the term in the 
spring. A comparison was made to "being occupied" in the 
same.manner as a "dwelling house" even though all members 
of the family are temporarily absent overnight or during 
the day.44 
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In Greisinger v. Gran~ Rapids Board of Education, dis-
cretion of local school boards to refuse use by religious 
groups was upheld.45 The Grand Rapids Board of Education 
refused to permit. a group of Jehovah's Witnesses use of fa-
cilities for Sunday meetings. The Ohio statute allowed 
"school boards to grant permission to 'responsible' groups 
to use school facilities for a variety of reasons including 
'religious exercises'." 46 No violation of the Jehovah's 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
45Greisinger v. Grand Rapids Board of Education, 88 
Ohio App. 364, 100 N.E. 2d (Ohio) (1949). 
46Ibid. 
Witnesses' constitutional rights of freedom of speech, 
assembly, and worship was found. In so holding, the Ohio 
court relied on the well settled principle that a ''rea-
sonable" exercise of school board discretion must be up-
held by the courts unless it can be shown that a clear 
violation of statutory or constitutional rights has 
occurred.47 
In Hunt v. Board of Education of Kanawha County,48 
an action was brought to enjoin the board of education 
from prohibiting students at a public high school from 
voluntarily meeting on school premises for purposes of 
engaging in group prayers. Judge John A. Field, Jr. 
spoke for the court in saying the case presented only 
two questions: 
first, whether the Board of Education 
had the authority to prohibit the use of 
school facilities for any religious purpose, 
and second, whether such prohibition is con-
stitutionally permissable. It is my con-
clusion that both of these q~estions must be 
answered in the affirmative.49 
Judge Field quoted from the earlier Greisinger v. 
Grand Rapids Board of Education decision which spoke to 
4 7Ibid. 
48Hunt v. Board of Education of Kanawha County, 321 
Federal Supplement 1263 (West Virginia) (1971). 
49Ibid. 
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denial of use by religious groups on constitutional 
grounds. This decision stated: 
Appellants broadly contend that 
by reason of the refusal of their re-
quest by the board of education, they 
were denied their legal rights of freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom 
of worship, contrary to the Constitution of 
the United States and Constitution of Ohio.50 
The important point in the action was recognition 
that use of school property was denied to all religious 
groups regardless of sect. Implication was made that 
invidious ~iscrimination would be found if one re-
ligious gr6up were.~llowed use and another denied use.51 
Factors in Decisions Allowing or Prohibiting Use 
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Althou~h impprtant differences are present in the re-
viewed cases dealing with religious use during noninstruc-
tional time, several factors may be delineated: 
1. Whether use is permitted on a regular or 
temporary basis 
2. Whether use interferes with the regular 
school program 
3. Whether use involves damage to school 
property 
4. Whether use is authorized by either state 
statute or vote of electorate 
50Greisinger v. Grand Rapids Board of Education, 
100 N.E. 2d 294 (Ohio) (1949). 
51Hunt v. Board of Education of Kanawha County, 
Federal Supplement 1263 (West Virginia) (1971). . 
3 ?1 -~ 
5. Whether the plaintiff is a taxpayer is 
the district 
6. Terms of constitutional provisions for 
separation of church and state 
7. Whether one religious groups is given 
preference over another group 
Decisions Dealing with Use by Political 
or Subversive Groups 
Diversity of statutes addressing political use has 
created fertile ground for litigation questioning school 
board discretion to allow or prohibit political use. Ex-
panded use of facilities has also added to the legal con-
fusion by providing variety to types of political uses or 
used by groups that may be considered subversive. Board 
discretion in the area often provides decisions which may 
be questioned in terms of possible discriminatory intent. 
The purpose of this section is to review principles 
and issues in court decisions to help identify trends in 
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use of school facilities by political or subversive groups 
during noninstructional time. Three subdivisions of the 
section are (1) cases prohibiting use by political groups, 
(2) cases involving revoked use by political groups, and 
(3) cases involving nonsubversive pledges. 
Cases Prohibiting Use by Political Groups 
Political groups have questioned the right of school 
boards to deny access to school facilities for meetings and 
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elections. As in other areas, state statutes and state 
and federal constitutional issues are raised. 
In a 1932 suit, no authority to force a local board 
of trustees to permit a primary election in school build-
ings was found. The Johnson County Democratic Executive 
Committee brought suit against the board of trustees based 
on a Texas statute stating: 
In all cases where it is practicable 
so to do, all elections shall be held in 
some schoolhouse, fire station, or other 
public building within the limits of the 
election precig~t in which such election 
is being held. 
The ~chool trustees contended that use should not be 
granted because the regular school program was in session 
and interference would result. Trustees had "exclusive 
control and management"53 of s~hool property. Decision 
of the court was partially based on the fact that no 
statute existed in Texas requiring use of property for 
primary and election activities.54 
In Stanton v. Board of Education, a member of a board 
of education sought to force adoption of a policy prohibit-
52Trustees of Independent School District of Cleburns 
v. Johnson County Democratic Executive Committee, 52 S.W. 
2d 71, 122 Texas 48, reversing 52 S.W. 2d (Texas) (1932). 
53Ibid. 
54Ibid. 
ing certain groups from using school facilities. George 
Timone, member of the board, had proposed a policy deny-
ing certain groups use of school facilities after hours. 
The proffered resolution would have denied use of school 
buildings to the following: 
(1) the Communist Party, (2) the 
organization presently known as American 
Youth for Democracy, (3) any other group 
or organization which the Superintendent 
of Schools shall have reason to believe 
is a Communist, Nazi or Fascist group or 
organization, or an organization that 
fosters racial or religious intolerance, 
or is a front for any such group or 
organization.55 
The suit requested that the board be forced to change 
the decision. In denying the relief sought by Mr. Timone 
and affirming the action of the school board, the justices 
stated: 
If persons gathering in assemblage 
have committed crimes elsewhere, or are 
engaged in a conspiracy against the 
public peace or order, they may be prose-
cuted for such crimes or =onspiracy, but 
that under the provisions of the Federal 
Constitution and the Constitution of the 
State of New York guaranteeing the rights 
of free speech and peaceable assembly, 
they may not be punished for mere par-
ticipation in a peaceable gssembly for 
lawful public discussion.s 
The courts went on to say that boards of education are 
vested with wide discretion as to the proper use of school 
55stanton v. Board of Education, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 559 (New 
York) (1948). 
56Ibid. 
buildings, and that the exercise of such discretion will 
not be interfered with by the courts. An exception is 
when a decision violates a specific statute or is 
essentially arbitrary.57 
The National Socialist White People's Party brought 
suit to compel a school board to permit the party to use 
a high school auditorium for a meeting to be held during 
nonschool hours. Circuit Court Judge Winter spoke for 
the court: 
. school board's repeated exer-
cise of its discretionary authority to 
rent high school auditorium for a nominal 
fee during nonschool hours to public and 
private groups for public and private 
meetings on a first come first served 
basis to the extent that the auditorium 
was not needed for school purposes and 
that nonschBol uses would not endanger 
the property constituted an effective 
dedication of the auditorium for exer-
cise of First Amendment rights of freedom 
of speech, association and assembly and 
that the school board's denial of use of 
the auditorium because of the political 
party's discriminatory membership poli-
cies constituted an invalid prior re-
straint as much as if it had denied the 
political party the use of the forum on 
the basis of a controversial belief which 
the party would express at that place.58 
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A school board does not have arbitrary power to prohibit 
use by political parties because they are considered sub-
57Ibid. 
58National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 
473 Federal Reporter 2d 1010 (Virginia) (1973). 
versive by the school board. Goodman v. Board of Edu-
cation allowed school boards the right to refuse use of 
facilies to the Socialist Party on the grounds that it 
was a subversive organization. 59 The court also ruled 
that the burden of proof to determine the group's sub-
84 
versiveness rested with the school board. If a subversive 
nature could not be proved, use must be granted to the 
Socialist Party. 60 To prove a subversive nature, the 
board, established proof that the petitioning organi-
zation advocated the overthrow of the government by force, 
violence, or other unlawful means.61 
The Yonkers Committee for Peace brought suit against 
a local school board to force the board to allow use of a 
city high school auditorium to conduct a forum for the 
discussion of problems relating to war and peace. The 
court denied the request because the group had not followed 
proper appeal channels.62 
The decision reads: 
While discretion was by statute vested 
in boards of education as to the proper use 
59Goodman v. Board of Education of San Francisco United 
School District, 120 P. 2d 665 (California) (1941). 
60Ibid. 
6~Ibid. 
62Ellis v. Dixon, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 854 (New York) (1953). 
which might be made of school buildings 
outside of school hours, activities not 
embraced in the general school program 
should not be encouraged when of such 
controversial nature as to engender ill 
feeling and dissension in the community.63 
Right to preserve school programs and buildings from 
disturbances was the issue in Payroll Guarantee Associ-
ation v. Board of Education of San Francisco United 
School District. Gerald Smith was denied access to 
school facilities to discuss a proposed constitutional 
amendment because of picketing and noisy boisterous ac-
tivities at previous speeches. 64 The school board refusal 
was upheld by the following reasoning in the decision: 
Speakers who express their opinions 
freely must run the risk of attracting 
opposition; they cannot expect their 
opponents to be silenced while they con-
tinue to speak freely. If a speaker in 
a school building or the opposition that 
he arouses attract so much attention as 
to disturb school activities, it would 
not be for the police to curb those who 
incidentally caused the disturbance so 
long as their activities were lawful ••• 
The board's primary concern is with 
the maintenance of the program. It can-
not dissipate its energies oy seeking to 
guide and control or even to evaluate 
the strategy of opposing factions at 
every passing meeting that may be held 
in a school building .• , The primary 
task of the schools is education. The 
63Ibid, 
64Payroll Guarantee Association v. Board of Education 
of San Francisco United School District, 163 Pacific 2d 
433 (California) (1945). 
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statute established that the educational 
activities of schools shall take prece-
dence over other permissive but secondary 
uses of school buildings. In passing on 
an application for an extraneous use of a 
school auditorium the board must consider 
probably effect on the regular school 
program and must deny one that would 
lead to interference with that program.65 
Cases Involving Revoked Use to Political Groups 
Once a board of education has granted use of school 
86 
facilities, difficulty with revoking the permission to use 
often becomes evident. Such was the case in New York when 
the school board withdrew permission to use a school audi-
torium from a musical organization for a concert.66 The 
district claimed that the concert performer was a ''highly 
controversial figure" who had been critical of United 
States policy in Vietnam and that there existed the possi-
bility of disturbances during the concert. Justice Fuld 
stated the general principle concerning the matter: 
The State is not under a duty to 
make school buildings available for 
public gatherings but, if it elects to 
do so, it is required by constitutional 
provision to grant the use of such fa-
cilities in a reasonable and nondis-
criminatory manner equally applicable 
to all and administered with equality 
to a11. 67 
65Ibid. 
66East Meadow Community Concerts Association Board of 
Education 272 N.Y.S. 2d 341 (New York) (1966). 
67Ibid. 
The board had allowed several uses of the auditorium 
for various purposes including concerts by the same group 
at other times. Judge Fuld applied the general principle 
stated above: 
• board is not barred from 
preventing use for an unlawful pur-
pose, but in the case before us the 
justification asserted for canceling 
the permit is the unpopularity of 
(the performer's) views rather than 
the unlawfulness of the plaintiff's 
concert. The expression of contro-
versial and unpopular views is pre-
cisely what is protected by both 
the Federal and State Constitutions.68 
A similar case occurred in the 1947 Cannon v. Towner 
litigation. Joseph Cannon, president of the Carver Cul-
tural Society, brought action against a school board for 
canceling use of a junior high school auditorium by a 
controversial singer.69 Discretion was again an issue. 
The decision made reference to the difference between 
canceling a permit under the circumstances and initial 
discretion of the school board to deny use. 
New Yor~ statutes allow school boards to adopt rea-
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sonable regulations for use of school facilities including 
options for entertainment. 7 0 No local regulation allowed 
68Ibid. 
69cannon v. Towner, 70 2d N.Y.S. 303 (New York) 
(1947). 
70Ibid. 
revoking permit to use facilities. The decision ex-
pressed: 
The defendant's only reason for 
its action is the political philosophy 
or ideology of the performer. That 
philosophy or ideology however ob-
jectionable to the vast majority of 
American citizens, had nothing to 
do with the purpose of which the 
permit was originally granted, to 
wit, a musical concert. 
The board ••• had neither the 
express nor the imQlied power to 
cancel the permit.71 
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An attempt was made in Dohrenwend v. Board of Education 
to force a board of education to revoke use privileges to an 
organization known as the "Westchest~r Committee for the 
Freedom Riders." 7 2 Political beliefs of the organization 
were an issue. The court allowed use of facilities for a 
fundraising concert to benefit the legal defense of the 
so-called "Freedom Riders." In the decision, the justice 
stated: 
that the proposed benefit 
was within the terms of the statute 
empowering a board of education to 
permit the use of school building 
for meetings, entertainments and 
occasions where admission fees are 
charged, when the proceeds thereof 
are to be expended for an educa-
tional or charitable purpose •• 
Judicial notice will be taken of 
the fact that the Freedom Riders 
were a group of persons partici-
71Ibid. 
72Ilo'n· .. r.=_n_Lfu.n.u~ v, B d f Pd ~- ??~ ~ v S 2rl 505 _ "" . , ... o a r o ., u c a ·- 1 o n , _ , .. 1 '. • 1 • • _ 
(New York) (1962'. 
pating in organized protests against 
racial discrimination, who were on 
occasion subject to arrest and 
criminal prosecution, and since money 
will be used to provide a legal de-
fense fund' such use is charitable 
in nature. 3 
Cases Involving Nonsubversive Pledges 
As shown in Chapter III, four states (California, 
Maryland, Nevada, and New York) have specific statutes 
relating to use by subversive groups. Three cases in 
California have set precedents for legislatures to 
follow in development of statutes. 
A California statute, developed prior to Danskin v. 
San Diego Unified School District,74 provided that no 
school district grant the use of school property to 
groups seeking to overthrow the government by force or 
violence. Applicants could be forced to sign an affi-
davit proving the applicants were not part of a sub-
versive element as provided in the act.75 
The Danskin litigation was brought to test the con-
stitutionality of the statute. The court in reaching its 
decision followed contemporary Supreme Court doctrine in 
73Ibid. 
74Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, 171 
Pacific 2d 885 (California) (1946). 
75Ibid. 
89 
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applying a "clear and present danger"-test to freedom of 
speech and of peaceable assembly, rights protected by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 76 
Justice Dooling, speaking for the court in American 
Civil Liberties Union v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 
used very eloquent language in delivering the opinion of 
the court: 
Where one searches deeper for the 
reason that motivates the prohibition 
of such meetings, there is no escaping 
the conclusion that the Legislature de-
nies access to a forum in a school 
building to 'subversive elements,' not 
because it believes that their public 
meetings would create a clear and 
present danger to the community, but 
because it believes that the privilege 
of free assembly in a school building 
should be denied to those whose con-
victions and affiliations it does not 
tolerate. What it does not tolerate 
it seeks to censor ••• Since the 
state cannot compel 'subversive ele-
ments' directly to renounce their 
convictions and affiliations, it 
cannot make such a renunciation a 
condition of receiving the privilege 
of free assembly in a school building. 
It is unconstitutional for the 
state to prohibit certain persons or 
groups classified as 'subversive ele-
ments' from exercising their rights of 
free speech and assembly at places where 
others are allowed to speak and assemble, 
it is a fortiori unconstitutional to re-
quire proof from any person or grouns that 
they are not 'subversive elements'. 7 7 
76rbid. 
77American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education 
of City cf Las Angeles, 359 Pacifi~ ed 45 (California) (1961). 
The court further noted that prior to passage of the 
California Civic Center Act, the state was not required 
to open its school buildings for public use. Having 
open~d its doors under the act, however, the state could 
not arbitrarily or discriminatorily prohibit certain per-
sons from using buildings.78 
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A revised California statute requiring an oath was at 
issue in a very similar case filed by the American Civil 
Liberties Union against the Los Angeles Board of Education.79 
The statute challenged by ACLU of Southern California v. 
Board of Education of City of Los Angeles suffered essen-
tially the same fate as the statute in the Danskin case.BO 
The statute was found to be 
violative of the rights of peace-
able assembly and free speech guaran-
teed by the Constitution of the United 
States and the state constitution. 
that the legislature could not set up 
a system of prior restraint based upon 
anticipation that at a meeting held 
under the sponsorship of an organi-
zation committed to the overthrow of 
the government by force, violence, or 
other unlawful means there would be com-
mitted acts intended to further the 
overthrow of the government.Bl 
78Ibid. 
79ACLU of Southern California v. Board of Education of 
City of Los Angeles, 379 Pacific 2d 16 (California) (1963). 
80lbid. 
81Ibid. 
Following this decision, the board of education of 
San Diego Unified School District developed regulations 
similar to the California Education Code found uncon-
stitutional in the first two cases presented in this 
section. 
Citing the two previous cases involving the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, the ruling 
was: 
It is not necessary to repeat 
what was said in those prior opinions 
inasmuch as no sound reason has been 
advanced to induce us to reconsider 
our conclusions there set forth •• 
For the reasons stated in those cases 
the regulations here involved must be 
held to be unconstitutional, and a 
~erempg~ry writ of mandate should 
J.ssue. 
Decisions Dealing with Use for 
Commercial Purposes 
Use of school property for commercial purposes has 
been challenged on statutory and constitutional grounds. 
As shown in the following cases, courts will not permit 
use of public school property where the primary purpose 
is financial gain. However, use has been allowed when 
commercial gain is incidental to an otherwise legitimate 
use of facilities and to interference with regular school 
programs is present. 
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In this section selected cases to determine issues 
and principles delimiting allowed or prohibited uses are 
reviewed. 
Cases Allowing Commercial Use 
A number of early cases questioned the right of school 
boards to allow operation of cafeterias and school stores. 
Such was the case in Ralph v. Orleans Parish School Board 
in 1925. 83 The legality was questioned of a school board's 
permitting private individuals to sell lunches to students 
and teachers on school property at a small profit. The 
opinion stated: 
Use of school property was merely 
incidental to the main operation of the 
school system, and that it served a 
meritorious purpose in providing students 
and teachers with wholesome food which 
could be consumed without the necessity 
of departing from school grounds.84 
Use of public school tax money for operation of a 
cafeteria was questioned in Goodman v. School District 
of Denver. 8 5 Allowing use was rationalized in the de-
cision: 
The evident intent of the school 
officials was not to permit the operation 
83Ralph v. Orleans Parish School Board, 104 Southern 
490 (Louisiana) (1925). 
84Ibid. 
85coodman v. School District of Denver, 32 F. 2d 586 
(Colorado) (1929). 
of a commercial enterprise for profit on 
school property, but to make it possible 
for wholesome food to be furnished to 
students at reasonable prices, which con-
tributed to their physical development 
and general environmental welfare. 
The fact that employees, and parents 
visiting the school, also availed themselves 
of opportunity ~o eat at the cafeteria did 
not serve to convert the enterprise into a 
business enterprise.86 
94 
Eating by outsiders in the cafeteria was also addressed. 
Abuse of the cafeteria by outsiders eating there was care-
fully guarded against.87 
A proprietor of a candy store challenged the legality 
of operation of school stores in Bozeman v. Morrow. The 
suit sought to enjoin a Texas school board from allowing 
a cafeteria to be maintained which sold confections and 
school supplies such as pens, pencils, erasers, etc.88 
In the denied relief, the trustees were found to be 
acting within the discretion con-
ferred upon them by law in permitting a 
cafeteria to be operated on school prem-
ises •••• School supplies were carried 
for emergency sales to students during 
school hours.89 
86Ibid. 
87Bozeman v. Morrow, 34 S.W. ed 654 (Texas) (1931). 
88Ibid. 
89Ibid. 
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In 1936, a statute which authorized first class school 
districts to operate lunch rooms was challenged to determine 
whether students should be prohibited from operating a cafe-
teria and candy store. 9 0 The ruling in this Hempel v. 
School District of Snohomis County case held: 
School directors have not exceeded 
their powers in allowing operation of the 
cafeteria in that there is no direct 
statutory authority explicitly empowering 
the directors to permit the use of school 
building for any purpose except for regular 
conduct of the school, but the grant of 
general power to the directors to control 
the property and manage the business and 
affairs of the school carried with it the 
implied power to allow the use of school 
buildings for any student activities that 
the directors might deem helpful in the 
education of tho§e for whom the school 
was established. 1 
A number of other decisions have upheld the dis-
cretionary powers of school boards to allow both school 
personnel and students to operate school stores.92 Most 
of these decisions speak to operation as a service func-
tion without pecuniary profit. Tyre v. Krug emphasized 
that no personal profit was allowed.93 
90Hempel v. School District of Snohomis County, P. 
2d 729 (Washington) (1936). 
9lrbid. 
92Restene v. Philadelphia School District, 26 Pa. D & 
C 655 (Pennsylvania) (1936): Cook v. Chamberlain, 225 N.W. 
141 (Wisconsin) (1929). 
93Tyre v. Krug, 149 N.W. 718 (Wisconsin) (1914). 
Sale of school class rings and musical instruments 
has provided additional issues for litigation. Givens 
Jewelers of Bossier, a retail jewelry firm, brought 
suit against a school board for allowing on-campus sale 
of class rings, charging that permission constituted a 
constitutionally prohibited loan or grant of property to 
a private enterprise. 94 Principals of the parish schools 
had traditionally allowed manufacturers' representatives 
to come on campus to discuss class ring designs. Repre-
sentatives of the manufacturer with the design chosen by 
students were then allowed to return to campus to sell 
the selected design.95 
96 
Article 4, §12 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, 
was used by the complainant jeweler: 
The funds, credit, property, or 
things of value of the State, or of any 
political corporation thereof, shall 
not be loaned, pledged or granted to 
or for any person or persons, associ-
ations or corpQrations, public or 
. t IJ6 prl.va e •••• 
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana found no violation 
of this provision. The decision stated: 
There is no evidence in the in-
stant case that the defendant school 
94Givens Jewelers of Bossier, Inc. v. Rich, 313 Southern 
2d 913 (Louisiana) (1975). 
95Ibid. 
96Ibid. 
board, or any of its principals, has, 
or intends to, relinquish any power, 
authority or control over any portion 
of the property belonging to the school 
board. Instead, the use of the prem-
ises by the class ring salesmen h~s 
been and will be allowed at the dls-
cretion of, and clearly subject to, 
the principal's authority and control 
on each occasion. Furthermore, the 
use of the school property by the 
salesmen, who visited the schools no 
more than a half dozen times a year 
appears to have been a casual and in-
cidental use of the building in each 
case not inconsistent with or preju-
dici~l to the main purpose for which 
the building was erected and within_t~e 
reasonabl9
7
discretion of school adm1n1-
strators. 
In Demers v. Collins, a seller of musical instru-
ments complained he was an aggrieved person because of 
the decision of a school committee.98 The question 
dealt with allowing access to school premises by sellers 
97 
of musical instruments. The decision allowing board dis-
cretion to determine persons given access stated ''the 
plaintiff failed to show the committee has litigated any 
personal right to him.99 
Private concert and theatrical groups complained that 
the Maryland National Guard was using school property 
leased to them in violation of state statute in Gottieb 
97Ibid. 
98oemers v. Collins, 201 A. 2d 477 (Rhode Island) 
(1964). 
98 
Knabe and Company v. Macklin.lOO A Maryland state statute 
gave school authorities power to dispose of or rent "for 
fixed and limited terms any of its property not needed for 
public purposes.rrlOl 
Officers of the guard had been renting the building 
for evening concerts and performances. The plaintiffs 
contended that renting for entertainments for one or 
more evenings was not "renting for a fixed and limited 
term." The court disagreed. The plaintiffs also argued 
that subletting the building for entertainment purposes 
amounted to taking the plaintiff's property without due 
process of law.102 Justice Pearce, speaking for the 
Court of Appeals, ruled: 
This is not the case of a municipal 
corporation perverting the functions of 
government by deliberately and indefi-
nitely engaging in business for profit, 
and entering into competition with its 
taxpayers. It is but temporary, casual, 
and incidental use of unused public 
property done in the practice of a public 
economy to avoid loss of revenue upon 
such unused public property, and to 
lighten thereby the general burden of 
taxation.l03 
lOOGottlieb Knabe and Company v. Macklin, 71 Atlantic 
949 (Maryland) (1909). 
101Ibid. 
lOZrbid .. 
99 
In Smilie v. Taft Stadium Board of Control, it was 
held that a statute specifically authorizing school boards 
to construct and operate stadia, sports arenas, and other 
recreational facilities and to lease them to persons, firms, 
and corporations, permitted the board to rent to private 
individuals for conducting midget automobile races. 1 04 
Residents of the area had attempted to get an in-
junction to stop the use because of the noise and dis-
turbances involved. The court in the ruling agreed 
that the board had acted within its authority.lOS 
Allowing a school athletic field to be used by a 
private baseball club was at issue in Royce Independent 
School District v. Reinhardt.l06 The agreement with the 
school district permitted a part of the school grounds to 
be used during vacation as a baseball field, in consider-
ation of the ball club's erection and maintenance of a 
fence around the grounds.l07 
An injunction, sought to prevent the trustees from 
allowing the use of the grounds, contended that rough 
l04Smilie v. Taft Stadium Board of Control, 205 P. 2d 
301 (Oklahoma) (1949). 
l05Ibid. 
106Rcyce Independent School District v. Reinhardt, 
159 S.W. 1010 (Texas) (1913). 
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crowds would attend the games and that there would be much 
yelling and noise and that school facilities would be 
damaged.l08 A 1 C J ppea s ourt udge Rainey stated: 
An ordinary game of baseball is 
not a nuisance per se, and the conduct-
ing of baseball games will not be en-
joined because of the shouts and noises 
incident to the game, although an in-
junction may be granted when the game 
is conducted in an indecent and dis-
orderly manner.l09 
Cases Prohibiting Commercial Use 
The Sugar v. Monroe case, heard before the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana in 1902, gave evidence that courts do 
not allow commercial use when the primary purpose is 
deemed to be comm~rcial gain.110 The case involved a 
school auditorium being used for a theater in Louisiana. 
The janitor of the school in question was paid 35 dollars 
per month to be the lessee of the auditorium in which a 
commercial theater would operate. Management of the 
theater was actually a school official who contracted 
for various professional entertainment groups and paid 
operating expenses.lll 
Justice Monroe, speaking for the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana, reported: 
108Ibid. 
109Ibid. 
Where a vote has been taken upon a 
proposition to impose a tax to build a 
schoolhouse, and has been favorably 
acted on, and a building has been con-
structed with the proceeds of bonds 
predicated upon such tax, it would be 
a breach of faith to allow such building 
to be converted into a theater, or to be 
used for the purpose of giving theatrical 
performances, as a business, whether in 
combination with its use for school pur-
poses or otherwise. It is, however, 
within the discretion of the municipal 
authorities having control of the 
property to make such casual and inci-
dental use of it as may not be incon-
sistent with or prejudicial to the main 
purpose for which it was acquired and 
changed conditions in the future may 
justify its use for some other purpose.112 
Length of lease agreements are often an issue in 
complaints concerning commercial use. A lease of school 
land executed by a school board to a private individual 
101 
for a term of ten years for the operation of a cafeteria 
was prohibited in Presley v. Vernon Parish School Board.ll3 
The court emphasized in canceling the use that the proposed 
enterprise was not a permissible casual use of school 
property, but rather a business undertaking to continue 
for a period of years. The court stressed the fact that 
under the terms of the lease the school authorities would 
not have full control and supervisio~ of facilities.ll4 
112rbid. 
113Presley v. Vernon Parish School Board, 139 So. 
692 (Louisiana) (1932). 
ll4rbid. 
Provision for access for school purposes was an 
issue in State ex re. Baciak v. Board of Educ~tion.l15 
A lease in this case had been made for five years to 
a county child welfare board for a receiving home for 
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neglected children. The lease provided for remodeling the 
building on condition that the school board renew the 
lease for an additional five years. The lease did not 
provide a method for return of the property to the dis-
-trict if needed for school purposes. The ruling of the 
court pointed out: 
•• A school board is without 
authority to lease a portion of a 
school building for use as a receiving 
home for dependent children or other-
wise, and not withstanding the same may 
not now or in the forseeable future be 
needed for school purposes .• ll6 
In the previously mentioned Royce case, use by a 
baseball club was allowed when the game was conducted 
in a decent and orderly manner.ll7 In Carter v. Lake 
City Baseball Club, a board of trustees was restrained 
from entering into an agreement to lease athletic grounds 
115state ex rel. Baciak v. Board of Education of 
C 1 e v e 1 a n.d c·i t v S c h o o 1 D i s t r i c t , 8 8 N • E • 2 d 8 0 8 ~ u tt J. o J 
(1949). 
ll6Ibid. 
117Royce Independent School District v. Reinhardt, 
159 S.W. 1010 (Texas) (1913). 
for playing baseball games of a professional or semi-
professional nature. 1 18 
The plaintiff maintained that such use constituted 
a private nuisance and that the trustees were without 
power to lease the grounds under the circumstances o£ 
the case. The complainant charged that the field was 
being used three to five nights per week and drawing an 
103 
average of fifteen hundred people. The complaint further 
stated that "people stand on top of trucks and cars to 
get a better view of the games and while so doing, make 
excessive noise, indulge in profanity, drink beer and 
whiskey, and throw the empty whiskey bottles and beer 
cans into yards of residents." Lack of bathroom fa-
cilities and the practice of using the rear of the 
bleachers were presented as evidence of practices pre-
senting intolerable and unbearable situations. 11 9 
The court in voiding the lease stated: 
In expressing our conclusions in 
the case at bar, we do not wish to be 
understood as going to the extreme of 
holding that school trustees may not 
make such casual and incidental use of 
the athletic field in question, not 
detrimental to the main purpose for 
which it was.created, as they may deem 
advisable.120 
118carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, 62 S.E. 2d 
470 (South Carolina) (1950). 
11 9rbid. 
120 
Ibid 
Use for Other Than Religious, Political, 
Or Commercial Purposes 
Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have 
statutes providing guidelines for private use of public 
school facilities. A wide range of statutory guide-
lines also provides a wide range of school board dis-
cretion that has produced ample litigation for study in 
all areas. Court decisions have often presented a di-
versity of opinions. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate se-
lected cases to determine issues and principles relative 
to areas other than religious, political, or commercial 
use. Cases presented in this section are divided into 
four categories: (1) use for civic and PTA purposes; 
104 
(2) use for social, recreational, and fraternal purposes; 
(3) use for after-school chil~are programs; and (4) use 
by teacher associations. 
Use for Civic or PTA Purposes 
Many states have provided statutory authority for use 
of school facilities by civic groups. Often goals of the 
school and goals of civic groups are closely attuned. 
Similar goals provide opportunity for close cooperation 
and collaboration among groups. However, this kinship does 
not exist in every situation, as shown by the following 
cases. 
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Even the Parent-Teacher Association is not immune 
to differences with school officials. Such was the case 
in Hennessey v. Independent School District Number 4 when 
facilities were denied the Parent-Teacher Association to 
hold meetings.121 
The local school board had received a number of re-
quests from the Parent-Teacher Association for permission 
to hold their meetings on school property. Requests were 
routinely turned down by the school board although other 
groups were routinely allowed to use facilities for meet-
ings. A regulation prohibiting use of school buildings by 
any organization that was unsupportive of the school board 
or any part of the school system or that dealt in person-
alities or engaged in frequent criticism of the school 
system and of school personnel in particular had been de-
veloped shortly after the first PTA request.l 22 
When the case reached the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 
Justice Doolin presented the decision: 
A school board may withhold 
school facilities. altogether from 
use by nonscholastic groups or may 
make reasonable classifications in 
determining availability. The state 
may control the use made of its pre-
121Hennessey v. Independent School Number 4, 552 P. 
2d 1141 (Oklahoma) (1976). 
122rbid. 
ises but not without regard to the 
Constitution. The equal protection 
clause precludes a school from cen-
soring expressions because it does 
not like its content or message, and 
it requires a state authority to deal 
with similarly situated organization in 
an even handed manner. The privilege 
of using a school should be available 
on a reasonable basis.l23 
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The findings in the East Meadowl24 case were applied. 
Justice Doolin again spoke for the court: 
A state is under no duty to make 
school buildings available for public 
gatherings and a school board is not 
prevented from barring its use for un-
lawful purposes. But where a school 
district allows a number of organi-
zations to use its facilities for non-
academic purposes, a board must not 
unconstitutionally discriminate against 
any comparable applicant in deciding 
who will and who will not be permitted 
its use. 1 25 · 
Parent-teacher groups have even questioned which of 
two school buidlings should be used. 1 26 In an Ohio case, 
a parent-teacher association brought suit to compel a 
board of education to allow the association to hold its 
meetings in the auditorium of a new school, rather than 
123Ibid. 
124East Meadow Community Concerts Association v. 
Board of Education of Union Free School District Number 3, 
op. cit. 
125Hennessey, op. cit. 
126state ex rel. Richland Parent-Teachers Association 
v. Board of Education, 33 Ohio LAbs 387 (Ohio) (1941). 
in an adjacent older school building as had been per-
mitted by the school board. The court ruled: 
The board acted within the dis-
cretion vested in it in determining 
that the use of the new school build-
ing by the association would inter-
fere with the regular school program, 
and that the old school building would 
suffice for the purpose of affording a 
meeting place for the association.l27 
A case involving a Kentucky Ruritan Club could also 
be placed under the commercial group heading. A plain-
tiff in Hall v. Shelby County Board of Educationl28 
challenged the validity of a lease of land and gym-
nasium from the Shelby County Board of Education to the 
Waddy Ruritan Club. The lease was for an indefinite 
period with the board.having the right to end the lease. 
The complainant owned a bluegrass music hall where 
he staged professional performances. The Ruritan Club 
had presented a number of bluegrass shows in the school 
gymnasium. 1 29 
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Both the trial court and the court of appeals affirmed 
the school board authority under state statutes to permit 
l2 7Ibid. 
128Hall v. Shelby County Board of Education, 472 S.W. 
Zd 489 (Kentucky) (1971). 
129rbid. 
the club to use otherwise unoccupied and unused prem-
ises. Kentucky Statute Section 162.050 allows: 
The board of education of any 
school district to permit the use 
of the schoolhouse, while school is 
not in session, for any lawful assem-
bly of educational, religious, agri-
cultural, political, civic or social 
bodies under rules and regulations 
which the board may deem proper.l30 
The appeals court noted that under the broad powers 
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given to school boards by statute, a lease to such an or-
ganization was permissible. The court further found that 
the complainant had no constitutional right to protection 
from competition.l31 
Use for Social, Recreational and Fraternal Purposes 
Social activities such as dancing have brought about 
a number of court actions. Many of the actions follow the 
pattern found in Merryman v. School District Number 16.132 
John W. Merryman, a resident taxpayer, appealed the 
right of a school district to allow use of school build-
ings for dances and other social activities·. 
130Baldwin 1 s Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated, 1963. 
Section 162.050. 
131Hall v. Shelby County Board of Education, op. cit. 
132Merryman v. School District Number 16, 5 P. 2d 267 
(Wyoming) (1931). 
Justice Riner, speaking for the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming, upheld the decision: 
The question thus presented is an 
open one in this state; this court hav-
ing never been called upon to pass on it, 
although it is a fact of common knowledge 
that during and at all times since terri-
torial days in Wyoming, school buildings 
by general consent, have been used aside 
from school session hours, for a variety 
of purposes other than the holding of 
public schools--Church assemblies of 
various denominations, dances, political 
meetings, lectures and entertainments of 
various kinds having been repeatedly held 
in them.l33 
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In Lewis v. Bateman,l34 decided in 1903, it was held 
that the trustees of a school district had no right to per-
mit a schoolhouse to be used for public and private dances 
inasmuch as this would be a misappropriation of trust 
property. The record showed that the seats in the school 
building had to be removed to permit the dancing and that 
ink from the inkwells would be spilled when the seats were 
moved. 
In McClure v. Board of Educationl35 the board of edu-
cation of the city of Visalia, California was authorized 
133Ibid. 
134Lewis v. Bateman, 73 Pacific 509 (Utah) (1903). 
135McClure v. Board of Education, 176 P. 711 
(California) (1918). 
to permit a social dance in the high school building. 
The decision was based on the statute of California 
that provided: 
There is hereby established a civic 
center at each and every public school-
house within the State of California 
where the citizens of the respective 
public school districts within the 
said State of California may engage 
in supervised recreational activities, 
and where they may meet and discuss, 
from time to time, as they may desire, 
any and all subjects and questions which 
in their judgement may appertain to the 
educational, political, economic, ar-
tistic and moral interests of the re-
spective communities ••• 136 
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The court contended that dancing was a form of recre-
ation and the statute permitted it by giving school boards 
wide discretion in the use of school facilities.l37 
Dancing was also found to be a legal use in Beard v. 
Board of Education,l38 Young v. Board of Trustees of Broad-
water County High School,l39 and Brooks v. Elder.l40 
l36Ibid. 
13 7 Ibid. 
138Beard v. Board of Education, 16 P. 2d 900 (Utah) 
(1931). 
139Young v. Board of Trustees of Broadwater County 
High School, 4 P. 2d 725 (Montana) (1931). 
140Brooks v. Elder, 189 N.W. 284 (Nebraska) (1922). 
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In Cost v. Shinault, 141 school directors were allowed 
to lease the second story of a school building to a fra-
ternal organization. A statute specifically authorized 
school districts to allow private schools to be operated 
in schoolhouses when not being used for public purposes. 
The suit was brought on the assumption that this was the 
only purpose allowed other than the regular school pro-
gram. Justice Smith provided the ruling from the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas in saying: 
It is a matter of common know-
ledge that many quasi public uses are 
made of the rural school buildings of 
the state. We do not believe it was 
the purpose of the Legislature, in 
granting express authority for pri-
vate schools to be taught in the 
public schools, to exclude other uses 
where such do not interfere with school 
nor injure the buildings.l42 
In Laglow v. Hill, 143 a plaintiff contended that the 
school board had no power to permit fraternal groups to 
use school facilities. The school directors countered 
with statutory permission that reads: 
Grant the temporary use of 
schoolhouses when not occupied by 
school, for religious meetings, 
Sunday schools, for evening schools 
14lcost v. Shinault, 166 S.W. 704 (Arkansas) (1914). 
142Ibid. 
143Laglow v. Hill, 87 N.E. 369 (Arkansas) (1914). 
and literary societies, and for such 
other meetings as the directors may 
deem proper.I44 
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The directors were found to have discretionary con-
trol in these matters and to have acted properly within 
their powers. 14 5 
Use for After School Child Care 
Five states have specific statutes allowing school 
facilities to be used as child care facilities when not 
in use by the regular school program. Hawaii has such a 
statute: 
The Department of Education may 
enter into agreements and contracts 
with individuals, organizations, or 
agencies for the use of public school 
buildings facilities, and grounds for 
the operation of after school child 
care programs. The board of edu-
cation shall issue such rules as are 
necessary to carr4 out the purposes 
of this section.! 6 
A North Carolina case, Kiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,147 questioned 
144IJlinois Annotated Statutes, Chapter 122, Section 
10-22.10. 
145Laglow v. Hill, op. cit. 
146Hawaii Revised Statues, Section 298-23.5. 
147Kiddie Corner Day Schools, Inc. v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 285 S.E. 2d 110 (North 
Carolina) (1981). 
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the legality of the public school system to conduct 
after-school care at the elementary schools. Justice 
Becton, speaking for the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 
stated: 
Constitutional uniform public 
school system requirement was not 
violated by formulating a program 
to alleviate problems of "latchkey" 
children. Also, the program satis-
fied the constitutional requirement that 
all expenditures of tax dollars be 
for public purpose. 148 
Use by Teacher Associations 
Rights of teachers to use school facilities for dis-
tribution of literature and for association business have 
been questioned in the courts. In a New York case a 
plaintiff, representing the local teachers' association, 
brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
against a school system policy that stated that material 
distributed to teachers in school mailboxes should be 
only for official school system business.l49 
The problem arose when the Bayshore Classroom 
Teachers' Association distributed a publication, The 
Voice, through faculty mailboxes. The secretary for 
l48Ibid. 
149Michael Friedman as President of Bayshore Class-
room Teachers Association v. Union Free School District 
Number 1, 314 Federal Supplement 223 (New York) (1970). 
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the teachers' union received a letter stating that dis-
tribution of the material was in violation of the school 
board policies.l50 
The district court held that the policy prohibiting 
distribution of materials by teachers inhibited First 
Amendment rights of the teachers. The policy was found 
to be illegal.l51 
In Delaware, a teachers' organization charged that 
the school board's denial of use of certain school fa-
cilities to its members transgressed their rights under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 52 As a ~art of 
the negotiated agreement with another teachers' organi-
zation in the district, the board had granted that or-
ganization exclusive rights to use facilities to represent 
teachers. The action of the board was found legal by the 
federal district court in the ruling: 
The policy served to promote a 
compelling state interest, the desire 
to keep school buildinjs from becoming 
labor battlegrounds.l5 
150Ibid. 
lSlibid. 
152Federation of Delaware Teachers v. De La Warr Board 
of Education, 335 Federal Supplement 386 (Delaware) (1971). 
153Ibid. 
A similar case, Local 858 of American Federation of 
Teachers v. School District Number 1, 154 was litigated 
in Colorado. The local union, which lost the repre-
sentative election, claimed the school district's re-
fusal to let the union use certain school facilities 
violated the constitutional rights of the union and 
its members. 
The specific actions that the union claimed were 
illegal included 
(1) denying the AFT use of school 
buildings for meetings, free of charge; 
(2) denying the AFT_ use of school bulle-
tin boards, except during election cam-
paigns; (3) denying AFT use of teachers' 
mailboxes, except during election cam-
paigns ••• l55 
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The court ruled that certain exclusive contract rights 
could be granted to an elected collective bargaining agent 
in the public sector as well as the private sector. As in 
the Delaware case, the court balanced a "compelling State 
interest" in labor tranquility within the public schools 
against a negligible impairment to the plaintiffs.l56 
154Local 858 of American Federation of Teachers v. 
School District Number 1, 314 Federal Supplement 1069 
(Colorado) (1970). 
155Ibid. 
156Ibid. 
The opposite had been held true in Dade County 
Classroom Teachers Association v. Ryan.l57 That de-
cision allowed the use of school facilities by unions, 
but warned that no exclusive right to use of the fa-
cilities could be granted. The court held: 
We see no objection to the 
school board allowing the inter-
venor the use of interschool mail 
facilities or bulletin board space, 
or furnishing it teacher lists and 
giving the right to hold meetings 
on school property to Intervenor and 
its members, so long as the same 
privileges are afforded all teachers 
or their collective bargaining organi-
zations not aligned with the Inter-
venor; always provided any of such 
privileges or considerations are 
subject to cancellation by the 
school board at any time in its 
sound and sole discretion.l58 
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No state statutes allowed exclusive bargaining rights. 
In the presence of such a statute, the courts would have 
granted exclusive rights to use school facilities. 1 59 
157nade Countv Classroom Teachers Association, Inc. 
v. Ryan, 225 South~rn 2d 903 (Florida) (1969). 
158Ibid. 
159Ibid. 
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CHAPTER V 
REVIEW OF SELECTED CASES 
Cases throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century 
have shown much diversity of statutory interpretation. 
Having construed meanings of state statutes and consti-
tutions, the courts have granted varying degrees of dis-
cretion to local school boards. 
Courts have made most decisions in light of state 
statutes and state constitutions. In decisions concerning 
freedom of speech, due process, equal protection, and free-
dom of religion, courts have turned to principal explana-
tions of the United States Constitution. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general re-
view, analysis, and discussion of twenty selected cases 
which have set precedents for later court rulings concern-
ing private use of public school facilities. Cases in the 
areas of religious, commercial, political, and other com-
munity uses as well as cases o~ constitutional concerns 
are presented. These cases, presented in chronological 
order, illustrate the variety of legal decisions and are not 
all-inclusive in nature. A description of the facts of each 
case, the decisions in each case, and finally, a discussion 
of the decisions are set forth. 
Facts 
Spencer v. Joint School District 
15 Kansas 259 (1875) 
This case involved an action brought to restrain the 
district from leasing its school building for other than 
school purposes. Essentially, the plaintiff objected to 
the use of the building for religious purposes.! 
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The primary question was the authority of the school 
board to allow outside use of school facilities paid for 
with tax funds. Contention of the plaintiff was that Kansas 
statutes did not allow private use of any facilities paid 
for with tax funds because such use would involve improper 
use of tax monies.2 
Decision 
The district court ruled in favor of the school di-
rectors to allow private use. The plaintiff appealed to 
the trial court which sustained the findings of the dis-
trict court. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas, 
the decision of the trial court was overthrown and re-
manded to the district court for further action in 
accordance with the views of the Supreme Court.3 
lspencer v. Joint School District 15 Kansas 259 (1875). 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 260. 
The district and trial court had considered the fact 
that school facilities were used all over the state by 
general consent or without active opposition. These 
courts recognized that little damage was done by use, 
that taxpayer money had built the facilities, and that 
private use ~~as a common practice particularly in the 
new settlements of the state. 4 
ll~ 
The Supreme Court of Kansas spoke of all these areas 
in their decision, but said that only one issue prevailed 
that taxation cannot be used to support any private use of 
school facilities. The court ruled that allowing use of 
facilities by a religious group would indirectly amount to 
supporting the religious group.s 
Discussion 
Typical of early cases disallowing use of school fa-
cilities, this case brought to light several factors which 
appear in later litigation such as temporary and casual use, 
general feeling by the public that school facilities should 
be used, and degree of damage incurred to school property. 
The Kansas Supreme Court argued that use of school fa-
cilities by a religious group would amount to support 
4rbid., p. 261. 
5Ibid., p. 262. 
of that religious group. Such action equated use of a 
tax-financed school building by a religious group to 
building a church building with tax funds.6 
Nichols v. School Directors 
93 Illinois 61 (1879) 
Facts 
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The state of Illinois enacted a statute allowing 
school directors to grant temporary use of schoolhouses, 
when not occupied by schools, for religious meetings and 
Sunday schools, for evening schools and for literary 
societies, and for other such meetings as the directors 
considered proper. 7 The complainant, as a citizen, tax-
payer, and freeholder of the school district,sought an 
injunction to restrain the directors from allowing the 
schoolhouse of the district to be used as a religious 
meeting house. The complainant and other taxpayers had 
formerly protested this issue, but use had been allowed 
by the school directors, nonetheless.8 
Decision 
A temporary injunction was allowed with the bill 
6Ibid., p. 261 
7Nichols v. School Directors, 93 Illinois p. 61 (1879). 
8Ibid. 
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filed by the complainant at the district court level. The 
circuit court sustained the right of the school directors 
to grant private use of facilities and dissolved the 
temporary injunction which had been granted. The com-
plainant appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court 
and found no grounds for an injunction.9 
The complainant had assailed the statute as being 
unconstitutional, on the basis of Article 2, Section 3 
which said no individual was required to support any re-
ligion or support preference of any religious denomination 
or group. Article 8, Section 3 of the Illinois Consti-
tution, which forbade school districts from making appro-
priations from the school fund for aid to any church or 
for any sectarian purpose, was also cited.10 
Discussion 
This case brought forth a theme used in later cases 
that incidental benefit by religious groups is not placed 
under the ban of support to religious groups in consti-
tutional provisions. The court raised the question that 
exemption of church property from taxation might also create 
increased citizens' taxation.ll 
9Ibid. 
lOibid • 
. llTbid .. , 
The ruling of the court also spoke of noninter-
ference with the regular school program and affirmed 
discretion of local school directors to follow statu-
tory authority.12 
Bender v. Streabich 
37 Atlantic 853 (1897) 
Facts 
In 1897, H.H. Bender brought suit against Martin K. 
Streabich, president of Manor Township board of school 
directors, for allowing religious and other community 
groups to use school facilities. 1 3 The only question 
presented was whether school directors may permit or 
authorize the use of school buildings for other than 
school purposes.l4 
The case was first heard in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Lancaster County. An appeal was made to the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on July 15, 1897. 1 5 
Decision 
The Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County af-
firmed the complaint of H.H. Bender and granted an in-
12Ibid. 
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13Bender v. Streabich, 37 Atlantic 853 (Pennsylvania) 
(1897). 
14Ibid. 
junction to the plaintiff restraining the school di-
rectors from allowing use. The holding of lyceums in 
the public school houses was found not to be within the 
meaning and intent of common-school law, not an aid to 
education, and not for the general improvement of the 
neighborhood.l6 
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with Justice Fell 
speaking for the majority, held that school directors may 
not permit the use of school buildings for sectarian re-
ligious meetings, nor for the holding of public lyceums, 
nor for any purposes other than school purposes. Such 
uses were found to be in line with educational purposes, 
but not in line with the use intended by the laws of 
Pennsylvania.l7 
Discussion 
The court referred to an earlier Pennsylvania case, 
Hysong v. School District,l8 for the answer to the ques-
tion of religious use. The findings of the Supreme Court 
clarified that any use directly related to the instruc-
tional program would not be prohibited. Discretion of 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid., p. 854. 
18Hysong v. School District 30 Atlantic 482 
(Pennsylvania) (1861). 
local boards to allow unchallenged use of facilities was 
also implied in the ruling.l9 
Use of tax funds was an issue in the case as it was 
in Sf!encer v. Joint School District. Both 
Court and the Pennsylvania Court felt that 
lead to part of the 
private activities 
spective states. 
Facts 
school funds being used 
not intended by the laws 
Sugar v. City of Monroe 
32 Southern 961 (1902) 
the Kansas 
use would 
to support 
of the re-
Citizens of Monroe, Louisiana, approved a school 
bond of $155,000 dollars for the purpose of school con-
struction; a portion of this amount was used to construct 
a high school which included an auditorium with a seating 
capacity of over 1,000.20 
The school auditorium was used as a public theater 
under the auspices of a pretended lease to the school 
janitor. Tom Stewart, the janitor, was paid 45 dollars 
per month as janitor of the high school and lessee of the 
auditorium. Management of the auditorium for theatrical 
19aender v. Streabich, p. 854. 
20sugar v. Monroe 32 Southern 961 (Louisiana) (1902). 
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purposes was in the hands of a man who was a chairman of 
the city finance committee, mayor ~ tern of the city, and 
member and chairman of the entertainment committee of the 
local school board.21 
The plaintiffs, citizens, taxpayers, and owners of 
an opera house in the city of Monroe brought suit to re-
strain the use of the school building as a theater. The 
case was first heard in district court of Ouachita Parish 
and later appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.22 
Decision 
Ruling of District Court Judge Luther Hall of the 
district court of Ouachita Parish was in favor of the 
defendants. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana which heard the case on June 16, 1902.23 
In reversing the decision of the district court the 
Supreme Court considered three points: 
(1) That the city of Monroe is engaged in 
the business of conducting a theater. 
(2) That in doing so it pays no license 
to itself, whilst it exacts a license from 
the plaintiff and from all other persons 
engaged in the same business. 
(3) That it is using as a theater a public 
21Ibid. p. 962. 
22rbid. 
23Ibid. 
building worth nearly $70,000, especially 
dedicated by those at whose expense, in 
part, it was erected, to school purposes.24 
12i:i 
Under the first two points, the court found no grounds 
that the plaintiffs had established a pecuniary interest 
sufficient under law to give the court jurisdiction. Under 
the third point evidence was found that the court should 
determine whether an illegal use was being made of school 
property. An analogy was made in the decision that using 
the auditoriu~ as a theater would correspond to using 
another part as a jail, saloon, or hospital. 25 
Discussion 
The decision of the Supreme Court assisted in establish-
ing the principle that school facilities cannot be used 
when the primary purpose is commercial gain. The practice 
of allowing use that is temporary and casual was not 
questioned, but use for commercial gain was. The court 
also did not question the discretion of the school board 
to allow use under changed circumstances. 
Baggerly v. Lee 
73 Northeastern 921 (1905) 
Facts 
The state of Indiana enacted in 1901 legislation 
which granted the right to school trustees to allow use of 
') ' 
'--"~Ibi.d., p. 963. 
(' '' .. 
/~ ··' -~o .. 
a public school building for purposes other than school 
when not being used for school purposes. 2 6 Legislation 
also granted control and supervision of school property 
to township trustees.27 
John H. Lee, a trustee of Tobin school township, 
brought suit against James Baggerly and others who 
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served as managers of the Church of Latter Day Saints. 
The defendant~ had petitioned the plaintiff to permit 
them to use for church purposes a public school building 
during the part of the year in which there is no school. 
In granting the request, school trustees had expressly 
forbidden defendants or any one else from using school 
buildings for religious purposes during any time when the 
school term is in session.28 
The defendants had been entering and using school 
buildings during the school term on evenings and Sundays 
and other times when the school was not convened in de-
fiance of trustee directions. Trustee Lee brought suit 
in Circuit Court of Perry County to restrain such use. 
26Baggerly v. Lee 73 Northeastern 921 (Indiana) (1905). 
27Ibid., p. 922. 
28Ibid. 
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Decision 
Judge E.M. Swan of the Circuit Court of Perry County 
ruled in favor of the complaint filed by Trustee John H. 
Lee. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Indiana. The case was transferred to the Appellate Court 
of Indiana and was heard on .March 30, 1905. 
The appellants recognized that they hai no inherent 
right to use the schoolhouse for religious purposes, but 
based their right to use school facilities on an Indiana 
statute. The statute provided that if a majority of legal 
voters of any district desire the use of the schoolhouse of 
such district for other purposes when unoccupied for common 
school purposes, directors are to allow use giving equal 
rights and privileges to all religious denominations and 
political parties.29 
Judge Wiley, who spoke for the Appellate Court, af-
firmed the decision of the circuit court by stating: 
A schoolhouse is occupied for 'school 
purposes' from the time a school term opens 
until it closes, including school days, 
Saturdays, and nights, in the same sense 
that a dwelling house is 'occupied' by a 
family as a domicile even though all 
members of the family are temporarily 
absent overnight or during the day, or 
even for a longer period. .30 
29Ibid., p. 923. 
30Ibid. 
Discussion 
Discretion of local school trustees to determine 
conditions of use by outside groups was again affirmed 
in the decision. A somewhat unique interpretation of 
the phrase, "when unoccupied for common school purposes"31 
was provided. The court allowed that books, pencils, and 
other materials would be left unprotected and thus the 
interests of the school would be jeopardized by use during 
the regular term.32 
Royce Independent School District v. Reinhardt 
159 Southwestern 1010 (1913) 
Facts 
Texas statutes allowed independent shcool districts, 
with powers vested in a board of trustees to manage and 
control school property, ·to permit property which is not 
needed for school purposes to be used for private purposes 
which do not conflict with its use as school property.33 
Royce Independent School District permitted a part 
of the school grounds to be used as a baseball field during 
vacation. Use was granted in consideration of the ball 
club's erecting and maintaining a fence around the grounds.34 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid. 
33Royce Independent School District v. Reinhardt, 159 
S.W. 1010 (Texas) (1913) • 
. '31-+-;. ~ .. i :.:' 
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An injunction against use by the baseball club had 
been granted by Judge Kenneth Foree of the District 
Court of Rockwell County. The school trustees appealed 
the injunction to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.35 
The injunction was granted by the district court on 
the merits that rough crowds would attend the games, that 
there would be much yelling and noise, that school facili-
ties would be damaged, and that the undertaking as a whole 
would constitute a nuisance and an unauthorized use of 
school facilities.36 
Decision 
Judge Rainey, speaking for the Appeals Court held 
that school trustees have control over school property 
and at their discretion may permit use of the facilities 
when not in use for school purposes and that such use 
might be on either a gratis or a pay basis. The court 
pointed out that the baseball arrangement resulted in a 
considerable financial advantage to the district and there 
was no conflict with school purposes.37 
In regard to the nuisance complaint, the court held 
that noise and incidents accompanying games in the past 
35rbid. 
36rbid., p. 1011. 
37Ibid., p. 1012. 
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were "such only as were usual" at games of this type and 
that there was no vulgar and indecent conduct at these 
games.38 Judge Rainey added: 
That the game of baseball is not a 
nuisance per se is well settled. It is 
an innocent or legitimate amusement, and, 
like a legitimate business, to warrant 
an injunction stopping or destroying it, 
it must appear that the indulgence in it 
is necessarily a nuisance. An injunction 
against the games will not be granted 
simply because it is feared that it may 
become a nuisance.39 
Discussion 
Proving that use by the baseball club was a nuisance 
was a key issue in the complaint. Fear that use would be-
come a nuisance was not found to be a reason for granting 
an injunction. The decision left the possibility for other 
injunctions if the conduct of the games could be proven to 
be a· nuisance. 40 ·~ .~· 
As in each of the other cases presented, the courts 
examined the statutory authority of the school authorities 
to control and regulate outside use of school facilities. 
Interference with regular school program and damage to 
school property were also examined. 
38Ibid. 
3 9Ibid. 
40rbid. 
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Cost v. Shinault 
166 Southwestern 740 (1914) 
Facts 
School directors of Lawrence County, Arkansas, rati-
fied a lease between the district and the Independent 
Order of Odd Fellows which allowed the lease of the un-
used upper story of a schoolhouse for 50 dollars per year.41 
Arkansas statutes specifically authorized school districts 
to allow a private school to be operated in the schoolhouse· 
when not being used for public school purposes. A.B. Cost, 
the complainant, argued that the legislature's intent was 
to restrict the use of school facilities to just that pur-
pose and school directors had no authority to permit any 
other use.42 
Decision 
George Humphries, speaking for the Lawrence Chancery 
Court, had affirmed the right of the school directors to 
lease the upper story of the schoolhouse to the fraternal 
group. An appeal was made to the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
on April 27, 1914.43 
4lcost v. Shinault, 166 Southwestern 740 (Arkansas) 
(1914). 
42rbid. 
43Ibid. 
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The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the action of 
the school directors, stating that in managing school 
property, it was the duty of the school directors to 
make the most advantageous arrangement possible for the 
good of the district. Rental to the fraternal group was 
found to be an important financial advantage to the dis-
trict, and no interference with the regular school program 
was established by the complaint.44 
In answering the complaint that the legislature in-
tended outside use only for operation of a private school, 
the Supreme Court included the following statement: 
It is a matter of common knowledge 
that many quasi-public uses are made of 
the rural school buildings of the state. 
We do not believe it was the purpose of 
the Legislature, in granting express au-
thority for private schools to be taught 
in the public school buildings, to ex-
clude other uses where such uses do not 
interfere with school nor injure the 
buildings.45 
Discussion 
The court again made a determination of the statutory 
authority of the school directors to determine acceptable 
uses of school facilities by private groups. A novel 
aspect of the case involved allowing financial advantage 
to the school district as a determinant in allowing the use. 
44Ibid., p. 741. 
45Ibid. 
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Merryman v. School District Number 16 
5 Pacific 2d 267 (1931) 
Facts 
In 1869, the Wyoming Legislature provided power to 
school districts and school boards to perform duties as 
outlined by a vote of the people at an annual meeting. 
In this case, the electors of the township had authorized 
the school board to permit the building to be used for 
various purposes, including public entertainment.46 
John W. Merryman, the plaintiff, sought an injunction 
against the defendants, restraining them from permitting 
the use of school property for dances, social entertain-
ments by groups charging admission fees, or for any 
purpose other than strictly school or educational purposes. 
The school district had leased a newly erected school 
building to the Knights of Pythias Lodge for the pur-
pose of holding a dance. The fraternal group had been 
required to pay a fee in the amount of ten dollars that 
more than paid for expenses for lights, fuel, etc. in-
curred by the district. 
Decision 
The District Court of Crook County had found in favor 
of school board's right to grant use to the Knights of 
46Merryman v. School District Number 16, 5 Pacific 267, 
(Wyoming) (1931). 
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Pythias Lodge for the purpose of holding a dance. Merry-
man appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, which pro-
vided the d~cision on November 24, 1931.47 
In a lengthy decision by the Supreme Court, which 
quoted many former cases on the same topic, Justice 
Riner observed that such controversies were new to Wyoming. 
He expressed: 
The question thus presented is an 
open one in this state; this court 
having never been called upon to pass 
on it, although it is a fact of common 
knowledge that during and at all times 
since territorial days in Wyoming, school 
buildings by general consent, have been 
used aside from school session hours, for 
a variety of purposes other than the 
holding of public schools--church assem-
blies of various denominations, dances, 
political meetings, lectures and enter-
tainments of various kinds having been 
repeatedly held in them.48 
The Supreme Court ruled that the use planned was 
temporary, occasional, and liable at any time to be denied 
by the district electors. School trustees were also found 
to be within their statutory authority to grant use to the 
group. 4 9 Justice Riner said: 
So long as the proper maintenance 
and conduct of the school is not inter-
47Ibid. 
48Ibid., p. 269. 
49Ibid., p. 270. 
fered with, or in any wise hampered, and so 
long as school district property is neither 
injured, defaced, nor destroyed, as we view 
it, our law vests a generous amount of dis-
cretion in the school district ~lectors.SO 
The Supreme Court also found the Knights of Pythias to 
be an orderly and law-abiding group.Sl 
Discussion 
A new angle to determine discretion of school boards 
was found in this case. The decision was based on approval 
of the school board's decision by a vote of the electorate 
of the school district at an annual meeting. Since this 
was the first question of the type addressed by the Wyoming 
Supreme Court, a detailed review of numerous cases, includ-
ing cases previously cited in this chapter, was presented 
as part of the decision. 
Again as in other cited cases, board discretion was 
the key issue as were the well-established principles of 
no damage to school property, temporary and casual use, 
and noninterference with the regular school program. 
Facts 
Trustees of Independent School District of 
Cleburne v. Johnson County Democratic 
Executive Committee 
52 Southwestern 71 (1932) 
Texas Revised Statutes of 1925 provided for holding 
SOibid., p. 276. 
elections in schoolhouses, firehouses, or other public 
buildings within the limits of an election precinct.S2 
Texas statutes also granted "the exclusive control and 
management of school property" to local boards of trus-
tees. 
G. Cone Smith and others, members of the Johnson 
County Democratic Executive Committee brought suit 
against C.L. Edgar and others, trustees of the Inde-
pendent School District of Cleburne County, to force the 
trustees to allow certain school houses to be used for 
holding Democratic primaries and general elections. The 
complaint was first brought in the district court of 
Johnson County and later appealed to the Court of Civil 
ApP.eals. and the Supreme Court of Texas.53 
Decision 
The District Court of Johnson County decided in 
favor of the Johnson County Democratic Executive Com-
mittee. The Waco Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the district court on appeal. The appeals 
court found it practicable to hold the election in the 
schoolhouses.54 
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52Trustees of Independent School District of Cleburne 
v. Johnson County Democratic Executive Committee, 52 South-
western 2d 71 (Texas) (1932). 
53Ibid., p. 71. 
54Ibid. 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Texas where Justice Greenwood spoke for the court in 
rendering the decision: 
The discretion to determine whether 
it is practicable to hold elections in 
schoolhouses, in cities assuming ex-
clusive control and management, through 
a board of trust~es, of the public free 
schools within the limits of the cities, 
is to be exercised by the trustees.SS 
Discussion 
An interesting aspect of the case was the presence 
of two conflicting statutes. The word "practicable" was 
the key in the ruling of the Supreme Court. Discretion 
of local school trustees to determine conditions of use 
was again upheld. 
Facts 
Goodman v. Board of EDucation of San 
Francisco Unified School District 
120 Pacific 665 (1941) 
This case arose in California, where the State Edu-
cation Code authorized school board~ to grant use of 
school buildings for public, literary, scientific, 
recreationai, or educational meetings or for the dis-
cussion of matters of general or public interest. 
Lillian Goodman brought a proceeding against the Board 
SSibid., p. 73. 
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of Education of the San Francisco Unified School District 
to compel the school board to permit the use as a civic 
center of an auditorium or schoolroom in a public school-
house for the purpose of meeting and discussing the 
Socialist Party's position on the question of peace.S6 
Decision 
Justice Ward, expressing the view of the District 
Court of Appeal of California, followed a similar pattern 
in determining the status of the complaint. Management, 
direction, and control of a civic-center schoolhouse was 
found to be vested in local school boards. No inter-
ference with the regular school program was determined.57 
Discretionary power of local school boards was ap-
proved as long as power was not used in an arbitrary 
manner. The complainant had said that use had been 
granted to sundry associations for discussion of political, 
economic, and moral matters and issues. Justice Ward stated: 
Whatever discretion was reposed in 
respondent board, it was not intended 
that one public group should receive 
favors denied another of like charactei 
because the latter holds views contrary 
to those of the first group.58 
56Goodman v. Board of Education of San Francisco Uni-
fied School District, 120 Pacific 2d 665, (California) 
(1941). 
57Ibid., pp. 666, 667. 
58Ibid., p. 668. 
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The right to refuse use to the Socialist Party was 
allowed if the group was proven to be a subversive group. 
Justice Ward also expressed that the responsibility to 
determine whether the group was subversive rested with 
the school board. Right to use facilities was required 
if the local board could not prove that the petitioning 
organization advocated the overthrow of the government by 
force, violence, or other unlawful means.59 
Discussion 
California's mandated use statute restricted local 
school boards' discretion to determine whether certain 
uses are allowable. An interesting aspect of the case 
was introduction of the issue of arbitrary treatment by 
school boards. Express statutory provisions for use were 
also found to weigh more heavily than implied constitu-
tional authority. 
Facts 
Payroll Guarantee Association v. Board of 
Education of San Frncisco Unified 
School District 
163 Pacific 2d 433 (1945) 
In 1945, the state of California enacted revised 
legislation which made school buildings available for 
59Ibid. 
community activities on the condition that activity 
must not disturb the educational program.60 Revised 
statutes also gave local school boards the right to 
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make reasonable regulations for use of school property 
by outside groups.61 Statutes also included a directive 
that school buildings were not to be used by any group 
which advocated the violent overthrow of the United 
States.62 
The San Francisco school board refused to permit 
the use of an auditorium for a mass meeting where 
Gerald Smith would speak on a proposed constitutional 
amendment. At other meetings where Mr. Smith had spoken, 
picketing and noisy, boisterous activities had resulted. 
A threat of picketing at the proposed meeting had also 
been received.63 
The school board refused the request based on the 
fact that e~ening classes were held in the building and 
that these classes might be disturbed. A writ of mandamus 
was sought by the petitioners to compel the school board to 
60Payroll Guarantee Association v. Board of Education 
of San Francisco United School District, 163 Pacific 433, 
(California). 
6lrbid., p. 433-434. 
62Ibid. 
63rbid., p. 434-436. 
grant use of the auditorium. The petitioners contended 
that any disturbance which might arise would not be by 
their group and that they should not be penalized for 
the disorderly conduct of others.64 
Decision 
The petition was heard before the Supreme Court of 
California on November 8, 1945. Justice Traynor spoke 
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for the majority in the decision which upheld the action 
of the school board. Reasoning was as follows: 
Speakers who express their opinions 
freely must run the risk of attracting 
opposition; they cannot expect their 
opponents to be silenced while they 
continue to speak freely. If a speaker 
in a school building or the opposition 
that he arouses attract so much attention 
as to disturb school activities, it would 
not be for the police to curb those who 
incidentally caused the disturbance so 
long as their activities were lawful, 
but for the board to prevent the occur-
rence of such disturbance. Neither a 
speaker or his opponent are thereby 
stilled; they may express themselves 
fully and freely in school buildings 
as elsewhere whenever their activities 
do not bring in their wake a disturbance 
of the regular school program.b5 
Justice Traynor went on to saythat it was not the 
school board's responsibility to evaluate the strategies 
64rbid., PP· 433-434. 
65 Ibid., p. 435. 
of different factions, but rather to carry out the pri-
mary task of maintaining the educational program. If 
the regular school program were interfered with, then 
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the school must deny requests that create interference.66 
Discussion 
The decision of the Supreme Court was not unanimous. 
Justice Carter dissented by saying he believed the issue 
was whether a governing body of a school district may ar-
bitrarily refuse use of a school building under its super-
vision. He believed that a ~ivotal issue in the case was 
that the board did not provide evidence that the major 
educational function would be hindered.67 
No question of the element of subversiveness of the 
group was present in this case as was present in the 
Goodman case. 
In a later case, the group chose to make application 
for use of the same auditorium after the ruling, but 
changed the time of the meeting to a Sunday afternoon 
so there would be no interference with the regular school 
program. The school board required liability insurance 
in large amounts before use would be granted and waived 
66Ibid. 
67Ibid., P· 436-438. 
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the insurance requirement for other groups. Request for 
use was rejected because the group could not pay the in-
surance. 
The applicants brought suit against the board to 
gain permission to use the facilities without the re-
quired insurance. The court ruled in favor of use with-
out the insurance.68 
Southside Estates Baptist Church v. 
Board of Trustees 
115 Southern 2d 697 (1959) 
Facts 
In this Florida case, an appeal was made to stop the 
tempo~ary use of school buildings for religious purposes.69 
The Board of Trustees of Duvall County had permitted several 
churches to use various school buildings during Sunday non-
school hours while church buildings' construction was being 
completed. The record does not show whether the churches 
paid a rental.70 
The appellants said that by permitting religious groups 
to use school facilities on Sunday, the school trustees were 
68Ellis v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified 
School District, 164 Pacific 2d (California) (1945). 
69southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trus-
tees of School Tax District Number 1, 115 Southern 2d 
697 (Florida) (1959). 
70Ibid., p. 698. 
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indirectly taking money from the public treasury to aid 
religious groups, an act which is a violation of the 
Florida Declaration of Rights. The appellees argued that 
the appellants had shown no direct expenditures of public 
funds. 71 A Florida statute was also used in the argument 
by the appellees. The enactment reads: 
•• subject to law, the trustees of 
any district may provide for or permit 
the use of school buildings and grounds 
within the district, out of school hours 
during the school term or during vacation, 
for any legal assembly, or as community 
play centers, or may permit the same to 
be used as voting places in any primary, 
regular, or special election. The county 
board shall adopt rules and regulations 
necessary to protect school plants when 
used for such purposes, and shall provide 
for the use of school property other than 
that under the supervision of the trustees.72 
Decision 
The decree of the lower court was affirmed in the 
Florida Supreme Court. Justice Thornal, speaking for the 
Supreme Court, held that the action of the board of trus-
tees in permitting the churches' temporary use did.not 
violate the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Consti-
tution. No federal constitutional violations were found 
by the court and an often quoted statement was given: 
7lrbid., p. 699. 
72rbid., p. 697-698. 
We find nothing in the conduct of 
the appellee trustees to suggest the in-
volvement of public funds or property in 
the establishment of a religious or in 
preferring one religious faith over another. 
We agree with those courts which have ob-
served that in the ultimate the American 
people are basically religious. Their 
spiritual or theological views might 
differ, but by and large, they are com-
mitted to the ideal that there should 
be a place for any and all religions in 
the scheme of our community and social 
life. 7 3 
Discussion 
Discretion of the school trustees to determine the 
nature of "legal assemblies" was approved through the 
litigation. Interestingly, the court recognized that a 
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number of diverse rulings had been given by other courts, 
but saw fit to align their thinking with those that allow 
use by religious groups. A growing trend to use the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution as a basis for legal challenges was also found. 
Facts 
East Meadow Community Concerts Association v. 
Board of Education of Union Free School 
District Number 3, County of Nassau 
219 North Eastern 172 (1966) 
East Meadow Community Concerts Association, a non-
profit educational and cultural association, had presented 
73rbid., p. 100. 
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an annual series of musical concerts for the past ten 
years in a high school auditorium. Permission to use 
the auditorium had been granted for use during 1966, 
including a concert scheduled for March 12, 1966, which 
featured Pete Seeger. In December, 1965, the school 
board withdrew permission to use the auditorium for the 
Pete Seeger concert on the basis that Seeger was a 
"highly controversial figure" who had been critical of 
United States policy in Vietnam. Possibility of dis-
turbances during the concert was also given as a reason.47 
The association brought action against the school 
board alleging violation of c~nstitutional rights in 
cancelling use of the school building for the concert. 75 
Decision 
The case, appealed to the Court of Appeals after an 
adverse judgment by the Supreme Court of New York, was 
tried on constitutional grounds. Justice Fuld, pro-
viding the opinion of the Appeals Court, expressed the 
general principle governing the matter: 
The state is not under a duty to make 
school buildings available for public 
gatherings, but if it elects to do so, it 
74East Meadow Community Concerts Association v. Board 
of Education of Union Free School District Number 3, County 
of Nassau, 219 North Eastern 2d 172 (New York) (1966). 
75rbid., p. 173-174. 
is required by constitutional provision 
to grant the use of such facilities 'in 
a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner 
equally applicable to all and administered 
with equality to all!.76 
The court took into consideration that the school 
board had allowed several uses of the auditorium in-
eluding concerts by the same group at other times. 
In applying the general principle stated above, Justice 
Fuld expressed: 
board is not barred from 
preventing use for an unlawful purpose, 
but in the case before use the justifi-
cation asserted for canceling the per-
mit is the unpopularity of (the per-
former's) views rather than the 
unlawfulness of the plaintiff's con-
cert. The exprcesion of controversial 
and unpopular views, is precisely what 
is protected by both the Federal and 
State Constitutions.77 
Discussion 
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The East Meadow decision continued a trend to use the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution as a basis for legal appeals when use is denied or re-
voked by local school boards. No questions were raised in the 
decision concerning interference with the regular school 
program or damage to school property. 
76rbid., p. 174. 
7 7 rbid. 
An interesting aspect of the case was that the time 
of the proposed concert had passed before the case was 
heard by the appeals ~ourt, yet the court heard the 
case on constitutional grounds. 
Hunt v. Board of Education of County of Kanawha 
321 Federal Supplement 1263 (1971) 
The statutes of West Virginia do not specifically 
address use of school facilities by religious groups. 
Prior statutes had allowed religious use, but present 
statutes deleted mention of use by religious groups. 
Action in the case was begun by a group of high 
school students who were prohibited from meeting before 
school hours to hold voluntary prayer meeti~gs. 7 8 Action 
was brought in the Federal District Court on Constitu-
tional grounds of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, 
and free exercise of religious beliefs. A manual of ad-
ministration of the Kanawha County Schools had a section 
which directed that all requests for use of school 
buildings for religious purposes were to be denied. 
School policy also required that no students would be in 
a school building without the supervision of a teacher.79 
78Hunt v. Board of Education of County of Kanawha, 321 
F. Supp. 1263 (West Virginia) (1971). 
79Ibid., p. 1264. 
The plaintiffs had begun to meet on the premises 
of Herbert Hoover High School before school hours for 
the purpose of offering group prayers. Meetings had 
been initiated without the knowledge of the school 
staff. Once notified of the meetings, the school prin-
cipal denied access to school facilities to the group. 80 
Decision 
John A. Field, Jr., Chief Judge of the Federal Dis-
1~ 
trict Court, determined that only two questions should be 
answered in the decision: first, whether the Board of 
Education had the authority to prohibit the use of school 
facilities for any religious purpose, and second, whether 
such prohibition is constitutionally permissable. Justice 
Field concluded that the answer to both questions must be 
in the affirmative.81 In finding no constitutional depri-
vation, Judge Field stated: 
The position of official neutrality 
evidenced by the regulating of the Board 
of Education here in question does not 
bespeak g~vernment· hostility toward the 
religious beliefs of any individuals, 
including the plaintiff herein, but is 
merely consistent with the well-established 
constitutional pr~nciple of separation of 
Church and State. 2 
80Ibid. 
81Ibid., p. 1265. 
82Ibid., p. 1267. 
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Discussion 
The findings of the court followed a pattern estab-
lished in earlier church-state decisions such as McCollum 
v. Board of Education. 8 3 Validity of the complaint was 
judged on both the state statutory merits and consti-
tutional merits. 
The court noted that all religious use of school 
property was prohibited by school board regulation. 
Such prohibition was found to be in compliance with the 
West Virginia statute governing use by outside groups. 
Facts 
National Socialist White People's Party 
v. Ringers 
473 F. 2d 1010 (1973) 
Virginia Code Annotated of 1969 allowed local school 
boards to rent high school auditoriums during nonschool 
hours for any legal assembly as will not impair the effie-
iency of the schools. The National Socialist White People's 
Party appealed a district court ruling to the United States 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The District Court had 
denied the party's complaint to compel the Arlington County 
School Board to permit the party to use a high school audi-
83McCollum v. Board of Education, 68 Supreme Court 
461 (Illinois) (1958). 
toritim for a meeting to be held during nonschool 
hours. 84 
The Arlington County School Board had initially 
granted the party's application to use a high school 
auditorium for a public meeting. Permission was re-
voked when the party published a handbill announcing 
a rally inviting only white, non-Jewish persons to 
attend. The party claimed that the board's denial of 
a meeting place infringed the rights secured by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution. 85 
Decision 
In reversing and remanding the decision of the 
152 
district court, the majority of circuit court judges held 
that the school board's repeated exercise of its dis-
cretionary authority to rent school auditoriums for a 
nominal fee during on-school hours to public and pri-
vate groups for meetings on a first-come, first-served 
basis, to the extent that the auditorium was not needed 
for school purposes, constituted an effective dedication 
of the auditorium for exercise of First Amendment rights. 
84National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 
473 F. 2d 1010 (1973). 
ssrbid., p. 1019. 
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It was aiso found that the school board's denial of use 
of the public forum of a high school auditorium because 
of the political party's discriminatory membership poli-
cies constituted an invalid prior restraint, as if use had 
been denied on the basis of a controversial belief the 
party would be likely to express at the place.86 
The court further held that exercise of First Amend-
ment rights in a public forum dedicated to that purpose 
cannot be outweighed by state action doctrine. State 
espousal of racial views woudl not result from use of 
school facilities dedicated as a public forum, according 
to Judge Winter.87 
Circuit Court Judge Butzner concurred in part and 
dissented in part with the majority of the circuit court. 
He concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Federal Constitution does not authorize a federal 
court to compel a state to rent its property to an or-
ganization that bars black people from its membership. 
Judge Butzner also felt that contrary to the party's 
assertion, its First Amendment rights are not so over-
riding that its racially discriminatory membership prac-
tices are irrelevant.88 
B6rbid., p. 1010-1011. 
B7rbid. 
88Ibid., p. 1010-1023. 
15~ 
Discussion 
The central issue in this case is the conflict of 
the rights of the state versus constitutional guarantees 
of the United States Constitution. The District Court 
decision had been based on possible violence and damage 
to the facilities and unconstitutionally involving the 
state in the party's racially discriminatory policies. 
Even though the Supreme Court had ruled on discrimi-
natory political parties in earlier decisions, the majority. 
of the appeals court chose to give priority to the First 
Amendment rights of freedom of speech, association, and 
assembly. 
Facts 
Hennessey v. Independent School 
District Number 4 
552 Pacific 2d 1141 (1976) 
In this case, a parent-teacher association sought 
a writ of mandamus to require the Lincoln County School 
Board to allow use of school facilities for meeting of the 
parent-teacher organization. The District Court of 
Lincoln County had upheld the right of the school board 
to withhold use of school facilities from the parent-
teacher group. The parent-teacher association appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma claiming the action by the 
school board was arbitrary, discriminatory, and a denial 
of rights guaranteed bythe Constitutions of the United 
States and of Oklahoma in that the board had allowed 
certain other groups access to school facilities for 
their meetings.89 
The school board had allowed such groups as Lions 
Club, Young Homemakers' Organizations, and 4-H Clubs 
to use buildings as authorized under Oklahoma law. 
The parent-teacher group had applied several times to 
the superintendent and had been denied access while no 
evidence was present that other groups had been denied. 
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With statutes giving boards discretion to determine uses, 
no constitutional challenge has been allowed if local 
boards ban all outside use. Once school boards exercise 
this discretion by allowing certain groups use of property 
for purposes determined by the local board, then they must 
not adopt a discriminatory policy as to who will be 
allowed access to facilities. 
Facts 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Realm of Louisiana 
v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board 
578 Federal 2d 1122 (1978) 
A local unit of the Ku Klux Klan brought suit against 
a school board questioning the constitutionality of an 
officially adopted policy under which groups advocating 
89Hennessey v. Independent School District Number 4, 
552 P. 2d 1141 (Oklahoma) (1976). 
1~6 
racial discrimination were excluded from use of school 
facilities.90 The United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Louisiana had denied temporary in-
junctive relief against the school board to apply this 
new policy to the Ku Klux Klan. Judge E. Gordon West, 
of the District Court, had spoken for the majority in 
saying that the policy did not violate equal protection. 
At some time after the first parent-teacher association 
request, the school board adopted rules which stated 
that the school board would not tolerate or continue 
affiliation with any organization which was unsupportive 
of the school board or any part of the school system. 91 
Decisions 
Only one issue not dealing with constitutional issues 
was determined, that being that no evidence was presented 
that the parent-teacher association request would not be 
in the best interests of the community.92 
The Supreme Court found the actions of the school 
board to be in violation of the First and Fou~teenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States as an 
90Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Realm of Louisiana v. 
East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 578 F. 2d 1122 
(Louisiana) (1978). 
91Ibid., p.1144. 
92Ibid., p. 1144-1145. 
abridgement of freedom of speech, and a denial of equal 
protection; they were also in violation of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.93 
Discussion 
In the decision, a need for harmonious balance be-
tween broad constitutional guarantees and discretionary 
authority to allow outside use under regulations and 
conditions prescribed by a local board was addressed. 
In all cases studied thus far or improperly deny rights 
of speech, assembly, or association. The Klan appealed 
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.94 
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East Baton Rouge Parish School Board had maintained 
a standing policy of allowing outside organizations to 
use school facilities for meetings and gatherings during 
nonschool hours. Permission was granted on a first-come 
first-serve basis on condition of a modest rental fee and 
the payment of any overtime custodial or janitorial ex-
penses incurred. In granting this permission for such 
use, no distinction between applicants was made on the 
basis of their political or ideological views.9 5 
93Ibid. 
94Ibid. 
95Ibid., p. 1123. 
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On November 17, 1975, the Klan was granted permission 
to use a school gymnasium on November 22, 1975, for what 
it termed a patriotic meeting. However, the planned 
·meeting did not take place. Dr. John Bell, Chief of the 
Branch Office for Civil Rights of the United States De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare in Dallas, 
telephoned the school board on November 19 to say that 
the proposed use by the Ku Klux Klan would violate 
certain regulations to the Emergency School Aid Act and 
unless permission was revoked, federal funds might be 
cut off.96 Bell's call put the school board in a di-
lemma. Eventually, it chose to revoke the granted use 
to the Klan. Even though Dr. Bell had retreated with 
his threat, the school board developed a new policy 
which discriminated among applicants on the basis of the 
content of the ideas they advocate, their membershp, and 
meeting-attendance policies, which, accordingly, 
excluded the Ku Klux Klan from using school facilities. 
The Klan immediately amended its appeal to include an 
attack on the new policy.97 
Decision 
Circuit Court Judge Gee, speaking for the Appeals 
Court, expressed only one basic issue in the case. This 
96Ibid. 
97 T '-·; l - 1J.-.c. .. 1 ?· i.l24. 
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issue was the right of an agency of the state, consistent 
with the Constitution, to condition the off-time use of 
public school facilities on the political or ideological 
views of the applicant, on its membership policies, or 
who may be permitted to attend its proposed function.98 
The court first applied the "public forum" doc-
trine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Grayned v. City 
of Rockford,99 and found that the local board had his-
torically permitted a variety of groups to use school 
facilities. In remanding the case to the District Court, 
no evidence to support a claim of possible violence and 
damage to school property was found. The court suggested 
that this might be presented during the re-hearing at the 
district level.100 
Discussion 
The ruling in National White People's Party v. Ringers 
was quoted a number of times in this case. An analogy was 
drawn concerning the state's responsibility for the views 
expressed during use that compared views expressed at·a 
shopping mall to those expressed in a "public forum" gym-
nasium.101 
98Ibid. 
99Grayned v. City of Rockford, 98 Supreme Court 229A 
(1972). 
lOOop. cit. p. 1125. 
The whole decision was centered around the advisa-
bility of a board of education's assuming the right to 
allow certain types of uses where ideas and policies 
were found to be suitable while prohibiting those it 
does not approve--all this being in the name of equal 
protection and civil rights.102 
Facts 
Resnick v. East Brunswick Township 
Board of Education 
389 Atlantic 2d 944 (1978) 
New Jersey statutes allow local school boards to 
adopt rules allowing use of school property during non-
instructional hours for giving and receiving of instruc-
tion in any branch of education and holding of social, 
civic, and recreational meetings and entertainments and 
other purposes.l03 
Since 1962, the East Brunswick Township Board of 
Education has allowed a number of local groups to use 
its school facilities during nonschool hours. Groups 
using facilities have included various religious groups 
as well as other nonprofit social, civic, recreational, 
and charitable groups.l04 
l02Ibid. 
103Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Edu-
cation, 389 A. 2d 944 (New Jersey) (1978). 
104Ibid., p. 946. 
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Three religious groups--East Brunswick Baptist 
Church, Nativity Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the 
Reform Temple of East Brunswick--had rented school fa-
cilities including classrooms, all-purpose rooms, and 
gymnasiums. Each of the groups used facilities during 
nonschool hours for religious instruction and services. 
Each of the groups had building plans which would pro-
vide their own facilities for these uses. A rental fee 
was assessed which approximated the cost of janitorial 
services. Religious groups were required to make annual 
reapplications for use.l05 
Upon learning of the use of East Brunswick schools 
for religious purposes, Abraham Resnick complained to 
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the board of education. When the school board took no 
action, Resnick filed a complaint in the Chancery Court. 
His complaint alleged that use of schools by religious 
groups violated the state statute governing outside use 
of school facilities and the United States and New Jersey 
Constitutions.l06 
Decision 
The trial court held that the state statute governing 
use of school facilities neither contemplated nor permitted 
lOSibid. 
106Ibid., p. 948. 
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the use of public schools by religious groups for worship 
services, but that Sunday schools and Hebrew instruction 
were within permitted uses of the state statute. Use 
by the groups was also found to involve an outlay of 
taxpayer funds for utilities and thus violated the pro-
visions of the state constitution. The court went on to 
state that a rental based on actual cost would alleviate 
this problem.l07 
The trial court also affirmed _the complaint that use 
of schools for religious worship and instruction violated 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. Excessive entanglement was found based on 
administrative responsibilities of the employees of the 
board, political entanglement in subjecting defendant 
board to pressures from those promoting use and those 
opposing use, and excessive entanglement in the storage 
of religious materials in school buildings where they 
were accessible to children during school hours.l08 
Limits to the decision were indicated by the court's 
statement that its ruling did not deal with rental to re-
ligious groups at a rate that approximated what would be 
charged on the open market for comparable private facilities, 
107Ibid. 
108Ibid., p. 948-949. 
nor did it cover temporary use of public school facili-
ties during emergencies such as after fire or flood.l09 
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The defendants appealed to Superior Court, which 
heard the arguments and affirmed the decision for es-
sentially the same reason. The defendants again appealed 
to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey presented its de-
cision in three areas: nonconstitutional grounds, state 
constitutional grounds, and federal constitutional grounds. 
By a 5-2 margin, the Supreme Court reversed the decision 
of the lower court.110 
On nonconstitutional grounds the court concluded 
that no statutory bar to religious services or instruction 
being carried out in public schools during periods when 
facilities were not being used for school purposes was 
present. On state constitutional grounds the court ruled 
that school was made available on the same terms and con-
ditions to religious groups as to other nonprofit groups. 
The court found no interference with the regular school 
program. Full reimbursement of rental costs was required 
to clear any state constitutional barrier.lll 
l09Ibid. 
-llO!bid., p. 949-953. 
lllrbid. 
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Federal constitutional issues related to whether 
permitting religious groups to rent public school fa-
cilities at a rate reflective of the cost incurred by 
the. school board ran afoul of the "establishment clause" 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The court rejected the idea that the board was imper-
missibly subsidizing religion. 11 2 No preference to a 
particular religious group was found based on the number 
of different religious groups using facilities.ll3 
Decision 
The tripartite test was applied in the decision of 
the Supreme Court. Federal constitutional issues were 
weighed in light of the landmark decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in the area of church-state relations. 
The Southside Estates decision, discussed earlier in this 
chapter, was given heavy emphasis in the decision. 
The dissenting justices saw the ruling as another 
fissure in the wall of separation between church and state. 
Justice Clifford, in dissenting the opinion, saw a need 
to guard against excessive governmental involvement in 
religious affairs, no matter how pure the motive may be.ll4 
112rbid. 
ll3Ibid. 
114Ibid., p. 960-96E .• 
Kiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
N.C. App., 285 S.E. 2d 110 (1981) 
Facts 
The plaintiffs in this case were day care operators 
in Charlotte, North Carolina. The defendants are the 
duly elected corporate body under the laws of the state. 1 15 
The controversy arose over the school board's in-
volvement in the initiation and operation of the Dilworth 
Extended Day Enrichment program, which was designed to 
alleviate the problem of "latch-key" children. Instead 
of leaving school grounds at the end of the day, students 
enrolled in the program remained at school where, under the 
supervision of program staff, they did homework or studied, 
and engaged in other activities. Students taking part in 
the program, which operates from 2:00-5:30 p.m., were not 
required to stay until 5:30,and parents chose days and 
times of attendance. The program was self-sufficient and 
no cost was incurred by the school board with the ex-
ception of incidental cost of heat and lights.ll6 
llSKiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 285 S.E. 2d 110 (North 
Carolina) (1981). 
ll6Ibid. 
The complaint by Kiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. 
was in the following seven areas: 
(1) that the program violated the Constitutional 
mandate requiring a general and uniform sys-
tem of free public schools; 
(2) that school funds were used to establish 
and maintain the program; 
(3) that the expenditures were not for public 
purposes and have not been approved by 
the voters; 
(4) that the School Board was in unauthorized 
competition with the plaintiffs; 
(5) that the program violated the personal 
and property rights of the plaint~ff; 
(6) that there was no statutory authorization 
for the program; 
(7) that the legislature could not delegate to 
the school board the power or authority to 
maintain the program.ll7 
Decision 
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Judge Becton, speaking for the court, ruled that the 
program should not be judged as a day-care center, but 
rather an educational program sponsored by a school-
organized committee.ll8 
On the first point of contention, Judge Becton ruled 
that a mandate to have a uniform system would be impossible 
117rbid. 
118Ibid., p. 113-115. 
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because every school has differences. On the second 
point, the ruling provided that the program was self-
sufficient. The school board was also found to be free 
under statutes of North Carolina to allow the use of 
facilities. No violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments was found.ll9 
Discussion 
An important issue in the case was the property 
rights of the day care operators. Although the program 
did present competition to the day-care operators, no 
vested constitutional right to day-care service by pri-
vate groups was found. 
Facts 
Country Hills Christian Church v. unified School 
District Number 512, Johnson County 
560 Federal Supplement 1207 (1983) 
Country Hills Christian Church had requested use of 
public school facilities to hold religious meetings on 
numerous occasions. Kansas statutes allow school dis-
tricts to open any or all school buildings for community 
purposes, and to adopt rules and regulations governing 
such use of buildings. This school district had policies 
119Ibid. 
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which had allowed a number of different groups, including 
several churches, to use its facilities.120 
Country Hills Christian Church had initially been 
granted use of school facilities. When the superintendent 
learned that religious services were planned, permission 
was withdrawn. Withdrawal was based on advice from legal 
counsel that allowing use would be a violation of the 
"establishment clause" of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Country Hills members re-
quested the school board to amend the policy to allow · 
use by religious groups. The school board refused and 
Country Hills then brought suit against the board in 
United States District Court.121 
Three questions were determined in the District 
Court: 
(1) Has the school board created a public 
forum? 
(2) Can the defendants constitutionally 
deny a group access to a public 
forum because the group plans to use 
the forum for religious purposes? 
(3) Does the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment prohibit defendants 
from allowing religious uses of school 
120countrv Hills Christian Church v. Unified School 
District Number 512, Johnson County, 512 F. Supp. 1207 
(Kansas) (1983). 
121Ibid, p. 1212-1214. 
Decision 
on the same terms and conditions as 
they apply to other groups.122 
Judge Saffels presented the findings of the court. 
On the first point, the court stated that defendants had 
made facilities available to a variety of groups that 
board policies created a public forum. 1 23 
On the second point, Justice Saffels quoted the 
Widmar v. Vincent decision which stated that religious 
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worship and discussion are forms of speech and association 
protected by the First Amendment. 124 The view taken by the 
court on this point was that Country Hills Christian Church 
had been denied access to a public forum based solely on 
their exercise of free speech.l25 
On the third point concerning use of the establishment 
clause, the court held that the school board was required 
to be neutral in relations with groups of religious be-
lievers, but neither adverse nor favorable towards any 
group. The court also examined the effects of the 
1 2 2 rbid. 
l23Ibid. 
124Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
125country Hills v. Unified School District, op. cit., 
p. 1215-1218. 
tripartite test and found no violations of the test in 
the case presented.l26 
Discussion 
The decision reiterated rulings in other cases 
dealing with public forms which stated that once a 
school is opened as a public forum equal access must be 
proviried to all groups. The school board, on the ad-
vice of legal counsel, had chosen to use the tripartite 
test developed in the Lemon decision as a basis for de-
nial of use to the religious group. No violation of 
the tripartite test was found in allowing the use by 
the church in this case. 
The decision could have interesting applications to 
other situations arising during requests for use of 
school facilities. This ruling may make legal use of 
school facilities for student prayer groups after school 
hours. 
126 rbid. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Citizens frequently request use of public school fa-
cilities for private purposes. Responses to requests 
given by school boards and administrators have opened 
numerous areas of litigation. Validity of litigation has 
been judged in light of varying statutory and constitu-
tional provisions of the states. Federal constitutional 
issues have also been raised in many situations. 
Legal principles presented in this study relating 
to private use of public school facilities are not ex-
clusive to the area. First and Fourteenth Amendment con-
cerns as well as school board discretion reach into a 
variety of other areas addressed by school boards and 
administrators. Uniqueness arises when broad principles 
are applied to the narrow area of private use of public 
school facilities. 
Summary 
State legislatures in forty-four states have enacted 
statutes providing guidelines for regulation of public 
school facilities by private groups. Laws range from very 
specific to very broad methods of expression. 
Three broad classifications appear from review of 
state statutes which provide guidelines for private use 
of public school facilities. These classifications show 
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the range of allowable use and the authority of school 
boards to regulate use by private groups. 
Statutes Mandating Broad Use 
The intent of mandating statutes is that use will 
be granted subject to regulations by local school boards. 
Five states (California, Hawaii, Maryland, Ohio, and Utah) 
fall in this classification. 
Use for Specific or General Purposes as Allowed by Local 
School Boards 
Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have 
statutes describing uses for specific or general purposes 
as allowed by local school boards. Typically, statutes in-
eluded terms such as "may allow" or "may permit" instead 
of "shall allow". 
Statutes in this classification often provide lists 
of suggested activities which may or may not be allowed 
by school boards. Other possible activities are not for-
bidden. Methods of development of rules and regulations 
are also frequently provided. 
Statutes Not Specifically Addressing Conditions of 
Private Use 
Ten states are without statutes or have statutes not 
specifically addressing private use of public school fa-
cilities. States in this classification generally have 
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statutes that describe methods of accountability of school 
boards for control of school property~ 
Statutory Responsibility for Cost of Private Use 
Seventeen states have chosen not to mention cost of 
use specifically, thus leaving school boards wide dis-
cretion to determine cost responsibility. Twenty-seven 
states make users responsible for all costs incurred by 
private use. Fourteen states provide funding from state 
sources for certain categories of use. Seven states pro-
vide funding through community school programs or civic 
center programs. 
Types of Allowed Users 
Sixteen states have laws specifically addressing use 
by religious groups; these states allow use of public 
school facilities for religious meetings under regula-
tions determined by school boards or boards of trustees. 
Twenty-six states cite use of school facilities for 
political meetings or as polling places. Statutes vary 
in descriptions of political or election use. Several 
states allow political use only following a vote of the 
people or only if the political group represents a cer-
tain percentage of the electorate. 
Four states have enacted statutes concerning use by 
subversive groups. 
use statutes. 
Most of these states have mandated-
Recreational use and educational use are the most 
frequently mentioned activities cited by statute. 
~hirty states specifically mention use for educational 
purposes and twenty-seven states mention use for recre-
ational purposes. 
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Four states have statutory provisions for operation 
of after-school child-care programs. California, Hawaii, 
Maryland, and Tennessee are included. 
States with statutes concerning priva~e use of fa-
cilities vest authority for control and regulation of 
school property in local governmental agencies. Non-
interference with regular school programs is also fre-
quently mentioned. 
In the introductory chapter some basic questions 
were proposed. Discussion developed around those six 
questions will provide insight c~ncerning private use 
of public elementary and secondary school litigation. 
1. What are the major legal issues regarding pri-
vate use of public elementary and secondary school fa-
cilities? 
Legal issues relating to the topic are based on these 
areas: (1) nonconstitutional grounds, (2) state consti-
tutional grounds, and (3) federal constitutional grounds. 
Because of the diversity in each of these areas, a defini-
tive list of all legal issues is difficult to delineate. 
l75 
However, certain issues tend to hold true in most juris-
dictions. 
The primary issue deals with whether school boards 
used proper discretion in granting or rejecting certain 
uses and the conditions of the decisions. Conditions of 
use have often involved the following general issues: 
1. Determination of interference with the regular 
school program 
2. Determination of possible damage to school 
property 
3. Determination whether the use will be casual, 
temporary, and incidental 
4. Determination of constitutional and statutory 
authority of school boards to allow or pro-
hibit use 
5. Determination whether use has been allowed 
in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner 
Several issues have arisen under certain categories 
of use. Often issues raised fall within the framework 
of federal constitutional concerns. 
Religious use requests often have raised issues con-
cerning neutrality of school boards as required by the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Other First and Fourteenth Amendment 
issues raised in litigation have centered around exclusion 
from a public forum, equal access, and the "free exercise 
clause." 
Commercial use requests have created issues dealing 
with property rights of individuals, determining whether 
use promotes personal gain, and rights of school boards 
to operate school cafeterias and school stores. Length 
of use for commercial purposes has also been questioned. 
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Requests from political groups have developed issues 
of First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, association, 
and assembly. Other issues have centered on possible dis-
ruptions of the regular school program, discriminatory 
practices when controversial or unpopular views are an-
ticipated during use, required nonsubversive oaths, and 
violations of the equal protection clause. 
Entirely new issues have been created by requests 
from teacher associations and unions for use of school 
facilities. The major issue involves granting exclusive 
rights for access to facilities to particular groups. 
Compelling state interests have also been an issue. 
The legal issues are simply measures of school 
board application of statutory and constitutional 
allowances. 
2. What major legal principles emerge from landmark 
judicial decisions that are applicable to the statutory 
provisions of the states? 
Questions relating to private use of public school 
facilities are answered as each relates to the statutes 
of the state where the litigation occurs, the constitutional 
provisions of that state, and federal constitutional freedoms 
relating to the proposed use. Federal and state constitu-
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tional freedoms must not be violated by state statutes or 
school board regulations. Any school board regulation 
must not be in contravention to state statutes. 
Certain general principles have been established by 
judicial action at various levels: 
1) School boards or other local authorities are 
vested with control of school property 
2) School authorities may prohibit use that 
interferes with the regular school program 
3) Use may be prohibited if there is substantial 
proof of damage to school property 
4) Approved uses must be temporary, casual, and 
incidental 
5) Use must be granted to groups in a non-
discriminatory and nonarbitrary manner 
6) When allowed by statute, school authorities 
may deny all requests for use 
Litigation involving religious use of public school fa-
cilities has created certain principles unique to religious 
use. Generally, religious use has been allowed if it is not 
barred by statute or if use is included in school board 
policies. General principles apply to the area of religious 
use. Courts have found that once facilities are opened to 
one religious groups, they must be opened to all equally. 
Principles established for religious use include the follow-
ing: 
1) Direct or indirect use of public school funds 
to aid any religious denomination is illegal 
(In most instances temporary, casual, and in-
cidental use of facilities has been found not 
to provide aid.) 
2) Religious use cases will be judged in light 
of the "establishment clause" of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States 
3) Religious groups must pay full reimbursement 
of cost incurred by use 
4) Conflict of "establishment clause" and "free 
exercise clause" are resolved by the facts 
of a particular case 
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Use by political and subversive groups has also spawned 
lawsuits creating principles unique to this group: 
1) All political groups must be treated in a non-
discrimnatory manner (It has 
just because the school board disagreed with 
the philosophy of a particular group, such 
disagreement could not be used to ban use.) 
2) Once school boards open facilities to use by 
political groups, constitutional rights of 
freedom of speech, assembly, and access to 
a public forum must not be abridged 
3) A nonsubversive oath cannot be required as a 
condition of use 
4) The burden of proving a group is subversive 
or may damage school facilities belongs to 
the school board. 
Use of school facilities for commercial purposes has 
brought about court action to determine legally acceptable 
principles for such use. Principles include the following: 
1) School facilities cannot be used when the primary 
purpose is personal gain 
2) Facilities may be rented for uses which duplicate 
business enterprises when these uses are occasional 
and temporary 
3) School boards have a legal right to operate school 
stores and cafeterias 
4) Facilities may not be leased for permanent busi-
nesses on s~hool groun1s 
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Social use was a much judicated area in the early part 
of the century. Court rulings have established that dances 
and other social activities are legal when not in contra-
vention to the general principles for nonschool use. 
Legal principles, which apply to every case concerning 
a particular type of use, are impossible to extract from the 
body of case law. Sharp differences between court rulings 
still occur. Differences in rulings are often the result of 
diversity of state statutes. Others result because of phi-
losophy and customs of a particular geographical area. 
3. Based on recent court cases, what issues related to 
private use of public school facilities are being litigated 
or are likely to be? 
The major issue litigated in facility use cases is the 
manner in which school boards have applied the statutory and 
constitutional authority of their respective states. Freedoms 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States have also been used as 
challenges to school board action and constitutionality of 
state statutes. 
A tendency toward liberalization of the types of per-
missable private use of school facilities has occurred in 
recent court decisions. The Resnick case is typical of the 
division of issues presented in most litigation. Issues 
fall into three broad categories: (1) state statutory 
issues, (2) state constitutional issues, and (3) federal 
constitutional issues. 
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The Resnick case, Country Hills case, and National 
Socialist White People's Party cases present reasonably 
clear models for judicial process for addressing issues re-
lating to private use of public school facilities. General 
principles of noninterference with regular school programs, 
casual and temporary use, and granting of use in a non-
discriminatory and nonarbitrary manner seem to be well 
established. 
Federal constitutional issues have been present in the 
majority of cases processed during the last 25 years. The 
constitutional issues of freedom of speech and equal pro-
tection seem to be the most litigated constitutional issues. 
Religious use continues to be a prime issue for ju-
dicial action. New issues relating to "creative" approaches 
to school-community cooperation have come to the fore-
front. The Kiddie Korner Day Care case addressed the new 
and fertile area of after-school care programs. 
Recent teacher association cases have brought issues 
of exclusive rights of access to school facilities by 
representative unions before the courts. Freedom of 
association has also been an issue in these teacher union 
cases. 
4. What trends can be determined from analysis of 
the statutory provisions of the states? 
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The legislatures of the states have developed a more 
permissive attitude toward private use of public school fa-
cilities. According to information presented in Chapter II, 
seventeen states had provided "wider-use" legislation by 1914. 
By 1964, this total had risen to thirty states with statutes 
specifically allowing private use of school facilities. By· 
1984, forty-four states had enacted statutes providing 
guidelines for regulation of public school facilities use by 
private groups. Twenty-seven states chose to develop statutes 
allowing expanded use during the seventy-year period between 
1914 and 1984. 
Five states have specified statutes allowing school fa-
cilities to be used for after-school care programs. Five 
states have laws mandating use by private groups under board 
regulations. 
State statutes show much diversity in their language 
and uses allowed. This diversity has helped fuel the di-
verse judicial interpretations of allowed private use 
of public school facilities. 
5. Based on established legal precedent, what are 
the legally acceptable criteria for private use of public 
elementary and secondary school facilities? 
Legally acceptable criteria for determining whether 
school boards have acted corrl~ctl~-~· ir: P'2r!:li::ting 0r dsr;:·irlg 
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private use of public school facilities are based on state 
statutes, state constitutions, and the Constitution of the 
United States. Statutory and constitutional precedents 
determine whether school boards have acted in arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal ways. Early cases tended to rely 
on fiscal limitations. Later cases have relied more on 
precedents established by commonly held opinions of the 
meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Conclusions 
The power of local school boards to regulate use of 
public school facilities by private groups has been 
questioned on many occasions in state and federal courts. 
Many states have chosen to encourage expanded use of 
school facilities by private groups through enactment of 
more permissive state legislation. Permissive legislation 
has resulted from favorable public opinion that public 
school facilities should be widely used by private groups. 
Early court decisions were inclined toward limited 
use of school facilities by nonschool groups. As public 
opinion and state statutes became more permissive, court 
rulings also took a more open approach to expanded uses. 
As public use of school facilities increased, legal 
complaints concerning authority of school boards to con-
trol and regulate outside use increased. Court proceedings 
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mercial, and other groups to use facilities and under 
what conditions and regulations such use might be per-
mit ted. 
Although the statutes of the forty-four states with 
permissive statutes and court rulings vary widely, certain 
common principles have emerged as follows: 
1) Decisions of courts are made in light of 
statutory and constitutional issues relat-
ing to specific uses. 
2) Courts will not interfere with decisions of 
local school boards unless violations of 
statutory or constitutional issues are found. 
3) School authorities may prohibit use that inter-
feres with the regular school program. 
4) Temporary, casual, and incidental use of school 
property is allowed under board discretion. 
5) School boards must not allow use in an arbitrary, 
capricious, discriminatory, or illegal manner. 
6) School boards may deny all requests for use when 
allowed by statute. 
7) Permissability of use by religious groups is 
evaluated in light of the First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
8) Once school boards open facilities to use by 
political groups, constitutional rights of 
freedom of speech, assembly, and access to a 
public forum must not be abridged. 
9) School boards and state legislatures cannot 
require nonsubversive oaths as a condition 
for use. 
10) Burden of proving a group is subversive or 
may damage school property belongs to the 
school board. 
11) School facilities cannot be used for commercial 
purposes when the primary purpose is personal 
financial guin. 
12) School boards have a legal right to operate 
school stores and school cafeterias. 
13) School facilities cannot be leased for perma-
nent businesses on school grounds. 
14) School boards must operate within their own 
rules and regulations, statutory entitlement, 
state constitutions, and the Constitution of 
the United States. 
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Legality of private use of school property continues 
to be in a state of flux because of the diversity of state 
statutes. Generally, decisions relating to private use of 
school facilities are made first in light of state statutes 
and state constitutions. Broader issues relating to the 
federal Constitution are determined in view of prevailing 
rulings of the Federal Courts. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
This study has dealt strictly with private use of public 
school facilities. A number of interesting areas not ad-
dressed in the study were located during the review of 
literature and review of statutes and court cases. Areas of 
possible further study include (1) tort liability during 
nonschool use; (2) use of school buses for private purposes; 
(3) legality of private schools using public school facilities; 
(4) legality of released time programs for sectarian purposes; 
(5) legality of one school district allowing unused property 
to be used by other school districts; (6) legality of long-
term leases of public school property for civic, social, or 
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commercial purposes; and (7) legality of facility improve-
ments based on long-term leases. 
The recent development of community scqool programs also 
increases possibilities of conflict with other governmental 
agencies in providing services to various citizens. Rights 
of teacher unions to access to school property also presents 
fertile ground for future litigation, and hence, future 
study. 
Further study should also be undertaken to determine the 
status of new statutes and new court cases as the decade of 
1980's comes to a close. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATE LAWS AFFECTING PRIVATE USE OF PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL FACILITIES 
ALABAMA 
Section 16-10-11. Use of schoolhouse for 
civic purposes. 
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The board of school trustees shall have the power to 
authorize the use of the schoolhouse for such civic, social, 
recreational and community gatherings as in its opinion do 
not interfere with the principal use of the said school build-
ing or property. It shall be the duty of the persons or per-
sons making application for the use of the schoolhouse for a 
public meeting place to see that the said schoolhouse after 
said meeting is in as clean a condition as it was before said 
meeting, and in case of failure upon the part of said person 
or persons to whom permission has been granted to hold the 
meetings to place said school after said meeting in as clean 
a condition as it was when said schoolhouse was turned over to 
said person or persons for said meeting, or the failure of the 
person or persons to respond in damages to any injury to the 
property, the ordinary wear and tear excepted, the board of 
school trustees shall refuse all further applications for the 
use of such schoolhouse by the same party. 
Section 9-15-36. Leasing of school lands. 
With the approval of the governor, the commissioner of 
conservation and natural resources is hereby authorized and 
empowered to rent or lease school lands upon such terms as he 
deems ad»isable, and he is also hereby authorized and empowered 
to rent or lease school lands for the purposes of prospecting 
for oil or gas upon such lands and to execute contracts for the 
sale of oil or gas from school lands, upon such terms and for 
the best interest of the state. 
The commissioner of conservation and natural resources, 
with the approval of the Governor, is also hereby authorized 
to lease school lands for the purpose of mining or removing 
there from coal, iron and other minerals, other than oil or 
gas upon a royalty basis and may include rights-of-way therein 
or easements over or upon such lands as may be deemed necessary 
or convenient to the operation or conduct of any mine or mining 
operation under such lease. 
202 
ALASKA 
Section 14.03.100. Use of school facilities. 
The governing body of a school district may allow.the 
use of school facilities for any legal gatherings or assem-
blies. The governing body shall adopt bylaws that will in-
sure reasonable and impartial use of the facilities. 
Chapter 36. Community Schools. 
Section 14.36.010/ Purpose, intent. 
(a) The community school is an expression of the philosophy 
that the school, as the prime educational institution of the 
community, is most effective when it involves the people of 
that community in a program designed to fulfill the educational 
needs. The community school promotes a more efficient use of 
school facilities through an extension of buildings and equip-
ment beyond the normal school day. The purpose of this chapter 
is to provide state leadership and financial support to en-
courage and assist the school districts in the establishment 
of community schools. 
(b) It is the intent of the legislature that: 
(1) a program of community school grants be established to 
provide assistance to local communities in the initial de-
velopment, implementation, and operation of the community 
school program. 
(2) technical assistance, monitoring, training and coordi-
nation of statewide efforts to develop and operate community 
school programs provided by the department. 
(3) the community school program will become fully operationl 
once a plan of operation has been approved by the Commissioner, 
and 
(4) evaluation of the approved plan of operation for a com-
munity school program shall be conducted by the department in 
cooperation with the school district at least once every four 
years; a report of the community school programs evaluated in 
the preceding year shall be presented by the Commissioner to 
the legislature before the 15th day of each regular sesion of 
the legislature. 
Section 14.36.020. Community schools grant fund created; limi-
tations on use. 
There is created a community schools grant fund as the 
account in the general fund. The fund shall be used to make 
community school grants to local attendance areas or school 
districts under this chapter. Legislative appropriations for 
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community school grants shall be deposited in this fund. 
Community school grants may e used for planning, training 
and operations. (§ 1 ch 103 SLA 1975) 
Section 14.36.030. Grants from the state. 
(a) A district operating a community school program under 
an approved plan of operation may receive an annual grant 
from the state of one-half of one percent of its public 
school foundation support or $10,000, whichever is greater. 
(b) For each fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1980, a 
district operating an approved community school program under 
(a) of this section may receive a further grant from the state 
equal to the amount allocated by the district to the support 
of the community school program from sources other than the 
grant provided under (a) of this section. The additional 
grant under this subsection may not exceed the amount re-
ceived under (a) of this section. 
(c) The support of a community school program by a district 
under (b) of this section may be in cash or in kind. Cash 
support may be devised from any source the district considers 
appropriate. In kind support by a district is limited to sup-
port for purposes which benefit only the community school 
program. Cash and in kind support of community school program 
by a district shall be itemized in the community education 
section of the district budget. 
Section 14.36.040. Community school program, application for 
grants. 
Under regulations adopted by the board of education, a 
district may submit to the commissioner an application for a 
community school grant. An application shall include; 
(1) a comprehensive plan for the community school program 
including, but not limited to, before and after school hours 
activities for both children and adults, continued education 
programs for children and adults, and cultural enrichment and 
recreational activities for citizens in the community; 
(2) a provision for a community schools advisory council; 
(3) provision for community school direction and coordination 
to include personnel requirements; 
(4) an assurance that the community school program will be 
reasonably available to residents of all communities within 
the district. 
Section 14.36.050. Application review, disposition. 
The commissioner shall review and approved, disapprove 
or return to the district for modification, an application 
for a community school program grant. 
Section 14.36.060. Technical assistance. 
On the request of a school district, the department 
shall provide technical assistance to a schooi district 
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in developing and submitting an application for a community 
school program. The department may use its own staff or 
consultant that may be necessary to ·accomplish this purpose. 
Section 14.36.070. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "board" means the governing body of a school district; 
(2) "commissioner'' means the ·commissioner of education; 
(3) "community school program" means the composite of those 
educational, cultural, social and recreational services pro-
vided the citizens of a community, except those services 
normally provided through the regular instructional program; 
(4) "department" means the Department of Education; 
(5) "district" means a district of the state public school 
system as defined in AS 14.12.010; 
ARIZONA 
Chapter 3 § 15-342 -- Powers and Duties of Boards --
Discretionary Powers 
The governing board may: Sell or long-term lease to 
the state, country or city any school property required for 
a public purpose, provided the sale or lease of the property 
will not affect the normal operations of a school within the 
school district. 
Section 15-363. School recreation centers; authority to con-
tract with public recreation boards and agencies. 
A. The governing board may operate school buildings and 
grounds for the purpose of providing a public play and recre-
ation center. The governing board may organize and conduct in 
the center community recreation activities which contribute to 
the physical, mental and moral welfare of youths residing in 
the vicinity. A school recreation center may be open at times 
the governing board deems advisable, including evening hours 
and vacation days, and shall be conducted in accordance with 
rules prescribed by the governing board. 
B. The governing board may cooperate and enter into contract 
with other public recreation boards and agencies in carrying 
out the purposes of this section. 
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Section 15-364. Agreements and expenditures of public monies 
for recreational facilities on school properties; use of pro-
ceeds of bond issues. 
A. The governing board of a school district may enter into 
agreements with counties, cities, towns or other school dis-
trict governing boards, providing for the construction, de-
velopment, cooperative maintenance, operation and use of parks 
and recreational facilities, including swimming pools, on 
properties used for school purposes and under the control of 
such school districts. The governing boards may expend public 
monies for the construction and development of such parks or 
recreational facilities in cooperation with cities, towns, and 
counties. 
B. Counties, cities and towns may expend public monies and 
enter into agreements with cities, towns and school district 
governing boards for the contruction, development, cooperative 
maintenance, operation and use of parks, swimming pools and 
other recreational facilities on properties used for school 
purposes, if the governing authorities having charge and con-
trol of such properties give their consent and cooperation. 
Section 15-1105. Civic center school fund; reversion to 
school plan fund. 
A. The governing board may lease or rent school buildings, 
grounds, buses, equipment and other school property to any 
person, group or organization for the recreational, educational, 
political, economic, artistic, moral, scientific, social or 
other civic purpose in the interest of the community. The 
governing board shall charge a reasonable use fee for the 
lease or rental of the school property, which fee may in-
clude goods contributed or services rendered by the person, 
groups or organization to the school district. 
B. The governing board may permit the uncompensated use of 
school buildings, grounds, buses, equipment and other school 
property by any school related group or by any organization 
whose membership is open to the public and whose activities 
promote the educational function of the school district as 
determined in good faith by the school district's governing 
board 
C. The governing board shall require proof of liability in-
surance for such use, lease or rental of school property. 
D. Except as provided in § 15-1102, monies received for and 
derived from the 1JSe of school property under this section 
shall be promptly deposited with the county treasurer who 
shall credit the deposits to the civic center school fund of 
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the respective school district. Monies placed to the credit of 
a civic center school fund may be expended for civic center 
school purposes by warrants drawn upon order of the school dis-
trict governing board. The civic center school fund of a 
school district or multiple school district civic center school 
program is a continuing fund not subject to reversion, except 
upon termination of a civic center school program. Upon termi-
nation of a civic center school program any remaining funds 
shall revert to the school plant fund of the .school district 
or districts. 
ARTICLE 3. COMMUNITY SCHOOL PROGRAM FUND 
Section 15-1141. Definitions. 
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires:. 
1. "Community school" means any school engaged in a community 
school program. 
2. "Community school monies" means monies received as fees, 
tuitions, grants or donations from any person or agency for a 
community school program. 
3. "Community school program" means the involvement of people 
in the development of an educationally oriented community. The 
community school serves the purposes of academic and skill de-
velopment for all citizens, furnishes supervised recreational 
and avocational instruction, supplies remedial and supplemental 
education, furnishes meeting places for community groups and 
provides facilities for the dissemination of a variety of com-
munity related services. 
Section 15-1142. Powers of the governing board. 
The governing board of any school district may: 
1. Establish and operate a community school program in any 
school in its school district. 
2. Budget and expend from the maintenance and operation 
section of the budget, as defined in § 15-903, to employ a 
qualified director necessary for each school or combination 
of schools engaged in community school programs. 
3. Expend community school monies for operation of a com-
munity school program. 
4. Establish tuition and fee charges for community school 
programs. 
Section 15-1143. Community school program fund. 
Monies deposited in a community school fund of a school dis-
trict may be used for community school programs only and are 
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not subject to reversion, except upon termination of a com-
munity school program. Upon termination of a community 
school program any remaining funds shall revert to the ope-
rating budget of the school district. 
ARKANSAS 
Constitution of Arkansas, Article 14, Section 2 
School fund--Use--Purposes.--No money or property be-
longing to the public school fund, or to this State for the 
benefit of schools or universities, shall ever be used for 
any other than for the respective purposes to which it be-
longs. 
Section 19-3605. Use of school facilities for recreation 
purposes secondary. 
The facilities of any school.district, operating a 
recreation program pursuant to the provisions of this act 
[§§ 19-3601-19-3605] shall be used primarily for the pur-
pose of conducting the regular school curriculum and related 
activities, and the use of school facilities for recreation 
purposes authorized by this act shall be secondary. 
Section 80-509. Duties and powers of school directors--
Budgets--Indebtedness. 
The board of school directors of each district in the 
State shall be charged with the following powers and per-
form the following duties: 
(a) Have the care and custody of the schoolhouse, grounds, 
and other property belonging to the District, and shall keep 
same in good ~epair, in sanitary and sightly condition; and 
to lease Sixteenth Section lands located in said School Dis-
trict, individually or in conjunction with the other Boards 
of Directors of other school districts inte~rested in said 
Sixteenth Section, as the case may be. 
(b) Purchase buildings or rent schoolhouses and sites 
therefor, and sell, rent, or exchange such sites or school-
houses. Provided, that in the selection of any school site, 
or the erection of any schoolhouse outside of an incorporated 
town or city, containing twenty-five hundred [2,500] or more 
inhabitants [the same] shall be approved by the county board 
of education, before the contract for securing the site, 
or contract for ouilding the house is made. 
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Section 80-517. Permission to use school buildings for com-
munity meetings may be granted. 
The directors of any school district may permit the 
use of the public schoolhouse thereof for social, civic 
and recreation purposes, or any other community purpose 
including any lawful meetings of its citizens, provided 
such meetings do not interfere with the regular school 
work, and they may make a charge therefor if they deem it 
proper to do so. 
Section 80-518. 
schoolhouse. 
Directors may permit private school to use 
The directors may permit a private school to be taught 
in the district schoolhouse during such time as the said 
house is not occupied by a public school, unless they be 
otherwise directed by a majority of the legal voters of the 
district. 
CALIFORNIA 
ARTICLE 9. JOINT USE 
Section 39470. Lease or agreement. 
Any school district may enter into a lease or agreement 
with a city, county, or city and county for the joint occu-
pancy, or a private education institution for its sole 
occupancy, or the real property and buildings of the school 
district, provided that no such occupancy of school buildings 
and grounds shall occur during normal school hours when the 
school is in session. 
Section 39470. Agreements for rent or lease; priority. 
(a) The governing board of any school district may enter in-
to agreements to make vacant classrooms or other space in 
operating school buildings available for rent or lease to 
other school districts, educational agencies, except private 
educational institutions which maintain kindergarten or 
grades 1 to 12, inclusive, governmental units, nonprofit or-
ganizations, community agencies, professional agencies, com-
mercial and noncommercial firms, corporations, parternships, 
businesses and individuals, including during normal school 
hours if the school is in session. 
(b) The governing board shall give first priority in leasing 
or renting vacant classroom space or other space to educational 
agencies for conducting special educa~ion programs and second 
priority to other educational agencies. 
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Section 39471. Building. 
As used in this article, "building" includes onsite and 
offsite facilities, utilities, and improvements which, as 
agreed upon by the parties, are appropriate for the proper 
operation or function of the building to be jointly occupied 
and used. It also includes the permanent improvement of 
school grounds. 
Section 39472. Prior determination of noninterference in 
school functions. 
Prior to entering into a lease or agreement pursuant to 
this article, the school district governing board shall de-
termine that the proposed joint occupancy and use of school 
district property or ~uildings will not do any of the follow-
. ;:.... 
ing: 
(a) Interfere with the educational program or activities of 
any school or class conducted upon the real property or in 
any building. 
(b) Unduly disrupt the residents in the surrounding neighbor-
hood. 
(c) Jeopardize the safety of the children of the school. 
Section 39473. Compliance with applicable provisions. 
The governing board of a school district entering into 
a lease pursuant to this article shall comply with the appli-
cable provisions of Article 4 (commencing with Section 39360). 
Section 39474. Space limitations; lease agreements exceeding; 
prior agreements. 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section 
and Section 39475, the amount of classroom space leased pur-
suant to this article in any school site during normal school 
hours shall not exceed 45 percent of the total classroom space 
of that school, and in no event shall the leased classroom 
space in the school district during normal school hours ex-
ceed 30 percent of the district's total classroom space in 
operating schools. 
(b) The governing board of a school district may, upon a two-
thirds vote, enter into lease agreements which exceed the 45-
percent limit per school upon making a finding that the leases 
are compatible with the educational purpose of the school. The 
board, however, shall not exceed, pursuant to this subdivision, 
the 30-percent limit of classroom space for the entire school 
district. 
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to agree-
ments for the lease of classroom space entered into by dis-
tricts on or before March 4, 1981. 
Section 39475. Exceeding space limitations; daycare 
centers, nursery schools or special education classes. 
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The governing board of a school district may lease 
vacant classroom space the total area of which exceeds the 
30-percent districtwide limit of classroom space available 
pursuant to this article, if a lease is for any daycare 
center, nursery school, or special education class. 
Section 39476. Uses other than public or education-related 
uses; zoning, use permits and construction and safety re-
quirements. 
A local agency having general planning jurisdiction may 
require adherence to appropriate zoning ordinances, use per-
mits, construction or safety codes, by a school district 
seeking to lease a portion of a school building for uses other 
than public or education-related uses. 
Section 39601. Furnishing, repairing, insuring and renting 
of school property. 
The governing board of any school district shall furnish, 
repair, insure against fire, and in its discretion rent the 
school property of its districts. The governing board may 
also insure the property against other perils. The insurance 
shall be written in any admitted insurer, or in any nonad-
mitted insurer to the extent and subject to the conditions 
prescribed in Section 1763 of the Insurance Code. Insurance 
on property of a district may be, in the discretion of the 
governing board, of the deductible type of coverage. By de-
ductible type of coverage is meant a form of insurance under 
which the insurance becomes operative when the loss and damage 
exceeds an amount stipulated in the policy or policies. 
The governing board, in their notice of bid for any school 
district construction, may indicate that it may elect to assume 
the cost pf fire insurance by adding the coverage to the dis-
trict's existing policy and in such event bids made on such 
construction shall be made in the alternative, with and with-
out the fire insurance coverage included, and the governing 
board shall make its election as to who shall secure and pay 
for such insurance at the time of accepting the bid. 
Section 40040. Short title. 
This article shall be known and may be cited as the 
Civic Center Act. 
Section 40041. Use of civic center by public; terms, 
conditions and purposes. 
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(a) There is a civic center at each and every public school 
facility and grounds within the state where the citizens, 
parent-teachers' association, camp fire girls, boy scout 
troops, farmers' organizations, school-community advisory 
councils, senior citizens' organizations, clubs, and associ-
ations formed for recreational, educational, political, eco-
nomic, artistic, or moral activities of the public school 
districts may engage in supervised recreational activities, 
and where they may meet and discuss, from time to time, as 
they may desire, any subjects and questions which in their 
judgement appertain to the educational, political, economic, 
artistic, and moral interests of the citizens of the communi-
ties, in which they reside. 
(b) The governing board of any school district may grant the 
use of school facilities or grounds as a civic center upon the 
terms and conditions the board deems proper, subject to the 
limitations, requirements, and restrictions set forth in this 
article, for any of the following purposes: 
(1) Public, literary, scientific, recreational, educational, 
or public agency meetings. 
(2) The discussion of matters of general or public interest. 
(3) The conduct of religious services for temporary periods 
by any church or religious organization which has no suitable 
meeting place for the conduct of the services, provided the 
governing board charges the church or religious organization 
using the school facilities or grounds a fee as specified in 
subdivision (c) of Section 40043. 
(4) Child care or day care programs to provide supervision 
and activities for children of preschool and elementary school 
age. 
(5) The administration of examinations for the selection of 
personnel or the instruction of precinct board members by 
public agencies. 
(6) Supervised recreational activities. 
(7) Mass care and welfare shelters during disasters of other 
emergencies affecting the public health and welfare by public 
agencies, including, but not limited to, the American Red Cross; 
and the provision of any services deemed necessary by the govern-
ing board to meet the needs of the community. 
(8) Other purposes deemed appropriate by the governing board 
Section 40042. Management, direction and control; rules and 
regulations. 
The management, direction, and control of school facili-
ties under this article is vested in the governing board of 
the school district which shall promulgate all rules and 
regulations necessary to provide, at a minimum, for the 
following: 
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(1) Aid, assistance, and encouragement to any of the ac-
tivities authorized in Section 40041. 
(2) Preservation of order in school facilities and on 
school grounds, and protection of school facilities and 
school grounds, including, if the governing board deems 
necessary, appointment of a person who shall have charge 
of the school facilities and grounds for purposes of their 
preservation and protection. 
(3) That the use of school facilities or grounds is not 
inconsistent with the use of the school facilities or 
grounds for school purposes or interferes with the regular 
conduct of schoolwork. 
Section 40043. Charge for use. 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the governing 
board of any school district shall grant without charge the 
use of any school facilities or grounds under its control, 
pursuant to the requirements of this article, to the following 
organizations: 
(1) Student clubs and organizations. 
(2) Fundraising entertainments or meetings where admission 
fees charged or contributions solicited are expended for the 
welfare of the pupils of the district. 
(3) Parent-teachers' associations. 
(4) School-community advisory councils. 
(5) Camp fire girls and boy scout troops. 
(6) Senior citizens' organizations. 
(7) Other public agencies. 
(8) Organizations, clubs, or associations organized for cul-
tural activities and general character building or welfare 
purposes (such as folk and square dancing). 
(9) Groups organized for the purpose specified in paragraph (7) 
of subdivision (b) of Section 40041. 
(b) The governing board may charge those organizations and 
activities listed in subdivision (a) an amount not to exceed 
the following: 
(1) The cost of opening and closing the facilities, if no 
school employees would otherwise be available to perform 
that function as a part of their normal duties. 
(2) The cost of a school employee's presence during the or-
ganization's use of the facilities, if the governing board 
determines that the supervision is needed, and if that em-
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ployee would not otherwise be present as part of his or her 
normal duties. 
(3) The cost of janitorial services, if the services are 
necessary, and would not have otherwise been performed as 
part of the janitor's normal duties. 
(4) The cost of utilities directly attributable to the 
organization's use of the facilities. 
(c) The governing board may charge an amount not to exceed 
its direct costs or not to exceed fair rental value of school 
facilities and grounds under its control, and pursuant to the 
requirements of this article, for activities other than those 
specified in subdivision (a). Each governing board which de-
cides to levy these charges shall first adopt a policy speci-
fying which activities shall be charged an amount not to 
exceed direct costs and which activities shall be charged an 
amount not to exceed fair rental value. 
(d) The governing board of any school district which autho-
rizes the use of school facilities or grounds for the purpose 
specified in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 40041 
shall charge the church or religious denomination an amount 
at least equal to the district's direct costs. 
(e) In the case .of entertainments or meetings where admission 
fees are charged or contributions are solicited and the net 
receipts are not expended for the welfare of the p~pils of 
the district or for charitable purposes, a charge shall be made 
for the use of school facilities or grounds which charge shall 
be for fair rental value. 
(f) As used in this section, "direct costs" to the district 
for the use of school facilities or grounds means those costs 
of supplies, utilities, janitorial services, services of any 
other district employees, and salaries paid school discrict 
employees necessitated by the organization's use of the 
school facilities and grounds of the district. 
(g) As used in this section, "fair rental value" means the 
direct costs to tbe district, plus the amortized costs of 
the school facilities or grounds used for the duration of the 
activity authorized. 
Section 40044. Used to further program or movement for over-
throw of the government by force a misdemeanor. 
Any use, by any individual, society, group, or organi-
zation for the commission of any act intended to further any 
program or movement the purpose of which is to accomplish the 
overthrow of the government of the United States or of the 
state by force, violence, or other unlawful means shall not 
be permitted or suffered. 
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Any individual, society, group, or organization which 
commits any act intended to further any program or mavement 
the purpose of which is to accomplish the overthrow of the 
government by force, violence, or other unlawful means while 
using school property pursuant to the provisions of this 
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Section 40045. Determination of intention; statement of 
information; discretion of board. 
No governing board of a school district shall grant the 
use of any school property to any person or organization for 
any use in violation of Section 40044. 
For the purpose of determining whether or not any indi-
vidual, society, group, or organization applying for the use 
of the school property intends to violate Section 40044, the 
governing board shall require the making and delivery to the 
governing board, by the applicant of a written statement of 
information in the following form. 
STATEMENT OF INFORMATION 
The undersigned states that, to the best of his or her 
knowledge, the school property for use of which application 
is hereby made will not be used for the commission of any 
act intended to further any program or movement the purpose 
of which is to accomplish the overthrow of the government of 
the United States by force, violence or other unlawful means; 
That , the organization on whose behalf he or she 
is making application for use of school property, does not, to 
the best of his or her knowledge, advocate the overthrow of 
the government of the U~ited States or of the State of Cali-
fornia by force, violence, or other unlawful means, and that, 
to the best of his or her knowledge, it is not a communist 
action organization or Communist front organization required 
by law to be registered with the Attorney General of the United 
States. This statement is made under the penalities of perjury. 
(Signature) 
The school board may require the furnishing of additional 
information as it deems necessary to make the determination 
that the use of·school property for which application is made 
would not violate Section 40044. 
Any person applying for the use of school property on 
behalf of any society, group, or organization shall be a merrber 
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of the applicant group and, unless he or she is an officer 
of the group, must present written authorization from the 
applicant group to make the application. 
The governing board of any school district may, in 
its discretion, consider any statement of information or 
written authorization made pursuant to the requirements 
of this section as being continuing in effect for the pur-
poses of this section for the period of one year from the 
date of the statement of information or written authoriza-
tion. 
Section 40046. Liability for perjury. 
Written statements of information as required by Section 
40045 need not be under oath, but shall contain a written 
declaration that they are made under the penalty of perjury,· 
and any person so signing the statements who willfully states 
therein as true any material matter which he or she knows to 
be false, is subject to the penalties prescribed for perjury 
in the Penal Code. 
ELECTIONS CODE DIVISION 3, CHAPTER 1 
Section 1504. Public buildings and public schools; use as 
polling places; storage of voting equipment. 
(a) The governing body having jurisdiction over school 
buildings or other public buildings may authorize the use 
of its buildings for polling places on any election day, 
and may also authorize the use of its buildings, without 
cost, for the storage of voting machines and other vote-
tabulating devices. However, if a city or county clerk 
specifically requests the use of a school building for poll-
ing places on an election day, the governing body having 
jurisdiction over the particular school building shall allow 
its use for the purpose requested. 
(b) Once a governing body has approved the use of a school 
building as a polling place, the governing body shall in-
struct the school administrator to provide the clerk a site 
with an adequate amount of space which will allow the pre-
cinct board to perform its duties in a manner which will not 
impede, interfere, or interrupt the normal process of voting. 
(c) The school administrator shall also make a reasonable 
effort to insure that the site is accessible to the handi-
capped. 
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COLORADO 
Section 22-32-118. Summer schools - continuation, evening, 
and community education programs. (2) 
(a) A board of education may establish and- maintain contin-
uation programs, part-time programs, evening programs, vo-
cational programs, programs for aliens, and other opportunity 
programs and may pay for such programs out of the moneys of 
the school district or charge a fee or tuition. A board may 
also establish and maintain open-air schools, playgrounds, 
and museums and may pay for the same out of moneys of the 
school district. 
(b) In addition to the authority granted to a board of edu-
cation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), a board may 
establish and maintain community education programs in coope-· 
ration with any unit of local government, quasi-governmental 
agency, institution of higher education, or civic organization 
and may pay for such programs by a fee or tuition charged or 
out of moneys of the school district. Attendance in community 
education programs shall not be considered in computing attend-
ance entitlement under article 50 of this title and article 8 
and 60 of title 23, C.R.S. 1973. 
(c) For the purposes of this subsection (2), a "community 
education program" may be defined as a program which, while 
not interfering with the regular school program, may offer a 
composite of services to the citizens of its service area, 
including, but not limited to, year-round use of the facili-
ties and personnel of the school for off-hours educational, 
cultural,recreational and social enrichment activities for 
children, youth, and adults; family education and counseling, 
civic affairs meetings, and discussions; counseling for teen-
agers; community organization activities; senior citizen 
activities; cooperation with other social agencies and groups 
in improving community life; and other similar activities 
which provide educational, social, cultural, and recreational 
programs for ~hildren, youth, and adults. As used in this 
paragraph (c): 
(I) "Senior citizen" means a person sixty years of age or 
older and includes the spouse of a senior citizen; 
(II) "Senior citizen activity" includes, but is not limited 
to: 
(A) Provision for the serving to senior citizens of the meals 
regularly served to students at regular mealtimes and at a price 
not to exceed the adult cost of the meal as determined by the 
board of education of the school district; 
(B) Senior citizen volunteer programs in which senior citizens 
may assist in any or all aspects of school operation; 
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(C) Utilization of school facilities for senior citizens' 
social, educational, cultural, and recreational purposes. 
(d) As a part of a community education program established 
pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection (2), 
a board of education of a school district may establish and 
maintain preschool programs in connection with the schools 
of its district for the instruction of young children not yet 
eligible for kindergarten and may prescribe the educational 
activities and rules and regulations governing such programs. 
Said preschool programs shall provide opportunities for volun-
tary parental participation. Said preschool programs shall 
be a part of the public school system, and, notwithstanding 
the provisions of Section 22-32-117(2), the cost of establish-
ing and maintaining them may be paid from tuitions or gifts, 
or from the general school fund, or from state or federal 
moneys available to school districts for qualifying preschool 
programs; but such preschool programs shall not be eligible for 
state equalization program support under article 50 of this 
title. 
CONNECTICUT 
Section 10-239. Use of school facilities for other purposes. 
(a) Any local or regional board of education may provide for 
the use of any room, hall, schoolhouse, school grounds or other 
school facility within its jurisdiction for nonprofit educat-
ional or community purposes whether or not school is in session, 
(b) Any local or regional board of education may grant the 
temporary use of rooms, halls, school buildings or grounds or 
any other school facilities under its management or control for 
public, educational or other purposes or for the purpose of 
holding political discussions therein, at such time when the 
school is not in session and shall grant such use for any pur-
pose of voting under the provisions of title 9 whether or not 
school is in session, in each case subject to such restrictions 
as the authority having control of such room or building, 
grounds or other school facility considers expedient. 
DELAWARE 
CONSTITUTION OF DELAWARE, ARTICLE 10, SECTION 4 
Use of Public School Fund. 
Section 4. No part of the principal or income of the Public 
School Fund, nor or hereafter existing, shall be used for any 
other purpose than the support of free public schools. 
Article 15, Section 4512. Polling places; designation and 
preparation. 
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(a) Each department shall designate and procure for each 
election district in its county a polling place, which shall 
be the same as its registration place, wherever possible. The 
suitability, convenience and accessibility of the polling place 
to the voters of the election district must be given prime con-
sideration in its selection. 
(b) The departments of elections shall designate only con-
veniently located and readily accessible polling places for 
each election district. Such polling places, whenever possible, 
shall be located in public buildings which shall include suit-
able government buildings, schools, firehouses, community build-
ings, churches, financial institutions, lobbies or other gathering 
places at least 350 square fee in size. 
(c) Whenever the department has designated as polling places 
facilities owned or leased by agencies or subdivisions of this 
State, it shall be the duty of the officials of such agencies 
or subdivisions to make these facilities available and to pro-
vide a suitable and acceptable location, heat, lighting 1 and 
other services necessary for the conduct of the election, so long 
as such use is not incompatible with the primary function of the 
agency or subdivision. · 
FLORIDA 
Section 235.02. Use of buildings and grounds. 
The board including the Board of Regents, may permit the 
use of educational facilities and groups for any legal assembly 
or for community use centers may permit the same to be used as 
voting places in any primary, regular or special election. The 
board shall adopt rules necessary to protect educational facili-
ties and grounds when used for such purposes. 
GEORGIA 
ARTICLE II 
PUBLIC SCHOOL PROPERTY AND FACILITIES 
Part 1 
Powers of Local Boards 
Section 20-2-520. Acquiring and disposing of school sites; 
building, repairing, renting, and furnishing, schoolhouses. 
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(a) The county boards of education shall have the power to 
purchase, lease, or rent school sites; build, repair, or rent 
schoolhouses; purchase maps, globes, and school furniture; 
and make all arrangements necessary to the efficient operating 
of the schools. Such county boards are invested with the title, 
care, and custody of all schoolhouses or other property, with 
power to control such property in such manner as they think will 
best serve the interests of the public schools; and when, in 
the opinion of the county board, any schoolhouse site has be-
come unnecessary or inconvenient, they may sell it in the name 
of the county board; and the conveyance for any such sale shall 
be executed by the president or secretary of the county board, 
according to the order of the county board. Such county boards 
shall have the power to receive any gift, grant, donation, or 
devise made for the use of the public schools within the re-
spective counties; and all conveyances of real estate which 
may be made to such a· county board shall vest the property in 
such county board and its successors in office. Such county 
board may provide for the building of schoolhouses by a tax on 
all property located in the county and outside the territorial 
limits of any independent school system. The construction of 
all public school buildings must be approved by the county 
school superintendent and county board and must be according 
to the plants furnished by the county school authorities and 
the State Board of Education. 
HAWAII 
Section 296-2. Department of education; board of education; 
superintendent of education. 
There shall be a principal executive department to be 
known as the department of education which shall be headed 
by an elected executive board to be known as the board of 
education. The board·shall have power in accordance with law 
to formulate policy and to exercise control over the public 
school system through its executive officer, the superintendent 
of education. The superintendent shall be appointed and may 
be removed by a majority vote of the members of the board and 
shall serve as secretary of the board. 
Section 296-49. After-school and weekend programs. 
The state department of education and the appropriate 
county agencies may establish and regulate programs of after-
school and weekend community-school activities for childen, 
including, but not limited to, day-care programs, arts and 
crafts, hula, ukulele, and other educational or recreational 
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projects, wherever feasible, at public school and public park 
facilities. In addition to any appropriation of public funds, 
reasonable fees established by the agencies operating the pro-
grams may be collected from children enrolled in furtherance 
of particular programs. The appropriate agencies may obtain 
from time to time the services of persons in a voluntary or 
unpaid capacity, exempt from chapters 76 and 77, as may be 
necessary for carrying out the purposes of this section, and 
to regulate their duties, powers, and responsibilities when 
not otherwise provided by law. Any person whose services 
have been so accepted shall, while engaged in the performance 
of duty under this section, be deemed state employee or em-
ployees of a political subdivision, as the case may be, in 
determining the liability of the State or the political sub-
division for the negligent acts of such persons. 
Section 298-ss. Use of school grounds by county recreation 
departments. 
The board of education shall upon request by the depart-
ment of parks and recreation of the city and county of Honolulu 
or of the county of Hawaii make school grounds. available after 
school hours, in the respective counties where the request is 
made, for use by the department of parks and recreation re-
questing the same whenever such can be done without inter-
ference with the normal and usual activities of the school, 
and its pupils concerned. 
Section 298-23. Use of school facilities for recreational and 
community purposes. 
All public school buildings, facilities, and grounds shall 
~e available for general recreational purposes, and for public 
and community use, whenever these activities do not inte-fere 
with the normal and usual activities of the school and its 
pupils, concerned. Any law or portion of any law to the con-
trary notwithstanding, the department of education shall issue 
such rules as are deemed necessary to carry out the purposes 
of this section and shall be empowered to issue licenses, re-
vocable permits, concessions, or rights of entry to school 
buildings and grounds for such periods of use as deemed appro-
priate by the department. All such dispositions, including 
those in excess of fourteen days, need not be approved by the 
board of land and natural resources, provided the approval by 
the board of land and natural resources shall be required when 
such dispositions are for periods in excess of a year. The 
department of education may assess and collect fees and charges 
from the users of school buildings, facilities, grounds, and 
equipment. The fees and charges shall be deposited into a 
separate fund and expended by the department under rules as may 
be adopted by the board of education. 
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Section 298-23.5. Use of school facilities for after school 
child care. 
The dep~rtment of education may enter into agreements 
and contracts with individuals, organizations, or agencies 
for the use of public school buildings, facilities, and 
grounds for the operation of after school child care programs. 
The board of education shall issue such rules as are necessary 
to carry out the purposes of this section. 
Section 298-24. Use of school buildings. 
The fullest freedom shall be given to citizens of the 
State to use for lawful purposes all public school buildings 
throughout the State during the hours the structures are not 
in use for strictly educational purposes; provided, that the 
person vested with the proper authority over the building 
shall issue a permit to the applicant, when the proposed use 
is shown to be lawful by the applicant. 
IDAHO 
ILLINOIS 
CHAPTER 122 
Section 10-22.10. Control and supervision of school houses 
and school grounds. 
To have the control and supervision of all public school-
houses in their district, and to grant the temporary use of 
them, when not occupied by schools, for religious meetings 
and Sunday schools, for evening schools and literary societies, 
and for such other meetings as the board deems proper; to 
grant the use of assembly halls and class rooms when not other-
wise needed, including light, heat and attendants, for public 
lectures, concerts, and other educational and social interests, 
under such provisions and control as they may see fit to im-
pose; to grant the use of school grounds under such provisions 
and control as they may see fit to impose and to conduct, or 
provide for the conducting of recreational, social and civic 
activities in the school buildings or on the school grounds or 
both. 
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INDIANA 
Section 20-5-6-7. [28-1761]. Charge for use of facilities. 
The governing body of any school corporation may per-
mit any of its facilities to be used by any person in situ-
ations and at times which do not interfere with use of the 
facility for school purposes, as for example use of a swimming 
pool or other athletic facility, and may incur any necessary 
expense in the use or operation of the facility. The govern-
ing body may set and charge a schedule of fees for admission 
to or use of any facility, outside the school corporation's 
regular school program. All such fees shall be receipted to 
the general fund or to the special school fund of the school 
corporation. 
Section 20-5-37-1. [28-4301]. Use of school property for com-
munity purposes--Trustees authorized. 
Boards of school trustees in second or third class 
cities, boards of school trustees of any town and/or school 
trustees of school townships may, on their own initiative, 
and shall upon petition as provided for in Section 2 (20-5-
37-2) of this chapter establish and maintain for children 
and adult persons, in the school buildings and on the school 
grounds under the custody and management of such boards or 
school trustees of school townships, evening schools, vacation 
schools, debating clubs, community centers, gymnasiums, public 
playgrounds, public baths and similar activities and accommo-
dations to be determined by such boards or school trustees or 
school townships, without charge to the residents of such 
cities, towns, or townships; and may cooperate, by agreement, 
with other commissioners or boards or school trusteees of 
school townships having the custody and management, in such 
cities or political units, of public parks, libraries, museums 
and public buildings and grounds of whatever sort; to provide 
the equipment, supervision, instruction and oversight necessary 
to carry on such public educational and recreational activities 
in and upon such other buildings and grounds and to pay all 
such expenses from the general fund. 
Section 20-5-37-2. 
titian--Election. 
[28-4302]. Voters or freeholders pe-
Upon the filing of a petition with the clerk of a city or 
town or the trustees of any township, signed by not less than 
ten percent (10%) of the number of voters voting at the last 
general election held in such city, or upon presentation of a 
petition bearing the signatures of at least one hundred [100] 
freeholders living in any town or township, the question of 
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exercising the powers granted for any of the purposes enume-
rated in section 1 [20-5-37-1] of this act shall then be 
submitted to the electors of said cities, town, or townships 
as the case may be for the purpose held therein, and if a 
majority of the votes cast upon such question shall be in the 
affirmative then the board of school trustees of said cities 
or town or the school trustee of any school township shall 
exercise said powers in accordance with the said petition, 
pursuant to this act. 
Section 20-5-38-1 [28-4226]., Township trustee permitting use 
of abandoned school building for district community center--
Authorized--Petition--Sale prohibited. 
Whenever any district public school has been abandoned 
and the schoolhouse and school grounds in such district are 
no longer used or needed for public school purposes, the 
township trustee having charge of such school building and 
school grounds shall, upon application of not less than fifty-
one percent [51%] of the freehold residents of such school 
district, permit the use of such abandoned schoolhouse and 
school grounds as a community center for nonpartisan gather-
ings of citizens of such school district for civic, social 
and recreational purposes and the township trustee shall not 
sell or offer for s~le any such building or grounds during 
the time it is so used as a community center for for a period 
of one [1] year after the discontinuance of the use of any 
abandoned schoolhouse and school grounds for a community 
center. 
Section 20-5-39-1 [28-4229]. School corporations in third 
class cities permitting use of abandoned real estate for 
city park--Authorized. 
In any third-class city within the state, in which the 
school corporations of such cities have purchased, in the 
name of said school corporations, real estate to be used for 
school purposes, and the use of which real estate shall have 
since been abandoned .for school purposes, it shall be lawful 
for the school trustees of said school corporations to autho-
rize the use of such real estate for park purposes, in the 
manner and as provided by this chapter. 
IOWA 
Section 49.24. Schoolhouses as polling places. 
In precincts outside of cities the election shall, if 
practicable, be held in a public school building. Any 
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damage to the building or furniture resulting from the elec-
tion shall be paid by the county. 
Section 297.9. Use for other than school purposes. 
The board of directors of any school district may au-
thorize the use of any schoolhouse and its grounds within 
such district for the purpose of meetings of granges, lodges, 
agricultural societies, and similar societies, for parent-
teacher associations, for community recreational activities, 
community education programs, election purposes, other meet-
ings of public interest, public forums and similar community 
purposes; provided that such use shall in no way interfere 
with school activities; such use to be for such compensation 
and upon such terms and conditions as may be fixed by said 
board for the proper protection of the schoolhouse and the 
property belonging therein, including that of pupils, except 
that in the case of community education programs, any compen-
sation necessary for programs provided specifically by com-
munity education and not those provided through community 
education by other agencies or organization shall be compen-
sated from the funding provided for community education programs. 
KANSAS 
Section 72-1623. Powers and duties of board; libraries and 
certain cities. 
The board shall establish and maintain a system of free 
public schools for all children residing in the city school 
district and may make all necessary rules and regulations for 
the government and conduct of such schools; consistent with 
the laws of the state; Provided, The board of a city having 
a population of more than one hundred twenty thousand 
(120,000) and not more than two hundred thousand (200,000) 
may establish and maintain a public library and branch li-
braries, expenditures for which shall be paid from the general, 
building, and retirement funds in like manner to school ex-
penditures: Provided further, That if any city is located 
within the boundaries of a community high-school or rural 
high-school district that is maintaining a high school, the 
board shall not establish or maintain a high school. The 
board may divide the city school district into subdistricts 
for purposes of attendance by pupils. The board shall hold the 
title to, and have the care and keeping of all school buildings 
belonging to the city school district. The board may, in its 
discretion, open any or all school buildings for community pur-
poses, and may adopt rules and regulations covering such use 
of school buildings. 
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School buildings and other school properties not needed 
by the city school district may be sold by the board, at pri-
vate or public sale, upon the affirmative recorded vote of at 
least two-thirds of all the members of the board, at a regular 
meeting. Proceeds from the sale of any such school building 
or other property shall be placed in the general fund, bond 
and interest fund or in the building fund of the city school 
district, as determined by the board of education. Convey-
ances shall be executed by the president of the board and 
attested by the clerk. 
On or about October 1 of each year, in all cities of 
the first class, the board shall cause to be published in a 
newspaper printed and published in the city a statement 
showing the name, position and salary of the superintendent 
and department heads of said school system. 
KENTUCKY 
Section 162.050. Use of school property for public purposes. 
The board of education of any school district may permit 
the use of the schoolhouse, while school is not in session, 
by any lawful public assembly of educational, religious, ag-
ricultural, political, civic or social bodies under rules 
and regulations which the board deems proper. 
LOUISIANA 
Section 17.81. General powers of board. 
Each school board is authorized to make such rules and 
regulations for its own government, not inconsistent with 
law or with the regulations of the Louisiana State Board of 
Education, as it may deem proper. 
Section 17.101. Public schools; establishment by parish 
boards. 
Parish school boards may establish such public schools 
as they may deem necessary to provide adequate school facili-
ties for the children of the parish, and also trade schools, 
evening schools, schools for adults, schools and classes for 
exceptional children, and such other schools or classes as may 
be necessary to meet all special or exceptional requirements. 
Central or high schools may be established when necessary, 
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but no high school shall be established without the sanction 
of the state board of education. Practical, industrial and 
agricultural courses shall be fostered by the public school 
officials, and the state board of education may extend 
special financial aid to schools meeting required standards 
in such courses, with such funds as may be available for 
such purposes. 
MAINE 
Section 1001. Duties of school boards. 
School boards shall perform the following duties. 
(1) General duties. They shall have the duties prescribed 
to them in this Title. 
(2) Management of schools. They shall manage the schools and 
provide custody and care including repairs and insurance on 
school buildings and all school property in the school admini-
strative units. 
(3) No prohibition on use for political activity. The use of 
school buildings may not be denied to a person solely because 
use is requested for a political activity. 
Section 8604. Authority to operate programs not receiving 
state aid. 
A school board may make available facilities for adults 
evening educational and recreational activities; 
not reimbursed by the State. These courses and activities may 
be financed by tuition fees, by funds voted by the school ad-
ministrative unit, by funds from other sources or by a combi-
nation of these. 
MARYLAND 
Section 7-108. Use of school property for other than school 
purposes--In general. 
(a) County boards to encourage use. Each county board shall 
encourage the use of public school facilities for community 
purposes. 
(b) Application to county superintendent for use. (1) If 
written application is made to the county superintendent, the 
county board shall provide for the use of a public school fa-
cility for: 
(i) The presentation and discussion of public questions; 
(ii) Public speaking; 
(iii) Lectures; or 
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(iv) Other civic, educational, social, or recreational pur-
poses or church affiliated civic purposes. 
(2) These meetings shall be open to the public. 
(3) The county board may refuse the use of any school fa-
cility for these purposes if it appears that the use is likely 
to: 
(i) Provoke or add to a public riot or breach of the peace; 
or 
(ii) Create a clear and present danger to the peace and wel-
fare of the county or State. 
(c) Use by partisan political organization - Each county 
board may permit a partisan political organization that has 
polled 10 percent or more of the entire vote cast in this 
State in the last general election to use public school fa-
cilities for programs and meetings that relate to a political 
campaign for nomination or election of a candidate to public 
office. 
(d) Use for religious or other purposes - Each county board 
may permit the use of public school facilities for religious 
or other lawful purposes. 
(e) Use not to interfere with regular school functions -
School facilities may be used under this section or Section 7-
109 of this subtitle only at times that will not interfere 
with regular school sessions or other bona fide school ac-
tivities. 
Section 7-108. Use of school property for other than school 
purposes--In general. 
(f) Montgomery County - In Montgomery County, nonschool use 
of school facilities for public and community purposes and 
the manner by which costs associated with such use are appor-
tioned, may be regulated by local law consistent with the use 
criteria set forth in Section 7-110 and not inconsistent with 
any other provisions of this article. The local law authorized 
by this subsection may provide for an interagency coordinating 
board and for the appointment of its members by Montgomery 
County. Membership may include the Superintendent of Schools, 
the president of Montgomery College, the members of the Mont-
gomery County Planning Board, and such other members as may 
be provided by the local law. 
228 
Section 7-109. Same--Priority for day care program. 
(a) Use for approved day care programs.--If the program 
and public school facility comply with the rules and regu-
lations of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
that govern group day care centers, each county board: 
(1) Shall give priority to nonprofit day care programs 
for us~ of public school facilities before and after school 
houses; and 
(2) May make space available during school hours. 
(b) Rules and regulations for program.--Ea~h county board 
shall adopt rules and regulations for implementing this pro-
gram that are consistent with the rules and regulations of 
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene that govern 
group day care centers. 
(c) Additional costs.--Any additional costs incurred in the 
administration or support of these day care services shall be 
paid by the sponsoring organizations in accordance with an 
annual agreement with the county board that made the facili-
ties available. 
Section 7-110. Same--Charges for use and liability for 
damages. 
(a) Reasonable charge.--A reasonable charge for heating, 
lighting, and janitorial services for use of public school 
facilities under Sections 7-108 and 7-109 of this subtitle 
may be made. 
(b) Liability for damages.--(1) The person who applies for 
the use of school facilities shall be responsible for all 
damage to the property, other than ordinary wear and tear. 
(2) If the person does not pay for damages to the property, 
the county board may refuse any other application by that 
person for the use of the property until the damage is re-
paired without expense to the county board. 
(c) Leaving facilities in same condition.--(!) The person 
who applies for the use of school facilities shall leave the 
facilities after their use as clean as they were before the 
use. 
(2) If the person does not leave the facilities as clean as 
they were before the use, the county board may refuse to allow 
the person to use the facilities again. 
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MASSACHUSETTS 
Section 71. Public Use of School Property, Except in Boston. 
For the purpose of promoting the usefulness of public 
school property the school committee of any town may conduct 
such educational and recreational activities in or upon 
school property under its control, and, subject to such regu-
lations as it may establish, and, consistently and without 
interference with the use of the premises for school purposes, 
shall allow the use thereof by individuals and associations 
for such educational, recreational, social, civic philan-
thropic and like purposes as it deems for the interest of the 
community. The affiliation of any such association with a 
religious organization shall not disqualify such association 
from being allowed such a use for such a purpose. The use of· 
such property as a place of assemblage for citizens to hear 
candidates for public office shall be considered a civic pur-
pose within the meaning of this section. A school committee 
shall award concessions for food at any field under its con-
trol only to the highest responsible bidder. This section 
shall not only apply to Boston. 
MICHIGAN 
Section 15.41268. Community or recreation centers; use of 
school property as: Section 1268. (1) The board of a school 
district upon the written application of a responsible or-
ganization located in the school district, or of a group of 
at least 7 citizens of the school district may grant the use 
of school grounds, schools, or building facilities as com-
munity or recreation centers for the entertainment and edu-
cation of the people, including the adults and children of 
school age, and for the discussion of topics tending tothe 
development of personal character and of civic welfare. The 
occupation shall not infringe seriously upon the original and 
necessary uses of the properties. 
Regulations.· (2) The board shall prescribe regulations for 
occupancy and use to secure fair, reasonable, and impartial 
use of the properties. 
Damages, responsibilitv; use or rental fee. (3) The organi-
zation or group of citizens applying for the use of properties 
shall be responsible for damage done over and above ordinary 
wear, and may be required to pay a use or rental fee determined 
by the board. 
1-10. (Reserved for use in future supplementation.] 
11. Use for religious purpo~es. The action of voters of a 
school district at a meeting properly called and held in re-
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fusing to permit the use of a schoolhouse for religious meet-
ings was regular and authorized by former law. Eckhardt v. 
Darby, 118 Mich 199. 
Under former section, board of education was authorized, 
in its discretion, to make public buildings available during 
off-school hours for purpose of holding religious instruction 
classes, so long as authority of the school was in no manner 
utilized to secure attendance of pupils in such classes, and 
use was simply a use of the school building. Op Atty Gen, 
August 21, 1961, No. 3630. 
Bible study club or Bible fellowship club meeting on 
public property was not objectionable if it was a voluntary 
gathering, meeting after school hours, and if authority of 
the school was in no way utilized to organize or maintain th~ 
club. Op Atty Gen, August 21, 1961, No. 3630. 
12. Moot questions. Where case on certiorari presented simply 
abstract question of right to compel grant of use of school 
auditorium, dates for which application was made being past, 
question would not be decided. Barron v. Belongy, 229 Mich 
201. 
MINNESOTA 
Section 123.36. Schoolhouses and sites, access by persons for · 
non-curricular purposes, independent school districts. 
Subd. 5. The board may authorize the use of any schoolhouses 
in the district for divine worship, Sunday schools, public 
meetings, elections, and such other community purposes as in 
its judgement, will not interfere with their use for school 
purposes; but before permitting such use, the board may re-
quire a cash or corporate surety bond in a reasonable amount 
conditioned for the proper use of such schoolhouse, the pay-
ment of all rent and the repair of all damage occasioned by 
such use, and it may charge and collect for the usew of the 
district from the persons using such schoolhouse and reasonable 
compensation as it may fix. 
It may authorize the use of any schoolhouses or buildings 
in and of the district for the holding of primaries, elections, 
registrations, and all action in connection, therewith in such 
manner as in its judgement, will not interfere with their use 
for school purposes. It may impose such reasonable regulations 
and conditions upon such use as may seem necessary and proper. 
231 
MISSISSIPPI 
Section 37-7-301. Powers and duties of boards of trustees. 
The boards of trustees of school districts shall have 
the following powers, authority, and duties in addition to 
all others imposed or granted by law, to wit: 
(k) To authorize the use of the school buildings and grounds 
for the holding of public meetings and gatherings of the people 
under such regulations as may be prescribed by said board: 
MISSOURI 
Section 177.031. Care of property and purchase of supplies--
free use of buildings and grounds for public purpose. 
2. The school board having charge of the schoolhouses, build-
ings and grounds appurtenant thereto may allow the free use of 
the houses, buildings and grounds for the free discussion of 
public questions or subjects of general public interest, for 
the meeting of organizations of citizens, and for any other 
civic, social and educational purpose that will not interfere 
with the prime purpose to which the houses, bui1dings and 
grounds are devoted. If an application is granted and the 
use of the houses, buildings, or grounds is permitted for the 
purposes aforesaid, the school board may provide, free of 
charge, heat, light and janitor service therein when necessary, 
and may make any other provisions, free of charge, needed for 
the convenient and comfortable use of the houses, buildings, 
and grounds for such purposes, or the school boards may require 
the expense to be paid by the organizations or persons who are 
allowed the use of the houses, buildings and grounds. All per-
sons upon whose application or at whose request the use of any 
schoolhouse, building, or part thereof, or any grounds appurte--
nant thereto, is permitted as herein provided shall be jointly 
and severally liable for any injury or damage thereto which di--
rectly results from the use, ordinary wear and tear excepted. 
Notes of Decisions: 
3. Use of buildings 
A public achool board may not allow the use of public 
school propertY by the ministerial alliance to conduct re-
ligious training. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 265, Reed, Jr., 10-30-69. 
Public school board may allow use of public school property 
by church, college or municipality for civic, social and edu-
cational purposes that do not interfere ~Vith prime purposes of 
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school property, and where there is exchange of consideration 
between public school district and church education institu-
tion, then there is no aid to religion. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 
158, Witt, 8-22.67. 
As prescribed by this section, school boards have power 
to permit free use of school buildings and facilities for 
prekindergarten programs. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 100. Hearnes, 
1-18-66. 
MONTANA 
Section 13-3-105. Designation of polling place. 
Any publicly owned building may be used as a polling 
place. Such building must be furnished at no charge as 
long as no structural changes are required in order to use 
the building as a polling place. 
Section 39-6-607. Leasing district property and disposition 
of any rent-outs. 
The trustees of any district may rent, lease, or let 
any buildings, land, or facilities of the district under 
the terms specified by the trustees. Any money collected 
for such rental, lease, or letting may, in the discretion 
of the trustees be used for any proper school purpose and 
deposited in such fund as the trustees consider appropriate. 
Section 20-7-203. Trustees' policies for school library. 
The trustees shall adopt those policies necessary for 
regulating the use and operation of school libraries. 
These policies may provide for the use of school libraries 
by the residents of the district, provided that such use does 
not interfere with the regular school use of the library. 
Section 79.4142. 
rental. 
NEBRASKA 
Schoolhouse; use for public assemblies; 
The school board or board of education of every school 
district may in its discretion permit the use of public 
school buildings for public assemblages under such rules and 
regulations as it may adopt. The school board or board of 
education may exact such rental as may be necessary to meet 
the expense of such meeting, restore the property, and pay 
for e~tra help required. 
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NEVADA 
USE OF SCHOOL PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES 
Section 393.071. Authority to grant use of buildings, grounds 
for meetings or discussions. 
The board of trustees of any school district may grant 
the use of school buildings or grounds for public, literary, 
scientific, recrational or educational meetings, or for the 
discussion of matters of general or public interest upon such 
terms and conditions as the board deems proper, subject to the 
limitations, requirements and restrictions set forth in NRS 
393.071 to 393.0719, inclusive. 
Section 393.0711. Interference with use, occupancy for 
school purposes. 
No such use may be inconsistent with or interfere with 
the use and occupancy for the buildings or grounds for school 
purposes. 
Section 393.0712. Grant constituting monopoly prohibited. 
No such use shall be granted in such a manner as to con-
stitute a monopoly for the benefit of any person or organi-
zation. 
Section 393.0713. Term of privilege: Renewal and revocation. 
No privilege of using the buildings or grounds shall be 
granted for a period exceeding J year. The privilege is re-
newal or revocable in the discretion of the board at any 
time. 
Section 393.0714. Grant to public agencies for personnel 
examinations. 
The board of trustees of any school district may grant 
the use of school buildings, grounds and equipment without 
charge to public agencies for the purpose of holding exami-
nations for the selection of personnel. 
Section 393.0715. Use of school property for program, move-
ment to accomplish overthrow of government; penalty. 
(1) No school property, buildings or grounds may be used to 
further any program or movement the purpose of which is to 
accomplish the overthrow of the Government of the United 
States or ofany state by force, violence or other unlawful 
means. 
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(2) No board of trustees of any school district may grant 
the use of any school property, building or grounds to any 
person or organization for any use in violation of this 
section. 
(3) Any violation of this section is a misdemeanor. 
Section 393.0717. Regulations. 
(1) The board of trustees of the school district shall 
make all necessary regulations for the use of school build-
ings and grounds for civic meetings and recreational activities, 
and for the aid, assistance and encouragement of recreational 
activities. 
(2) The use of any school buildings or grounds for any meet-
ing or recreational activity is subject to such reasonable 
regulations as the board of trustees prescribes. 
Section 393.0718. Custodian of property: 
power. 
Appointment; 
The board of trustees of any school district may appoint 
a person who shall have charge of the grounds, preserve order-
protect the school property, plan, promote and supervise 
recreational activities, and do all things necessary in the 
capacity of a representative of the board of trustees. He 
shall have the of a peace officer to carry out the in-
tents and purposes of NRS 393.071 to 393.0719, inclusive. 
Section 393.0719. Payment of expenses by school district; 
reimbursement by users. 
Lighting, heating, janitor service and the services of 
the person referred to in NRS 393.0718, when, needed, and 
other necessary expenses, in connection with the use of 
public school buildings and grounds pursuant to NRS 393.071 
to 303.0719, inclusive, shall be provided for out of school 
district funds of the respective school districts. 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Section 199:22. Other Uses. 
A school district or a school board thereof may grant 
the use of any schoolhouse in the district for a writing or 
singing school, and for religious and other meetings, when-
ever such use will not conflict with any regular school 
exercise. The person so using a schoolhouse shall be liable 
for any damages to the same and to the property therein. 
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Section 199:22-a. Use to Feed Elderly. 
I. Any school board may operate or allow to be operated 
for the benefit of persons age 60 or over a meal program on 
school property including the use of school equipment. Such 
program may be operated on a profit basis and any surplus 
funds may be used to defray expenses or otherwise as the 
school board shall direct. Provided that such program shall 
be operated at no expense to the district and shall not 
interfere with the education of the students. The price 
charged for any meal may be based on the recipient's ability 
to pay as determined by the school board. 
II. The use in such program of food service equipment, food, 
and other items which are restricted in use to the benefit of 
the students is not authorized by this section unless such 
program is granted the permission upon such conditions as the 
restricting federal or state authority deems necessary. In 
addition to any such conditions, the school board shall main-
tain such records as will accurately reflect the percentage of 
use of school property, school food service equipment, food, 
and other such restricted items between the geriatric program 
and the child nutrition program. Further, insofar as prac-
ticable, grants in aid for replacement and originl equipment 
shall be requested on the basis of the percentage of use from 
both available child nutrition funds and from available geri-
atric program grants. 
NEW JERSEY 
USE OF PROPERTY 
Section 18A:20-34. Use of schoolhouse and grounds for various 
purposes. 
The board of education of any district may, pursuant to 
rules adopted by it, permit the use of any schoolhouse and 
rooms therein, and· the grounds and other property of the dis-
trict, when not in use for school purposes, for any of the 
following purposes: 
(a) The assembly of persons for the purpose of giving and 
receiving instruction in any branch of education, learning, 
or the arts, including the science of agriculture, horti-
culture, and floriculture; 
(b) Public library purposes or stations of public libraries; 
(c) The holding of such social, civic, and recreational meet-
ings and entertainments and such other purposes as may be 
approved by the board; 
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(d) Such meetings, entertainments, and occasions where ad-
mission fees are charged as may be approved by the board; 
(e) Polling places, holding ~lections, registration of 
voters and holding political meetings. 
Section 18A:50-l. Maintenance of program. 
The board of education of any school district may main-
tain a program of adult education and utilize buildings, 
equipment and other school facilities of the district for 
such purpose. The board shall determine the courses, which 
are to be offered, subject to the approval of the commissioner, 
with the consent of the state board. 
NEW MEXICO 
Section 21-14~4. Availability of school facilities; use of 
other facilities. 
Upon establishment of a branch community college, public 
school facilities are to be made available to the college if 
needed, and in such manner as will not interfere with the 
regular program of instruction. No public school funds shall 
be expended in the program, and the branch community college 
shall pay a proper amount for utilities and custodian service. 
The board may arrange for the use of available facilities 
other than public school facilities if approved by the board 
of regents. 
NEW YORK 
Section 16.414. Use of schoolhouse and grounds out of school 
hours. 
Schoolhouses and the grounds connected therewith and 
all property belonging to the district shall be in the cus-
tody and under the control and supervision of the trustees 
or board of education of the district. The trustees or board 
of education may adopt reasonable regulations for the use of 
such schoolhouses, grounds or other property, when not in use 
for school purposes, for such other public purposes as are 
herein provided. Such regulations shall not conflict with 
the provisions of this chapter and shall conform to the pur-
poses and intent of this section and shall be subject to re-
view on appeal to the commissioner of education as provided 
by law. The trustees or board of education of each district 
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may, subject to regulations adopted as above provided, per-
mit the use of the schoolhouse and rooms therein, and the 
grounds and other property of the district, when not in 
~se for school for any of the following purposes: 
(1) For the purpose of instruction in any branch of edu-
cation, learning of the arts. 
(2) For public library purposes, subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, or as stations of public libraries. 
(3) For holding social, civic and recreational meetings 
and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare 
of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses 
shall be non-exclusive and shall be open to the general 
public. 
(4) For meetings, entertainments and occasions where ad-
mission fees are charged, when the proceeds thereof are to be 
expended for an educational or charitable purpose; but such 
use shall not be permitted if such meetings, entertainments 
and occasions are under the exclusive control, and the said 
proceeds are to be applied for the benefit of a society, 
association or organization of a religious sect or denomi-
nation, or of a fraternal, secret or exclusive society or 
organization other than organizations of veterans of the 
military, naval and marine service of the United States and 
organizations of volunteer firemen. 
(5) For polling places for holding primaries and elections 
and for the registration of voters and for holding political 
meetings. But no political meetings shall be permitted un-
less authorized by a vote of a district meeting, held as 
provided by law, or, in cities by the board of education 
thereof. Except in cities, it shall be the duty of the 
trustees or board of education to call a special meeting for 
such purpose upon the petition of at least ten percent of 
the qualified electors of the district. Authority so 
granted shall continue until revoked in like manner and by 
the same body as granted. 
(6) For civic forums and community centers. Upon the pe-
tition of at least twenty-five citizens residing within the 
district or city, the trustees or board of education in each 
school district or city shall organize and conduct community 
centers for civic purposes, and civic forums in the several 
school districts and cities, to promote and advance principles 
of Americanism among the residents of the state. The trustees 
or board of education in each school district or city, when 
organizaing such community centers or cj.vic forums, shall 
provide funds for the maintenance and support of such com-
-munity centers and civic f arums, and shall prescribe 
regulations for their conduct and supervision, provided that 
nothing herein contained shall prohibit the trustees of such 
school district or the baord of education to prescribe and 
adopt rules and regulations to make such community centers 
or civic forums self-supporting as far as practicable. Such 
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community centers and civic forums shall be at all times 
under the control of the trustees or board of education in 
each school district or city, and shall be nonexclusive and 
open to the general public. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
Section llSC-203. Title of Article. 
This article shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Community Schools Act." 
Section llSC-204. Purpose of Article. 
The purpose of this Article 
munity involvement in the public 
use of public school facilities. 
to be the policy of this State: 
is to encourage greater com-
schools and greater community 
To this end it is declared 
(1) To provide for increased involvement by citizens in their 
local schools through community schools advisory councils. 
(2) To assure maximum use of public school facilities by the 
citizens of each community in this State. 
It is further declared to be the policy of this State 
that, to the extent sufficient funds are made available, each 
local board of education shall comply with the provisions of 
this Article. 
Section llSC-205. Definitions. 
As used in this Article. 
(1) The term "community schools advisory council" means a 
committee or citizens organized to advise community school 
coordinators, administrators, and local boards of education 
in the involvement of citizens in the educational process 
and in the use of public school facilities. 
(2) The term "community schools coordinator" means an em-
ployee of a local board of education whose responsibility 
it is to promote and direct maximum use of the public schools 
and public school facilities as centers for community de-
velopment. 
(3) The term "interagency council" means a committee or 
agency and organizational representatives appointed by the 
Governor to work with the Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion concerning the involvement of statewide agencies and 
organizations wich the public schools. 
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(4) The term "public school facility" means any education 
facility under the jurisdiction of a local board of education, 
whether termed an elementary school, middle school, junior 
high school, high school or union school. 
Section llSC-206. 
sponsibilities. 
State Board of Education; duties; re-
The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall prepare 
and present to the State Board of Education recommendations 
for general guidelines for encouraging increased community 
involvement in the public schools and use of public school 
facilities. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall 
consult with the interagency council in preparing the general 
guidelines. These recommendations shall include, but shall 
not be limited to provisions for: 
(1) The use of public school facilities by governmental, 
charitable or civic organizations for activities within the 
community. 
(2) The utilization of the talents and abilities of volun-
teers within the community for the enhancement of public 
school programs including tutoring, counseling and cultural 
programs and projects. 
(3) Increased communications between the staff and faculty 
of the public schools, other community institutions and 
agencies, and citizens in the community. 
Based on the recommendations of the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, the State Board of Education shall adopt 
appropriate policies and guidelines for encouraging increased 
community involvement in the public schools and use of the 
public schools facilities. 
The State Board of Education shall establish rules and 
regulations governing the submission and approval of pro-
grams prepared by local boards of education for encouraging 
increased community involvement in the public schools and 
use of the public school facilities. 
The State Board of Education is authorized to allocate 
funds to the local boards of education for the employment of 
community schools coordinators and for other appropriate ex-
penses upon approval of a program submitted by a local board 
of education and subject to the availability of funds. In 
the event that a local board of education already has suf-
ficient personnel employed performing functions similar to 
those of a community schools coordinator, the State Board of 
Education may allocate funds to that local board of education 
for other purposes consistent with this Article. Funds allo-
cated to a local board of education shall not exceed three 
fourths of the total budget approved in the community schools 
program submitted by a local board of education. 
Section llSC-207. Authority and responsibility of local 
boards of education. 
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Every local board of education elects to apply for 
funding pursuant to this Article shall: 
(1) Develop programs and plans for increased community in~ 
volvement in the public schools based upon policies and 
guidelines adopted by State Board of Education. 
(2) Develop programs ana plans for increased community use 
of public school facilities based upon policies and guide-
lines adopted by State Board of Education. 
(3) Establish rules governing the implementation of such 
programs and plans in its public schools and submit these 
rules along with adopted programs and plans to the State 
Board of Education for approval by the State Board of Edu-
cation. 
Programs and plans developed by a local board of edu-
cation shall provide for the establishment of one or more 
community schools advisory councils for the public schools 
under the board's jurisdiction and for the employment of 
one or more community schools coordinators. The local 
board of education shall establish the terms and conditions 
of employment for the community schools coordinators. 
Every local board of education which elects to apply for 
funding pursuant this Article shall have the authority to 
enter into agreements with other local boards of education, 
agencies and institutions for the joint development of plans 
and programs and the joint expenditure of funds allocated by 
the State Board of Education. Local funds from such local 
board of education applying for funds for the community schools 
program must equal at least one fourth of the total budget for 
the community schools program of said local board of education. 
Section llSC-208. Community schools advisory councils; duties; 
responsibilities; membership. 
Every participating local board of education shall 
establish one or more community schools advisory councils which 
may become involved in matters affecting the educational pro-
cess in accordance with rules established by the local board 
of education and approved by the State Board of Education and 
further shall consider ways of increasing community involvement 
in the public schools and utilization of public school facili-
ties. Community schools advisory councils may assist local 
boards of education in the development and preparation of the 
plans and programs to achieve such goals, may assist in the 
implementation of such plans and programs and may provide 
such other assistance as may be requested by the local boards 
of education. 
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Community schools advisory councils shall work with 
local school officials and personnel, parent-teacher organi-
zations, and community groups and agencies in providing 
maximum opportunities for public schools to serve the com-
munities, and shall encourage the maximum use of volunteers 
in the public schools. 
At least one half of the members of each community 
schools advisory council shall be the parents of students 
in the particular public school system: Provided, that 
less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the pupils attend-
ing a particular school reside outside the immediate com-
munity of the school, at least one half of the members 
shall be parents of students in the particular school for 
which the advisory council is established. Wherever 
possible the local board of education is encouraged to in-
clude at least one high school student. The size of the 
councils and the terms of membership on the councils shall 
be determined by the local board of education in accordance 
with the State guidelines. 
Section 115C-209. Community schools coordinators. 
Every participating local board of education shall 
employ one or more community schools coordinators and shall 
establish the terms and conditions of their employment. 
Community schools coordinators shall be responsible for: 
(1) Providing support to the community schools advisory 
councils and public school officials. 
(2) Fostering cooperation between the local board of 
education and appropriate ~ommunity agencies. 
(3) Encouraging maximum use of community volunteers in 
the public schools. 
(4) Performing such other duties as may be assigned by the 
local superintendent and the local board of education, con-
sistent with the purposes of this Article. 
Section 115C-524. Repair of school property; use of build-
ings for other than school purposes. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 115C-263 and 
115C-264, local boards of education shall have authority 
tn adopt rules and regulations by which school buildings, 
including cafeterias and lunchrooms, may be used for other 
than school purposes so long as such use is consistent with 
the proper preservation and care of the public school property. 
No liability shall attach to any board of education, indi-
vidually or collectively, for personal injury suffered by 
reason of the use of such school property. 
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Section 115C-527. Use of schools and other public buildings 
for political meetings. 
The governing authority having control over schools 
or other public buildings which have facilities for group 
meetings, or where polling places are located, is hereby 
authorized and directed to permit the use of such buildings 
without charge, except custodial and utility fees, by po-
litical parties, as defined in G.S. 163-96, for the express 
purpose of annual or biennial precinct meetings and county 
and district conventions: Provided, that the use of such 
buildings by political parties shall not be permitted at 
times when school is in session or which would interfere 
with·.normal school activities or functions normally carried 
on in such school buildings, and such use shall be subject 
to reasonable rules and regulations of the school boards 
and other governing authorities. 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Section 15-35-14. Use of school buildings for other than 
school purposes. 
School boards having charge of school buildings and 
other school facilities may permit the use thereof under 
proper restrictions for any appropriate purpose when not 
in use for school purposes. Equal rights and privileges 
shall be accorded to all religious denominations and to 
all political parties. Furniture fastened to the buildings 
shall not be removed or unfastened. Public school and high 
school auditoriums, gymnasiums, and other school facilities 
may be let for meetings, entertainments, or conventions of 
any kind, subject to such restrictions as the governing 
board of the district shall prescribe. Such use of the 
buildings and other facilities shall not be permitted to 
interfere with the operation of the schools or with school 
activities. A charge may be made for the use of the build-
ings, facilities, or any portion thereof. 
OHIO 
Section 3313.75. Use of schoolhouses generally. 
The board of education of a city, exempted village, or 
local school district may authorize the opening of school-
houses for any lawful purposes. This section does not 
authorize a board to rent or lease a schoolhouse when such 
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rental or lease interferes with the public schools in such 
district, or for any purpose other than is authorized by 
law. 
Section 3313.75. Schoolhouses available for educational and 
recreational purposes. 
Upon application of any responsible organization, or 
a group of at least seven citizens, all school grounds and 
schoolhouses, as well as all other buildings under the 
supervision and control of the state, or buildings maintained 
by taxation under the laws of this state, shall be available 
for use as social centers for the entertainment and edu-
cation of the people, including the adult and youthful popu-
lation, and for the discussion of all topics tending to the 
development of personal character and of civic welfare, and 
for religious exercises. Such occupation should not ser-
iously infringe upon the original and necessary uses of such 
buildings shall prescribe such rules and regulations for 
their occupancy and use as will secure a fair, reasonable, 
and impartial use of the same. 
Section 3313.77. Use of schoolhouses and grounds for public 
meetings. 
The board of education of any city, exempted village, 
or local school district shall, upon request and the pay-
ment of a reasonable fee, subject to such regulation as is 
adopted by such board, permit the use of any schoolhouse and 
rooms therein and the grounds and other property under its 
control, when not in actual use for school purooses, for any 
of the following purposes: (a) Giving in any 
branch of education, learning, or the arts; (b) Holding edu-
cational, religious, civic, social, or recreational meetings 
and entertainments, and for such other purposes as promote 
the welfare of the community; provided such meetings and enter-
tainments shall be nonexclusive and open to the general public; 
(c) Public library purposes, as a station for a public library, 
or as reading rooms; (d) Polling places, for holding elections 
and for the registration of voters, or for holding grange or 
similar meetings. 
Section 3313.78. Political meetings in schoolhouses and on 
grounds; liability for damage. 
Upon application of a committee representing any candi-
date for ~ublic office or any regularly organized or recog-
nized political party, the board of education having control 
of any school grounds mentioned in Section 3313.76 of the 
Revised Code, shall permit the same to be used as a place 
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wherein to hold meetings of electors for the discussion of 
public questions and issues. No such meeting shall be held 
during regular school hours. No charge shall be made for 
such use, but the candidate or committee so holding a meeting 
shall be responsible for any damage. done or expense incurred 
by reason thereof. 
OKLAHOMA 
Section 70-5-130. Permitting use of school building. 
The board of education of any school district may, under 
such regulations and conditions as it may prescribe, open any 
school building and permit the use of any property belonging · 
to such district for religious, political, literary, cultural, 
scientific, mechanical or agricultural purposes, and other 
purposes of general public interest and may make a reasonable 
charge to cover the cost of the use of such building and 
property. 
OREGON 
Section 332.172. Use of school buildings and grounds for 
civic and recreational purposes. 
(1) Subject to ORS 330.667, the district school board may 
permit the use of school buildings by residents of the dis-
trict for civic and recreational purposes, including use 
for: 
(a) Supervised recreational activities; 
(b) Meeting places for discussion of all subjects and 
questions which in the judgement of the residents may re-
late to the educational, political, economic, artistic and 
moral interes~s of the residents, giving equal rights and 
privileges to all religious denominations and political parties; 
and 
(c) Such other proper purposes as may be determined by the 
board. 
(2) The district school board may appoint a special super-
vising officer to have charge of the buildings and grounds, 
preserve order, protect school property and do all things 
necessary in the capacity of a peace officer to carry out the 
provisions of this section. 
(3) The district school board may establish a schedule of fees 
and collect fees pursuant to the schedule for use of school 
buildings and grounds and other facilities, including but not 
limited to gymnasium equipment, swimming pools':·athletic 
fields and tennis courts. 
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(4) Expenses for light, heat, janitor services and ser-
vices of the special supervising officer provided in con-
nection with use of buildings and grounds under this section 
which are not covered by the fees charged under subsection 
(3) of this section shall be paid out of the county or 
special school funds of the district in the same manner 
that other similar services are paid. 
(5) The district school board shall make rules governing 
the use of school buildings and grounds under this section. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
Section 7-775. Use of school buildings for other purposes; 
arrangements borough or township. 
The board of school directors of any district may per-
mit the use of its school grounds and buildings for social, 
recreation, and other proper purposes, under such rules 
and regulations as the board may adopt. The board shall 
make such arrangements with any city, borough, or township 
authorities for the improvement, care, protection, and main-
tenance of school buildings and grounds for school, park, 
play, or other recreation purposes, as it may see proper. 
Any board of school directors may make such arrangements as 
it may see proper with any officials or individuals for the 
temporary use of school property for schools, playgrounds, 
social, recreation, or other proper educational purposes, 
primaries and elections, and may permit the use of any 
school building for holding official meetings of the govern-
ing authorities of corporat~ or politic, governmental or 
quasi-governmental bodies, created by authority of any act 
of Assembly. The use thereof shall not interfere with school 
programs and shall be subject to reasonable rules and regu-
lations adopted by the board of school directors. 
The board of school directors of any school district 
shall have power and authority to lease any part of their 
respective school building, equipment and premises, or any 
vacant building, for any educational purpose. Such leases 
shall be subject to the terms and regulations which may be 
adopted by the board of school directors, and except in 
districts of the first class, shall be further subject to 
the approval of the Department of Public Instruction. 
Funds raised by individuals, groups, associations, or 
corporations, through the permissive use of school grounds 
or buildings, now or hereafter authorized by laws, shall be 
the property of the individuals, groups, associations, or 
corporations, and not the property of the school district, 
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subject, however, to such arrangements as the board may, at 
its discretion, lawfully make. 
The board of public education or the board of school 
directors of any school district shall have power and au-
thority to lease any of their respective school buildings or 
athletic fields to any reputable organization or group of 
persons for charitable purposes, subject to such charges as 
the board shall consider proper to reimburse it for any costs 
resulting from the leasing of such school buildings or ath-
letic fields. At the time of such leasing, any such board may 
require a bond, in an amount that it may deem proper, with re-
sponsible sureties or securities, and a statement of the 
charitable purposes for which such lease is requested. 
Section 951-16. Days and hours of registration; places of 
registration; use of polling places; payment of rentals; 
use of school buildings; public notice. 
The board of public education or school directors of 
each school district shall furnish suitable space in any 
public school building under its jurisdiction or control, 
~nd shall cause the room or space to be open and in proper 
order for use as a place of registration on each day when 
such room or space may be desired by the registration com-
mission for use as a place of registration in accordance with 
the provisions of this act: Provided, That such use shall not 
interfere with instruction for the conduct of which such board 
of public education or school directors shall be responsible. 
RHODE ISLAND 
Section 16-2-15. Location of schools--Control of property.--
The school committee shall locate all schoolhouses, and shall 
not abandon, close or change the location of any without good 
cause; and unless otherwise provided by law, said school com-
mittee of each town shall have the care and control of all 
public school buildings and other public school property of 
the town, including repairs of said buildings and the pur-
chase of furniture and other school equipment. 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
Section 59-19-90. General powers and duties of school 
trustees. 
Control school property, Take care of, manage and con-
trol the school property of the district. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
Section 13-24-20. Use of school facilities or buses for 
other community purposes--Compensation--Liability for 
damages. 
The school board may rent or grant the use of school 
facilities, motor vehicles or land belonging to the school 
district for any purposes which it considers advisable as 
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a community service for such compensation as it determines. 
The use may not interfere with school activities. Any per-
son or persons or public body using such school facilities, 
motor vehicles or land is responsible to the school district 
for any and all damages that may be caused by reason of the 
use or occupancy. The school district is not liable for any 
suit for damages which might arise as the result of such use 
or occupancy. 
TENNESSEE 
Section 49-2-203. Powers and duties. 
It shall be the duty of the local board of education: To 
permit school buildings and school property to be used for 
public, community or recreational purposes under such rules, 
regulations and conditions as may be prescribed from time to 
time by the board of education. 
(A) No member of such board or other school official shall 
be held liable in damages for any injury to person or property 
resulting from such use of school buildings or propety. 
(B) The local board of education may lease buildings and 
property or the portions of buildings and property it deter-
mines are not being used or are not needed at present by the 
public school system to the owners and/or operators of pri-
vate day care centers and kindergartens for the purpose of 
providing educational and child care services to the community. 
Such leases may not be e~tered for a term exceeding five (5) 
years and must be on such reasonable terms as are worked out 
between the school board and the owner and/or operator. No 
such leasing arrangement entered into in accordance with the 
preceding sentence shall be intended or used to avoid any 
school integration requirement pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Otherwise, public 
school buildings and property may not be used for private 
profit. The local board of education shall not execute any 
lease pursuant to this subdivision which would replace or 
supplant existing kindergarten programs or kindergarten pro-
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grams maintained pursuant to the Minimum Kindergarten Pro-
gram Law as contained in this title. The provisions of 
this subdivision shall also apply to municipal boards of 
education. 
TEXAS 
Section 20.21. Gymnasia, Stadia, and Other Recreational 
Facilities. 
The governing board of each independent school dis-
trict (including, as to each municipally controlled inde-
pendent school district, the city council or commission 
which has jurisdiction thereof) and the governing board of 
each rural high school district, and the commissioners 
court of every county, for and on behalf of each common 
school district under its jurisdiction, shall be authorized 
and have the power to acquire, purchase, construct, improve, 
enlarge, equip, operate, and maintain gymnasia, stadia, or 
other recreational facilities for and on behalf of its dis-
trict, and such facilities may be located within or with-
out the district. 
Section 20.23. Rentals, Rates, and Charges. 
The board or commissioners court shall be authorized to 
fix and collect rentals, rates and charges, from students 
and others for the occupancy or use of any of said facili-
ties, in such amounts and in such manner as may be determined 
by such board or commissioners court. 
Art 2.03. Held in public buildings. 
In all cases where it is practicable to do so, all 
elections--general, special, or primary--shall be held in 
some schoolhouse, fire station, or other public building 
within the limits of the election precinct in which such 
election is being held. No charge shall be made for the 
use of such building, except that any additional expense 
actually incurred by the authorities in charge of the 
building on account of the holding of the election there-
in shall be repaid to them by the authority liable for the 
expense of holding the election under the existing law. 
The authority liable for the expenses of the election may 
demand an itemized statement of the additional expense in-
curred for use of the building before making its remittance 
for such expense. If no public building is available, the 
election may be held in some other building, and any charge 
for its use shall be paid as an expense of the election. 
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UTAH 
CHAPTER 21 
CIVIC CENTERS 
Section 53-21-l. School buildings and grounds. 
There shall be a civic center at all public school 
buildings and grounds where the citizens of the respective 
school districts may engage in supervised recreational ac-
tivities, and where they may meet and discuss any and all 
subjects and questions which in their judgement may apper-
tain to the educational, political, economic, artistic and 
moral interests of the citizens of the community; but such 
use of public school buildings and grounds for such meet-
ings shall in no wise interfere with any school function or 
prupose. 
Section 53-21-3. Boards of education to control - super-
vising officer. 
The management, direction and control of such civic 
centers shall be vested in the boards of education of the 
school districts. Said boards shall make all needful rules 
and regulations for conducting such civic-center meetings 
and for such recreational activities as are provided for in 
Section 53-21-1, and may appoint a special supervising 
officer who shall have charge of the grounds, preserve order, 
protect the school property and do all things necessary in 
the capacity of a peace officer to carry out the provisions 
and the intent and purposes of this chapter. 
Section 53-21-4. Use of school property for, may be denied. 
Whenever in its judgement a board of education deems it 
inadvisable to permit the use of such school property for 
the purpose requested it may refuse the use of such school 
property for any other than school purposes. 
Section 53-21-5. Use of school buildings for other than 
school purposes. 
School buildings shall not be used for commercial pur-
poses, except that all boards of education may permit public 
school buildings , when not occupied for school purposes and 
when the use thereof will not interfere in any way with school 
purposes, to be used for a compatible educational or other 
purpose that will not interfere with the seating or other 
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furniture or property. The boards of education shall charge 
a reasonable fee for the use, the school buildings so that 
the district shall incur no expense for that use. 
VERMONT 
Title 16.3741. School buildings. 
Each town district shall provide, furnish, maintain 
and control schoolhouses suitable for schools under the 
provisions of this title. When so authorized by the town 
district, the board of school directors shall have power to 
lease or purchase buildings or sites for schoolhouses, lo-
cate and erect schoolhouses, and sell or otherwise dispose 
of schoolhouses or sites for same, and for such purposes a 
district may raise a tax on its grand list. 
VIRGINIA 
Section 22.1-131. Boards may permit use of school property; 
general conditions. 
A school board may permit the use, upon such terms and 
and conditions as it deems proper, of such school property 
as will not impair the efficiency of the schools. The school 
board may authorize the division superintendent to permit use 
of the school property under such conditions as it deems 
proper. The division superintendent shall report to the 
school board at the end of each month his actions under this 
section. Permitted uses may include use as voting places in 
any primary, regular or special election and operation of a 
local or regional library pursuant to an agreement between 
the school board and a library board created as provided in 
Section 42.1-35 of this Code. 
Section 22.1-132. 
use of property. 
Boards may impose certain conditions on 
Permits for the use of school property may contain, among 
other matters, (i) provisions limiting the use of the property 
while classes are in session and (ii) an undertaking by the 
leasee to return the property so used in as good condition as 
when leased, normal wear and tear excepted. 
WASHINGTON 
Section 28A.58~105. Night schools, summer schools, meet-
ings, use of facilities. 
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Every board of directors, unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law, shall: 
(1) Authorize school facilities to be used for night schools 
and establish and maintain the same whenever deemed advisable; 
(2) Authori~e school facilities to be used for summer schools 
or for meetings, whether public, literary, scientific, re-
ligious, political, mechanical, agricultural or whatever, 
upon approval of the board under such rules or regulations as 
the board of directors may adopt, which rules or regulations 
may require a reasonable rental for the use of such facili-
ties. 
WEST VIRGINIA 
Section A-5-18. Night schools and other school extension 
activities, use of school property for public meetings, etc. 
The board of education of any district or independent 
district shalJ have authority to establish and maintain 
evening night schools, continuation or part time 
day schools, and vocational schools, wherever practicable to 
do so, and shall admit thereto adult persons and all other 
persons, including persons of foreign birth, but excepting 
children and youth who are required by law to attend day 
schools; Boards of Education shall have the authority to 
use school funds for the financial support of such schools 
and to use the schoolhouses and their equipment for such 
purposes. Any such classes of schools shall be conducted 
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the state 
board of education. 
The board of education of any district or independent 
district shall have authority also to provide for the free, 
comfortable and convenient use of any school property to pro-
mote and facilitate frequent meetings and associations of 
the people for discussion, study, recreation and other com-
munity activities, and may secure, assembly and house ma-
terial for use in the study of farm, home ~nd community 
problems, and may provide facilities for the dissemination 
of information useful on the farm, in the home, or in the 
community. 
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WISCONSIN 
Section 40.30. District board; powers. 
(2) The board may grant the request of any responsible in-
habitant of the district to use the schoolhoue for such 
public meetings as will, in the judgement of the board, aid 
in disseminating intelligence and promoting good morals. 
The applicant shall be primarily, and the members of the 
board secondarily, liable to the district for any injury 
done to any property and for any expense incurred in conse-
quence of any such use of the schoolhouse. 
(3) The board may grant the use of the schoolhouse for 
lectures, entertainments and school exercises held under the 
auspices of and for the benefit of the school, and permit an 
admission fee to be ~harged. 
(4) The board may provide for the free use of such property 
for general civic, social and recreational activities 
that do not interfere with the prime use thereof; the use of 
school buildings shall not be granted for public dancing, 
over the written protest of a majority of the electors of the 
district, or if a resolution against public dancing in the · 
schoolhouses shall have been adopted at the annual meetings. 
(5) Except in cities of the first class the school board 
of any school district which holds an annual district meet-
ing, after being authorized to do so by the electors of any 
such meeting, and the .school board or board of education of 
any other school district, in its discretion, may grant the 
use of school buildings and school grounds to any responsible 
organization for public meetings to which an admission price 
is demanded, and to charge for such grant or use such sums 
as may be fixed by the school board or the board of education 
by a majority vote of the board members taken at a regular or 
special board meeting, all sums so received to be accounted 
for and paid into the school treasury to constitute part of 
the general fund and to be used for the benefit of the schools. 
(6) Any school board may provide free lectures on educational 
subjects, in the school buildings, in public library build-
ings or in other suitable places, and provide for the further 
education of the adult residents of the district. The board 
may purchase books, stationery, charts, and other things 
necessary to conduct said lectures and may designate some 
person to manage such lectures. 
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WYOMING 
Section 21-3-1}. Powers and duties of board generally. 
The district board shall make all contracts, purchases, 
payments and sales, necessary to carry out every vote of the 
district, for procuring any site for a schoolhouse, renting, 
repairing or furnishing the same, and disposing thereof, or 
for keeping a school therein, and performing such other 
duties as may be delegated to them by the district meeting. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Section 8-223. Powers of Board of Education, Mayor of Dis-
trict of Columbia, or National Park Service unabridged. 
No power or authority conferred by this chapter shall 
be construed to abridge the powers of the Board of Education, 
the Mayor of the District of Columbia, or the National Park 
Service to refuse the use of any ground, building, or fa-
cility under their individual or collective control whenever 
the use of any such ground, building, or facility for recre-
ational purposes would interfere with the use or purpose for 
which such ground, building, or facility was acquired or cre-
ated, and nothing herein expressed or implied shall be con-
strued to abrogate any powers vested in the Board of Education 
by the Organic Act of 1906 insofar as the control of public 
education and all necessary facilities and personnel is con-
cerned. 
Section 31-201. Control of school buildings; disposition of 
proceeds. 
(a) The control of the public schools in the District of 
Columbia by the Board of Education shall extend to include 
the negotiation and approval of use, license, and lease 
agreements, with or without monetary consideration, with 
respect to the use of public school buildings. and parts 
thereof and the grounds appurtenant thereto, und land in-
tended for such use, by or for any of the following: 
(1) Any agency or agencies of the District of Columbia govern-
ment, the United States government or any international organi-
zation; 
(2) Any person or organization providing an educational or 
recreational program involving students of the public schools, 
other children, youth, or adults; 
(3) Any person or organization providing a supplementary 
educational program; 
(4) Any person or organization conducting civic meetings 
for the free discussion of public questions; 
(5) Any person or organization operating a social center 
including, but not limited to, the following: 
(A) A pre-school center child development center, or day 
care center; 
(B) A health clinic or a counseling service; 
(C) A cocounity service program; 
(D) A co~munity-based consumer cooperative; or 
(E) A st~dio or workshop for instruction, display, per-
formance or promotion of the arts, or for other art-related 
purposes; 
(6) A playground or cePter for recreational activity; or 
( 7) Any o::her use which the Board of Education may deem to be 
compatible with the norrual use of the particular property and 
in the best interest of the local community, other than in-
dustrial uses, and which does not require major structural 
renovations at cost to the District of Columbia government to 
implement a particular agreement. 
(b) In the execution of subsection (a) of this section, pref-
erence shall be given to agencies of the District of Columbia 
government. 
(c) All rents, fees, and proceeds derived from the leases, 
licenses, or use agreements entered into pursuant to this 
act shall be paid to the Treasury of the District of Columbia, 
under regulations issued by the Mayor, and accounted for in 
the General Fund as a separate revenue source allocable to 
provide authority for the Board of Education to expend for the 
custody, cleaning, heating, air-conditioning, lighting, main-
tenance, security, and improvement of public school buidings 
and grounds, and the management of these leases, licenses, 
and use agreements. Any unobligated balance remaining 90 
days subsequent to the end of the fiscal year in which the 
revenues ~ere received shall be transferred by the Board of 
Education to the debt service fund to be applied toward the 
repayment of capital outlay loans and interest outstanding 
on public school buildings and grounds acquired and held for 
school purposes, pursuant to Section 1-105 over and above the 
amount ap?ropriated by the Congress of the United States to 
the District of Columbia for such purposes. 
(d) The authority of the Board of Education pursuant to this 
section shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the 
authority granted to the Board of Education by Section 31-106 
and by Sections 8-212, 8-223, and 8-224, insofar as these pro-
visions relate to the use of buildings and grounds under the 
control of the Board of Education. 
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(e) The Board of Education shall, in accordance with sub-
chapter 1 of Chapter 15 of Title 1, issue rules for the con-
sideration and review of applications for the use of public 
school buildings and grounds by lease or otherwise, pursuant 
to this section. Final approval of each lease, license, or 
use agreement entered into by the Board of Education pursuant 
to this act shall be reserved to the Board of Education which 
may delegate to the Superintendent any of its authority. 
